Friday, 30 January 2009
The paradox of Middle eastern conflicts!!
The crux winning of modern warfare in the Middle East today is that the blame goes not to the side that started the war or refuses to make peace but rather the one that has fewer casualties. Thus those unwilling to surrender to the opposition and indifferent to the costs of war will always be the victors.
Thursday, 29 January 2009
The First Middle East Constitution:
The terms of the Ottoman Constitution as put forward by Abdul Hamid II, and his advisers. An important document, especially for its repercussions on the late Ottoman Empire and the formation of Turkey as a state, where mistakes were taken into account.
BASIC LAW, 23 December 1876
The Territories of the Ottoman Empire
Art. 1: The Ottoman Empire comprises its present territories and privileged provinces, and as a single body, can never be divided for any reason.
Art. 2: The capital of the Ottoman Empire is the city of İstanbul; the said city has no privilege or exemption whatsoever setting it apart from other Ottoman cities.
Art. 3: The Imperial Ottoman Sultanate possesses the Great Islamic Caliphate, and is held, in accordance with ancient practice, by the eldest male member of the Ottoman dynasty.
Art. 4: His Imperial Majesty is the Protector of the religion of Islam, by virtue of the Caliphate, and the Ruler and Emperor of all Ottoman subjects.
Art. 5: The August Person of His Imperial Majesty is sacred and irresponsible.
Art. 6: The freedoms, goods, personal property, and, during their lifetimes, the revenues of the Ottoman dynasty are under public guarantee.
Art. 7: The sacred rights of His Imperial Majesty include: the dismissal and appointment of Ministers; the conferring of ranks and positions; the granting of decorations; the making of appointments to privileged provinces, in accordance with their privileges; the striking of coins; being mentioned in public prayer; the conclusion of treaties with foreign powers; the declaring of war and peace; the command of the land and naval forces; the execution of military operations and the provisions of the Şeriat and the law; the promulgation of regulations concerning the conduct of administrative departments; the reduction or commuting of legal penalties; the summoning and suspension of the Parliament, and in case of necessity, its dissolution, subject to the condition that fresh elections of Deputies be held.
General Rights of Ottoman Subjects
Art. 8: All subjects of the Ottoman Empire, regardless of religion or sect, are without exception deemed to be Ottomans; the status of Ottoman is obtained and lost in accordance with conditions specified by law.
Art. 9: All Ottomans possess their personal freedoms and are obliged not to violate the freedoms of others.
Art. 10: Personal freedom is inviolate from all forms of attack. No person may be punished on any pretext, except for the reasons and in the fashion laid down by law.
Art. 11: The religion of Islam is the religion of the Ottoman Empire. While this principle is protected, the freedom of all religions recognised in the Ottoman territories, and the validity, as in the past, of the religious privileges granted to various communities, are protected by the State, on condition that they do not disrupt the tranquillity of the population and public morals.
Art. 12: The Press is free within the limits of the law.
Art. 13: Ottoman subjects are permitted to form every kind of company for trade, industry and agriculture, within the limits of the regulations and the law.
Art. 14: One or more Ottoman subjects may petition the relevant authority concerning any matter which they see as violating the laws and regulations relating to themselves or to the public; they may also submit signed petitions to the Parliament, in its capacity as a prosecutor, and complain against the deeds of officials.
Art. 15: Instruction is free of let or hindrance. Every Ottoman is permitted to offer public and private instruction, on condition of conformity with the specific law.
Art. 16: All schools are under the superintendance of the State. Steps will be taken to ensure that the education of Ottcman subjects is marked by unity and order; there will be no infraction of the principles of instruction concerning the beliefs of the various religious communities.
Art. 17: All Ottomans are equal in the presence of the law, and, except in matters of religion and sect, in their civic rights and duties.
Art. 18: The employment of Ottoman subjects in the service of the State is conditional upon their knowing the official language of the State, Turkish.
Art. 19: In state service, all subjects may be granted suitable appointments, in accordance with their skills and abilities.
Art. 20: The established taxes, in accordance with the particular regulations, are imposed upon and distributed among all subjects, in proportion to the capability of each.
Art. 21: Everyone is assured of the goods and property of which he is the recognised possessor. Unless a necessity arising out of public interest is established, and unless compensation in accordance with the law is paid in advance, no-one's property may be taken.
Art. 22: Within the Ottoman territories every person's residence is inviolate. Except as provided by law, no-one's dwelling may be forcibly entered by the government, whatever the reason.
Art. 23: In accordance with a law which will be promulgated on the rules of trial, no person can be obliged to attend a court other than the one to which he is legally bound.
Art. 24: Arbitrary confiscation, corvée and arbitrary fines are prohibited. But taxes and impositions established in recognised fashion in wartime are excepted.
Art. 25: No money may be taken from any person, under the name of taxes and dues, or another name, except as provided by law.
Art. 26: Torture and every other form of ill treatment is categorically and totally prohibited.
The Ministers of the State
Art. 27: The posts of Grand Vizier and Şeyhülislam are conferred by His Imperial Majesty upon persons enjoying his confidence; similarly, the other Ministers are appointed by imperial İrade.
Art. 28: The Council of Ministers is convened under the presidency of the Grand Vizier and is the competent authority in important internal and external matters. Those decisions arising from its deliberations which require Imperial sanction are implemented by Imperial İrade.
Art. 29: Each Minister implements, in accordance with recognised practice, those matters pertaining to his department whose implementation falls within his authority; he submits to the Grand Vizier those matters whose implementation does not fall within his authority. The Grand Vizier implements those among the latter matters which do not require discussion, or else seeks the sanction of His Imperial Majesty; he submits those matters which require discussion to the Council of Ministers; in either case he implements the matter in accordance with Imperial İrade. The details of these matters will be defined in a special regulation.
Art. 30: The Ministers of the State are responsible for affairs and actions connected with their posts.
Art. 31: Should one or more Deputies make a complaint on a matter which lies within the competence of the Chamber of Deputies, and which invokes the responsibility of one of the Ministers of the State, then first of all, in accordance with the internal regulations of the Chamber of Deputies, a written statement of the complaint will be submitted to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, for examination by the section charged with discussing whether such matters should be referred to the Chamber; the President will send the statement within three days to the said section, which will conduct the necessary enquiries, and acquire sufficient explanations from the person complained against. Its decision, by majority, as to whether the complaint merits discussion, will be read out in the Chamber, and if necessary the person complained against will be summoned and interrogated, in person or indirectly. If the complaint is accepted by an absolute majority of two-thirds of the members present, a report requesting a trial will be presented to the Grand Vizier, and in accordance with the resulting Imperial İrade, the matter will be referred to the High Court.
Art. 32: The procedure for trying accused Ministers will be defined in a special law.
Art. 33: In all legal cases lying outside the sphere of their official responsibilities, and concerning purely themselves, there is no difference betreen the Ministers and other Ottoman individuals. Trials in such matters are held in the relevant public courts.
Art. 34: Ministers who have been charged with matters which it is decided fall within the competence of the High Court lose their positions until such time as they are acquitted.
Art. 35: If the Ministers insist upon a matter in which they are in dispute with the Chamber of Deputies, and if the Deputies, by a majority, and with a statement of their reasons, categorically and repeatedly refuse it, then it is within the sole authority of His Imperial Majesty to replace the Ministers, or else to dissolve the Chamber so that a new one may be appointed within the legal interval.
Art. 36: If, at a time when Parliament is not convened, there appears a compelling necessity to protect the state from danger or public tranquillity from disruption. and if the time is not suitable to summon and convene the Chamber to discuss a law deemed essential in this situation, decisions of the Council of Ministers, sanctioned by Imperial İrade, will have the force of provisional laws until such time as the Chamber of Deputies convenes to pronounce upon them, and provided that they are not contrary to the provisions of the Basic Law.
Art. 37: Every Minister, whenever he wishes, may attend the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, or send a senior official to represent him, and has a right of speech which takes priority over that of the members of the two chambers.
Art. 38: If a Minister is summoned to give explanations by a majority decision of the Chamber of Deputies, he will reply to questions either in person or by sending a senior official, and if seems necessary, he is entitled, on his own responsibility, to delay his answer.
The Officials
Art. 39: All officials will be appointed to posts within their competence and merit in accordance with conditions which will be defined by regulation. Officials thus appointed may not be dismissed or transferred unless conduct legally necessitating dismissal is proved, or they themselves resign, or compelling reason is perceived by the State. As will be defined by a special regulation, those of good behaviour and integrity and those who are retired by the State for a compelling reason will receive promotions, pensions and severance salaries.
Art. 40: As the duties of every post will be defined in a special regulation every official is responsible within the limits of his duty.
Art. 41: Although officials must show respect and regard for their superiors, their obedience is specific to the sphere determined by the law. Obedience to a superior offers no escape from responsibility in matters contrary to the lew.
Parliament
Art. 42: The Parliament comprises two separate chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.
Art. 43: The Parliament's two chambers meet annually at the beginning of November (O.S.), and are opened by Imperial İrade. They are closed, again by Imperial İrade, at the beginning of March (O.S.). Neither chamber may be convened when the other is not sitting.
Art. 44: His Imperial Majesty, should the State consider it necessary, may open the Parliament prematurely, and may shorten or extend the defined period of its meeting.
Art. 45: On the day of Parliament's opening, the inauguration ceremony is conducted in the presence of His Imperial Majesty, or, deputising for him, the Grand Vizier, and with the Ministers of the State and the current members of both chambers present. An Imperial Address will be read out, concerning the internal affairs and foreign relations of the state during the current year, and the measures and steps whose execution appears necessary in the following year.
Art. 46: Persons elected or appointed to the Parliament are, on the day of its opening, to be made to take an oath, in the presence of the Grand Vizier, to be loyal to His Imperial Majesty and the Fatherland, and to refrain from acts contrary to the provisions of the Basic Law and the duty conferred upon them; if not present on that day [they take the oath] in the presence of the Presidents [of the two bodies], the chamber of which they are a member being convened.
Art. 47: Members of Parliament are free to express their votes and opinions, and none may be obliged by any promise, threat or instruction Under no circumstance may they be exposed to indictment arising from their votes or from the opinions they have expressed in the course of discussion, even if they have acted contrary to the internal regulations of the Parliament. In the latter case they are dealt with in accordance with the said regulations.
Art. 48: If a member of Parliament is accused of treason, seeking to annul or abolish the Basic Law, or of an offence of corruption, he is judged by an absolute majority of two-thirds of the members present of the chamber of which he is a member; if he is legally condemned to a penalty necessitating imprisonment or exile, his status as a member is lost, and the judgement and punishment of his deeds is examined and decided upon by the relevant court.
Art. 49: Each member of the Parliament casts his vote in person, and each has the right to abstain from voting to reject or accept a matter under discussion.
Art. 50: No-one may be a member of both the aforementioned chambers at the same time.
Art. 51: Discussions may not begin in either of the two chambers of the Parliament unless one more than half the allotted members is present. All matters are decided by an absolute majority of the members present, excepting those where an absolute majority of two-thirds is specified. In the case of an equal division of votes, the President's vote counts as two.
Art. 52: If a person submits a petition concerning a claim on his own behalf to either of the two chambers of the Parliament, and if it is established that he has not previously referred to the officials of the State or to the department to which these officials are attached, the petition is to be rejected.
Art. 53: It is the prerogative of the Ministers to drew up new laws or to propose the amendment of an existing law. The Senators and the Deputies are empowered to request, in matters falling within their defined duties, the drawing up of laws or the amendment of an existing law: first of all, permission is sought from His Imperial Majesty through the Grand Vizier, and if a favourable Imperial İrade is granted, the drafting of bills, in accordance with explanations and information from the relevant departments, is passed to the Council of State.
Art. 54: Bills drafted after consideration by the Council of State, having been examined and accepted by the Deputies. and then by the Senate, and if their implementation is sanctioned by His Imperial Majesty's İrade, come into force. Should a bill be categorically rejected in one of these chambers, it may not be reconsidered during that year's session.
Art. 55: A bill is not accepted unless it has been read, clause by clause, first in the Chamber of Deputies and then in the Senate, each clause being voted upon and decided by a majority of votes, and after that, the bill in its entirety again being decided by a majority.
Art. 56: Under no circumstances may the Chambers receive and give a hearing to a person who has come to make a statement, whether on his own behalf or as the representative of a group, who is not a Minister, or Minister's representative, or a member of Parliament, or an official who has been formally invited.
Art. 57: The deliberations of the Chambers are conducted in the Turkish language, and copies of bills for discussion are printed and circulated to members in advance.
Art. 58: Votes in the Chambers may be taken by roll-call, special signs, or secret vote. The implementation of a secret vote depends upon a majority decision of the members present.
Art. 59: The internal discipline of each Chamber is maintained exclusively by its President.
The Senate
Art. 60: The President and members of the Senate are appointed directly by His Imperial Majesty, though their number must not exceed one third of the members of the Chamber of Deputies.
Art. 61: In order to be appointed a member of the Senate, it is necessary to be a person whose deeds inspire public trust and confidence, who has a record of praiseworthy service in affairs of the State, who is well known, and to be of an age no less than forty.
Art. 62: Membership of the Senate is for life. Members are appointed from among suitable persons who have formerly served as Ministers, Provincial Governors-General, Army Marshals, Kadıasker, Ambassadors, Patriarchs and Chief Rabbis, from among Army and Navy Generals, and other persons who possess the necessary attributes. Those who at their own request are appointed to other functions by the State forfeit their membership.
Art. 63: The salary of members of the Senate is 10.000 kuruş per month. Salaries received by members from the Treasury on other grounds will, if less than 10,000 kuruş, be raised to that sum; if 10,000 kuruş or more they will be maintained.
Art. 64: The Senate examines bills and budget proposals received from the Chamber of Deputies. Should, among the latter, there appear anything which fundamentally violates religion, the rights of His Imperial Majesty, liberty, the provisions of the basic Law, the territorial integrity of the State, the internal security of the country, the defence and protection of the Fatherland, or public morals, [the Senate], appending its opinion, returns it to the Chamber of Deputies, to be either categorically relected, or amended and corrected. It confirms bills it has accepted and submits them to the Grand Vizierate. Petitions submitted to the Senate are examined, and if necessary, presented to the Grand Vizierate with an appended opinion.
The Chamber of Deputies
Art. 65: The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies is determined on the basis of one member for every 50,000 males among Ottoman subjects.
Art. 66: Election is by secret ballot. Its form will be determined by a special law.
Art. 67: Membership of the Chamber of Deputies cannot be combined with a governmental office. However, Ministers who have secured election may be members, while other officials who secure election are free to accept or refuse. If they accept, however, they lose their government post.
Art. 68: The following are ineligible for election to the Chamber of Deputies. 1) Those who are not subjects of the Ottoman Empire; 2) Those, who in accordance with a special regulation, have been permitted to take temporary service with foreign powers; 3) Those who do not know Turkish; 4) Those under the age of thirty; 5) those who at the time of election are in private service; 5) Adjudged bankrupts who have not restored their creditworthiness; 6) Known bad characters; 7) Those under legal restraint whose restraint has not been lifted: 8) Those who have forfeited their civil rights; 9) Those who claim foreign nationality. Such persons cannot be members. At the elections to be held in four years' time it will also be obligatory to read and, as far as possible, to write Turkish.
Art. 69: General elections of deputies are held once every four years, and each deputy's term of office is four years, though re-election is permitted.
Art. 70: General elections of deputies must be held at least four months before the November in which the Chamber convenes.
Art. 71: Each member of the Chamber of Deputies is considered the representative, not merely of the constituency which elects him, but of all Ottomans.
Art. 72: Electors are obliged to elect Deputies from among the population of their constituency.
Art. 73: Should the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved by imperial İrade, fresh elections for all deputies will be commenced, so that they may convene within six months at most.
Art. 74: Should a member of the Chamber of Deputies die or fall under legal restraint, or absent himself from the Chamber for a lengthy period, or resign, or forfeit his membership as the result of legal condemnation or acceptance of an official post, another will be appointed in his place, in time, at the latest, to reach the next session.
Art. 75: The term of a member elected to a vacant deputy's post lasts until the next general elections.
Art. 76: Every deputy will be given by the Treasury, for each annual session, 20,000 kuruş, a monthly salary of 5,000 kuruş, and. in accordance with the civil service regulations, outward and return travel expenses.
Art. 77: The Chamber nominates, by a majority, three persons for its Presidency, and three each for its Second end Third Presidencies, making nine in all. They are submitted to his Imperial Majesty, and by Imperial İrade, one is preferred and appointed as President, and two as Vice-Presidents.
Art. 78: The discussions of the Chamber of Deputies are public. However, should it be proposed, by the Ministers or by 15 members of the Chamber of Deputies, to discuss an important matter in secret, the Chamber's meeting-place will be cleared of all but members, and the proposal will be accepted or rejected by a majority.
Art. 79: While the Chamber of Deputies is in session, no member may be arrested and tried, unless the Chamber itself decides by a majority that there are sufficient grounds for charges, or unless he is arrested during or after the commission of an offence or crime.
Art. 80: The Chamber of Deputies discusses the bills which are passed to it, rejects, accepts or amends those points which concern financial affairs and the Basic Law, and, in accordance with the Budget Law, examines public expenditures and decides upon them jointly with the Ministers, as, again with the Ministers, it determines the nature, quantity, distribution and raising of the corresponding revenues.
The Courts
Art. 81: In accordance with the specific law, Judges appointed by the State and possessed of Imperial Letters Patent cannot be removed. They may, however, resign. Judges' promotion, careers, transfers, retirements, and, should they be convicted of an offence, their dismissals, are governed by the specific law, and the same law indicates the requisite qualifications of judges and court officials.
Art. 82: All cases in the courts are conducted publicly, and judgements may be published. However, a court may conduct a case in secret for reasons specified in the law.
Art. 83: Everyone may, in the presence of the court, employ the legal means he judges necessary for the praservation of his rights.
Art. 84: A court may not, on any pretext, prevent the hearing of a case which lies within its jurisdiction, and once the hearing, or the preliminary enquries necessary for the hearing, have begun, it is impermissible to suspend or delay it, unless it has renounced the case. However, in cases entailing penalties, the rights of the government are enforced in accordance with the regulation.
Art. 85: Every case is tried in the relevant court. Cases between individuals and the government are tried in the public courts.
Art. 86: The courts are free from any interference.
Art. 87: Şeri cases are tried in the Şeri courts, and Nizami cases are tried in the Nizami courts.
Art. 88: The classes, duties and competences of the courts, and the allowances of judges, are defined in the law.
Art. 89: It is categorically not permitted to establish, under whatever name, an extraordinary court or commission empowered to deliver judgements outside the established courts, in order to try and judge special matters. But the appointment of guardians and arbitrators, as defined in the law, is permitted.
Art. 90: No judge may combine his position with another salaried State office.
Art. 91: Public Prosecutors will be appointed to protect public rights in criminal cases, and their duties and functions will be defined by law.
The High Court
Art. 92: The High Court is composed of thirty members. Ten each will be selected by ballot from among the presidents end members of the Senate, the Council of State and the Court of Appeal. [The Court] is convened, by imperial İrade, in the building of the Senate, whenever required. Its function is to try Ministers, Presidents and members of the Court of Appeal, and those who act against Imperial rights end bring the State into danger.
Art. 93: The High Court is divided into two: a bureau of accusation and a court of judgement. The Bureau of Accusation has nine members, selected by ballot from among three each of those members of the Senate, Council of State and Court of Appeal appointed to the High Court.
Art. 94: This Bureau decides by a two-thirds majority whether individuals against whom complaint has been made should be accused. Those in the Bureau of Accusation may not be in the Court of Judgement.
Art. 95: The Court of Judgement is composed of twenty-one persons, drawn, seven each from presidents and members of the Senate, the Court of Appeal and the Council of State. It passes judgement, by a two-thirds majority, and in accordance with the established laws, in cases whose trial has been judged necessary by the Bureau of Accusation. Its judgements cannot be appealed against.
Financial Affairs
Art. 96: State taxes may not be imposed, distributed and collected unless specified by law.
Art. 97: The State Budget is a law declaring estimates of revenues and expenditures. This law governs the imposition, distribution and collection of taxes.
Art. 95: The Budget Law is examined clause by clause and accepted in Parliament. Tables concerning the particulars of important revenues and expenditures are, in accordance with an exemplar defined by regulation, divided into sections, chapters and individual points, and are discussed one by one.
Art. 99: In order that the Budget Law may be applied within the year to which it refers, the bill is given to the Chamber of Deputies following the opening of Parliament.
Art. 100: Unless defined by a specific law, expenditures may not be made from State sources outside the budget.
Art. l0l: If, at a time when Parliament is not in session, it should prove, for extraordinary and compelling reasons, that there is a grave necessity to make expenditures not covered by the budget, the sums necessary to cover these expenditures may, upon submission to His Imperial Majesty and upon the issuing of an Imperial İrade, may be raised and expended, on the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, and on condition that a bill concerning the matter is submitted to Parliament after it has convened.
Art. 102: The Budget Law is valid for one year. Although it cannot be valid beyond that year, should, for some extraordinary reason, Parliament be dissolved before the budget is approved, the Ministers may, with the sanction of an Imperial İrade, extend the validity of the previous year's budget by decree, until the next session of Parliament, on condition that this extension does not exceed one year.
Art. 103: The Law of Final Accounts will reveal the true total of sums raised in revenue and disbursed as expenditures in any year, and its form and divisions will conform entirely to the Budget Law
Art. 104: The bill for the Law of Final Accounts is submitted to Parliament within four years at most from the end of the year it concerns.
Art. 105: A Court of Accounts will be set up to oversee the accounts of those charged with receiving and expending State resources, and to examine the annual accounts drawn up by government departments. Each year it will submit a statement of its findings and conclusions in a special report to Parliament. Once every three months, the Court will submit, through the Grand Vizier, a report on the state of the finances to His Imperial Majesty
Art. 106: The members of the Court of Accounts will be twelve persons, each of whom will be appointed by Imperial İrade, and will maintain his post for life, unless the necessity for his removal is confirmed by a majority of the Chamber of Deputies.
Art. 107: The details of the qualifications and duties of members of the Court of Accounts, the issues of their resignation, transfer, promotion and retirement, and the Court's sub-divisions, will be defined in a specific regulation.
The Provinces
Art. 108: The administration of the provinces is based upon the principles of the devolution of powers and the divisions of functions: the details will be defined in a specific regulation.
Art. !09: The form of election of the members of the Administrative Councils in the centres of the Provinces, Sub-Provinces and Kazas, and of the General Council which meets once a year in the Province’s centre, will be set forth in a special law.
Art. 110: The functions of the Provincial General Councils, as will be set forth in a specific law, will comprise the discussions of aspects of public works, such as the organisation of roads and passages, the formation of credit funds, and the facilitating of industry, commerce and agriculture, and also the dissemination of education among the public; they will also provide for the communication to the relevant authorities of matters concerning the violation of the provisions of the established laws and regulations concerning the apportionment and collection of taxes and other matters, with requests for their improvement
Art. 111: In each kaza there will be a Community Council for each millet, which will supervise the distribution to the rightful beneficiaries of the revenues of endowments in the form of houses, land and cash, in accordance with the terms of the endowment and ancient practice, and the distribution to the rightful legatees of revenues which have been left, in wills, for expenditure upon charitable purposes, and will also supervise the property of orphans in accordance with the specific regulation. These Councils will be composed of persons chosen from the millet in question in accordance with specific regulations which will be drawn up. These Councils will acknowledge the authority of the governmental authorities of their districts and of the Provincial General Councils
Art. 112: Municipal affairs nill be administered by Municipal Councils which will he established by election in the Capital and the provinces: the organisation and duties of these Municipal Councils, and the manner of election of their members, will be defined in a specific law.
Various Articles
Art. 113: Should, in any quarter of the country, there appear signs of an impending revolutionary outbreak, the Imperial government has the right to temporarily proclaim a state of siege specifically in that region. A state of siege entails the temporary suspension of the civil laws and regulations; the form of administration of a region under [a state of siege] will be defined in a specific regulation. It lies within the exclusive power of His Imperial Majesty to expel and exile from the Imperial Domains these who are proved by reliable police investigation to threaten the security of the government.
Art 114 The primary education of all Ottoman individuals will be compulsory; the detai!s of this will be defined in a specific regulation.
Art. 115: Not a single Article of the Basic Law may be suspended or waived on any grounds or pretext whatsoever.
Art. 116: Should the necessity for the changing or amendment of certain Articles of the Basic Law in accordance with circumstances become clear end absolute, it may be amended upon the following conditions: a proposal for such amendment having been made by the Council of Ministers, or the Senate, or the Chamber of Deputies, the amendment comes into force if, first of all, it is accepted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Chamber of Deputies, and then, having been confirmed likewise by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Senate, an imperial İrade is issued in that sense. An Article of the Basic Law whose amendment is proposed remains in force, losing none of its validity, until such time as, in the fashion explained, the necessary discussions have been completed and the imperial İrade has been issued.
Art. 117: Should any aspect of the law require interpretation. the definition of its meaning is settled, should it concern judicial matters, by the Court of Appeal; should it concern administrative matters, by the Council of State: and should it concern this Basic Law, by the Senate.
Art. 118: The regulations, practices and customs currently in force will remain so unless amended or abrogated by law or regulation in the future.
Art. 119: The Provisional Ordinance of 30 October 1876 concerning the Parliament is valid only until the end of the session of the Parliament which will meet for the first time.
The Territories of the Ottoman Empire
Art. 1: The Ottoman Empire comprises its present territories and privileged provinces, and as a single body, can never be divided for any reason.
Art. 2: The capital of the Ottoman Empire is the city of İstanbul; the said city has no privilege or exemption whatsoever setting it apart from other Ottoman cities.
Art. 3: The Imperial Ottoman Sultanate possesses the Great Islamic Caliphate, and is held, in accordance with ancient practice, by the eldest male member of the Ottoman dynasty.
Art. 4: His Imperial Majesty is the Protector of the religion of Islam, by virtue of the Caliphate, and the Ruler and Emperor of all Ottoman subjects.
Art. 5: The August Person of His Imperial Majesty is sacred and irresponsible.
Art. 6: The freedoms, goods, personal property, and, during their lifetimes, the revenues of the Ottoman dynasty are under public guarantee.
Art. 7: The sacred rights of His Imperial Majesty include: the dismissal and appointment of Ministers; the conferring of ranks and positions; the granting of decorations; the making of appointments to privileged provinces, in accordance with their privileges; the striking of coins; being mentioned in public prayer; the conclusion of treaties with foreign powers; the declaring of war and peace; the command of the land and naval forces; the execution of military operations and the provisions of the Şeriat and the law; the promulgation of regulations concerning the conduct of administrative departments; the reduction or commuting of legal penalties; the summoning and suspension of the Parliament, and in case of necessity, its dissolution, subject to the condition that fresh elections of Deputies be held.
General Rights of Ottoman Subjects
Art. 8: All subjects of the Ottoman Empire, regardless of religion or sect, are without exception deemed to be Ottomans; the status of Ottoman is obtained and lost in accordance with conditions specified by law.
Art. 9: All Ottomans possess their personal freedoms and are obliged not to violate the freedoms of others.
Art. 10: Personal freedom is inviolate from all forms of attack. No person may be punished on any pretext, except for the reasons and in the fashion laid down by law.
Art. 11: The religion of Islam is the religion of the Ottoman Empire. While this principle is protected, the freedom of all religions recognised in the Ottoman territories, and the validity, as in the past, of the religious privileges granted to various communities, are protected by the State, on condition that they do not disrupt the tranquillity of the population and public morals.
Art. 12: The Press is free within the limits of the law.
Art. 13: Ottoman subjects are permitted to form every kind of company for trade, industry and agriculture, within the limits of the regulations and the law.
Art. 14: One or more Ottoman subjects may petition the relevant authority concerning any matter which they see as violating the laws and regulations relating to themselves or to the public; they may also submit signed petitions to the Parliament, in its capacity as a prosecutor, and complain against the deeds of officials.
Art. 15: Instruction is free of let or hindrance. Every Ottoman is permitted to offer public and private instruction, on condition of conformity with the specific law.
Art. 16: All schools are under the superintendance of the State. Steps will be taken to ensure that the education of Ottcman subjects is marked by unity and order; there will be no infraction of the principles of instruction concerning the beliefs of the various religious communities.
Art. 17: All Ottomans are equal in the presence of the law, and, except in matters of religion and sect, in their civic rights and duties.
Art. 18: The employment of Ottoman subjects in the service of the State is conditional upon their knowing the official language of the State, Turkish.
Art. 19: In state service, all subjects may be granted suitable appointments, in accordance with their skills and abilities.
Art. 20: The established taxes, in accordance with the particular regulations, are imposed upon and distributed among all subjects, in proportion to the capability of each.
Art. 21: Everyone is assured of the goods and property of which he is the recognised possessor. Unless a necessity arising out of public interest is established, and unless compensation in accordance with the law is paid in advance, no-one's property may be taken.
Art. 22: Within the Ottoman territories every person's residence is inviolate. Except as provided by law, no-one's dwelling may be forcibly entered by the government, whatever the reason.
Art. 23: In accordance with a law which will be promulgated on the rules of trial, no person can be obliged to attend a court other than the one to which he is legally bound.
Art. 24: Arbitrary confiscation, corvée and arbitrary fines are prohibited. But taxes and impositions established in recognised fashion in wartime are excepted.
Art. 25: No money may be taken from any person, under the name of taxes and dues, or another name, except as provided by law.
Art. 26: Torture and every other form of ill treatment is categorically and totally prohibited.
The Ministers of the State
Art. 27: The posts of Grand Vizier and Şeyhülislam are conferred by His Imperial Majesty upon persons enjoying his confidence; similarly, the other Ministers are appointed by imperial İrade.
Art. 28: The Council of Ministers is convened under the presidency of the Grand Vizier and is the competent authority in important internal and external matters. Those decisions arising from its deliberations which require Imperial sanction are implemented by Imperial İrade.
Art. 29: Each Minister implements, in accordance with recognised practice, those matters pertaining to his department whose implementation falls within his authority; he submits to the Grand Vizier those matters whose implementation does not fall within his authority. The Grand Vizier implements those among the latter matters which do not require discussion, or else seeks the sanction of His Imperial Majesty; he submits those matters which require discussion to the Council of Ministers; in either case he implements the matter in accordance with Imperial İrade. The details of these matters will be defined in a special regulation.
Art. 30: The Ministers of the State are responsible for affairs and actions connected with their posts.
Art. 31: Should one or more Deputies make a complaint on a matter which lies within the competence of the Chamber of Deputies, and which invokes the responsibility of one of the Ministers of the State, then first of all, in accordance with the internal regulations of the Chamber of Deputies, a written statement of the complaint will be submitted to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, for examination by the section charged with discussing whether such matters should be referred to the Chamber; the President will send the statement within three days to the said section, which will conduct the necessary enquiries, and acquire sufficient explanations from the person complained against. Its decision, by majority, as to whether the complaint merits discussion, will be read out in the Chamber, and if necessary the person complained against will be summoned and interrogated, in person or indirectly. If the complaint is accepted by an absolute majority of two-thirds of the members present, a report requesting a trial will be presented to the Grand Vizier, and in accordance with the resulting Imperial İrade, the matter will be referred to the High Court.
Art. 32: The procedure for trying accused Ministers will be defined in a special law.
Art. 33: In all legal cases lying outside the sphere of their official responsibilities, and concerning purely themselves, there is no difference betreen the Ministers and other Ottoman individuals. Trials in such matters are held in the relevant public courts.
Art. 34: Ministers who have been charged with matters which it is decided fall within the competence of the High Court lose their positions until such time as they are acquitted.
Art. 35: If the Ministers insist upon a matter in which they are in dispute with the Chamber of Deputies, and if the Deputies, by a majority, and with a statement of their reasons, categorically and repeatedly refuse it, then it is within the sole authority of His Imperial Majesty to replace the Ministers, or else to dissolve the Chamber so that a new one may be appointed within the legal interval.
Art. 36: If, at a time when Parliament is not convened, there appears a compelling necessity to protect the state from danger or public tranquillity from disruption. and if the time is not suitable to summon and convene the Chamber to discuss a law deemed essential in this situation, decisions of the Council of Ministers, sanctioned by Imperial İrade, will have the force of provisional laws until such time as the Chamber of Deputies convenes to pronounce upon them, and provided that they are not contrary to the provisions of the Basic Law.
Art. 37: Every Minister, whenever he wishes, may attend the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, or send a senior official to represent him, and has a right of speech which takes priority over that of the members of the two chambers.
Art. 38: If a Minister is summoned to give explanations by a majority decision of the Chamber of Deputies, he will reply to questions either in person or by sending a senior official, and if seems necessary, he is entitled, on his own responsibility, to delay his answer.
The Officials
Art. 39: All officials will be appointed to posts within their competence and merit in accordance with conditions which will be defined by regulation. Officials thus appointed may not be dismissed or transferred unless conduct legally necessitating dismissal is proved, or they themselves resign, or compelling reason is perceived by the State. As will be defined by a special regulation, those of good behaviour and integrity and those who are retired by the State for a compelling reason will receive promotions, pensions and severance salaries.
Art. 40: As the duties of every post will be defined in a special regulation every official is responsible within the limits of his duty.
Art. 41: Although officials must show respect and regard for their superiors, their obedience is specific to the sphere determined by the law. Obedience to a superior offers no escape from responsibility in matters contrary to the lew.
Parliament
Art. 42: The Parliament comprises two separate chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.
Art. 43: The Parliament's two chambers meet annually at the beginning of November (O.S.), and are opened by Imperial İrade. They are closed, again by Imperial İrade, at the beginning of March (O.S.). Neither chamber may be convened when the other is not sitting.
Art. 44: His Imperial Majesty, should the State consider it necessary, may open the Parliament prematurely, and may shorten or extend the defined period of its meeting.
Art. 45: On the day of Parliament's opening, the inauguration ceremony is conducted in the presence of His Imperial Majesty, or, deputising for him, the Grand Vizier, and with the Ministers of the State and the current members of both chambers present. An Imperial Address will be read out, concerning the internal affairs and foreign relations of the state during the current year, and the measures and steps whose execution appears necessary in the following year.
Art. 46: Persons elected or appointed to the Parliament are, on the day of its opening, to be made to take an oath, in the presence of the Grand Vizier, to be loyal to His Imperial Majesty and the Fatherland, and to refrain from acts contrary to the provisions of the Basic Law and the duty conferred upon them; if not present on that day [they take the oath] in the presence of the Presidents [of the two bodies], the chamber of which they are a member being convened.
Art. 47: Members of Parliament are free to express their votes and opinions, and none may be obliged by any promise, threat or instruction Under no circumstance may they be exposed to indictment arising from their votes or from the opinions they have expressed in the course of discussion, even if they have acted contrary to the internal regulations of the Parliament. In the latter case they are dealt with in accordance with the said regulations.
Art. 48: If a member of Parliament is accused of treason, seeking to annul or abolish the Basic Law, or of an offence of corruption, he is judged by an absolute majority of two-thirds of the members present of the chamber of which he is a member; if he is legally condemned to a penalty necessitating imprisonment or exile, his status as a member is lost, and the judgement and punishment of his deeds is examined and decided upon by the relevant court.
Art. 49: Each member of the Parliament casts his vote in person, and each has the right to abstain from voting to reject or accept a matter under discussion.
Art. 50: No-one may be a member of both the aforementioned chambers at the same time.
Art. 51: Discussions may not begin in either of the two chambers of the Parliament unless one more than half the allotted members is present. All matters are decided by an absolute majority of the members present, excepting those where an absolute majority of two-thirds is specified. In the case of an equal division of votes, the President's vote counts as two.
Art. 52: If a person submits a petition concerning a claim on his own behalf to either of the two chambers of the Parliament, and if it is established that he has not previously referred to the officials of the State or to the department to which these officials are attached, the petition is to be rejected.
Art. 53: It is the prerogative of the Ministers to drew up new laws or to propose the amendment of an existing law. The Senators and the Deputies are empowered to request, in matters falling within their defined duties, the drawing up of laws or the amendment of an existing law: first of all, permission is sought from His Imperial Majesty through the Grand Vizier, and if a favourable Imperial İrade is granted, the drafting of bills, in accordance with explanations and information from the relevant departments, is passed to the Council of State.
Art. 54: Bills drafted after consideration by the Council of State, having been examined and accepted by the Deputies. and then by the Senate, and if their implementation is sanctioned by His Imperial Majesty's İrade, come into force. Should a bill be categorically rejected in one of these chambers, it may not be reconsidered during that year's session.
Art. 55: A bill is not accepted unless it has been read, clause by clause, first in the Chamber of Deputies and then in the Senate, each clause being voted upon and decided by a majority of votes, and after that, the bill in its entirety again being decided by a majority.
Art. 56: Under no circumstances may the Chambers receive and give a hearing to a person who has come to make a statement, whether on his own behalf or as the representative of a group, who is not a Minister, or Minister's representative, or a member of Parliament, or an official who has been formally invited.
Art. 57: The deliberations of the Chambers are conducted in the Turkish language, and copies of bills for discussion are printed and circulated to members in advance.
Art. 58: Votes in the Chambers may be taken by roll-call, special signs, or secret vote. The implementation of a secret vote depends upon a majority decision of the members present.
Art. 59: The internal discipline of each Chamber is maintained exclusively by its President.
The Senate
Art. 60: The President and members of the Senate are appointed directly by His Imperial Majesty, though their number must not exceed one third of the members of the Chamber of Deputies.
Art. 61: In order to be appointed a member of the Senate, it is necessary to be a person whose deeds inspire public trust and confidence, who has a record of praiseworthy service in affairs of the State, who is well known, and to be of an age no less than forty.
Art. 62: Membership of the Senate is for life. Members are appointed from among suitable persons who have formerly served as Ministers, Provincial Governors-General, Army Marshals, Kadıasker, Ambassadors, Patriarchs and Chief Rabbis, from among Army and Navy Generals, and other persons who possess the necessary attributes. Those who at their own request are appointed to other functions by the State forfeit their membership.
Art. 63: The salary of members of the Senate is 10.000 kuruş per month. Salaries received by members from the Treasury on other grounds will, if less than 10,000 kuruş, be raised to that sum; if 10,000 kuruş or more they will be maintained.
Art. 64: The Senate examines bills and budget proposals received from the Chamber of Deputies. Should, among the latter, there appear anything which fundamentally violates religion, the rights of His Imperial Majesty, liberty, the provisions of the basic Law, the territorial integrity of the State, the internal security of the country, the defence and protection of the Fatherland, or public morals, [the Senate], appending its opinion, returns it to the Chamber of Deputies, to be either categorically relected, or amended and corrected. It confirms bills it has accepted and submits them to the Grand Vizierate. Petitions submitted to the Senate are examined, and if necessary, presented to the Grand Vizierate with an appended opinion.
The Chamber of Deputies
Art. 65: The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies is determined on the basis of one member for every 50,000 males among Ottoman subjects.
Art. 66: Election is by secret ballot. Its form will be determined by a special law.
Art. 67: Membership of the Chamber of Deputies cannot be combined with a governmental office. However, Ministers who have secured election may be members, while other officials who secure election are free to accept or refuse. If they accept, however, they lose their government post.
Art. 68: The following are ineligible for election to the Chamber of Deputies. 1) Those who are not subjects of the Ottoman Empire; 2) Those, who in accordance with a special regulation, have been permitted to take temporary service with foreign powers; 3) Those who do not know Turkish; 4) Those under the age of thirty; 5) those who at the time of election are in private service; 5) Adjudged bankrupts who have not restored their creditworthiness; 6) Known bad characters; 7) Those under legal restraint whose restraint has not been lifted: 8) Those who have forfeited their civil rights; 9) Those who claim foreign nationality. Such persons cannot be members. At the elections to be held in four years' time it will also be obligatory to read and, as far as possible, to write Turkish.
Art. 69: General elections of deputies are held once every four years, and each deputy's term of office is four years, though re-election is permitted.
Art. 70: General elections of deputies must be held at least four months before the November in which the Chamber convenes.
Art. 71: Each member of the Chamber of Deputies is considered the representative, not merely of the constituency which elects him, but of all Ottomans.
Art. 72: Electors are obliged to elect Deputies from among the population of their constituency.
Art. 73: Should the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved by imperial İrade, fresh elections for all deputies will be commenced, so that they may convene within six months at most.
Art. 74: Should a member of the Chamber of Deputies die or fall under legal restraint, or absent himself from the Chamber for a lengthy period, or resign, or forfeit his membership as the result of legal condemnation or acceptance of an official post, another will be appointed in his place, in time, at the latest, to reach the next session.
Art. 75: The term of a member elected to a vacant deputy's post lasts until the next general elections.
Art. 76: Every deputy will be given by the Treasury, for each annual session, 20,000 kuruş, a monthly salary of 5,000 kuruş, and. in accordance with the civil service regulations, outward and return travel expenses.
Art. 77: The Chamber nominates, by a majority, three persons for its Presidency, and three each for its Second end Third Presidencies, making nine in all. They are submitted to his Imperial Majesty, and by Imperial İrade, one is preferred and appointed as President, and two as Vice-Presidents.
Art. 78: The discussions of the Chamber of Deputies are public. However, should it be proposed, by the Ministers or by 15 members of the Chamber of Deputies, to discuss an important matter in secret, the Chamber's meeting-place will be cleared of all but members, and the proposal will be accepted or rejected by a majority.
Art. 79: While the Chamber of Deputies is in session, no member may be arrested and tried, unless the Chamber itself decides by a majority that there are sufficient grounds for charges, or unless he is arrested during or after the commission of an offence or crime.
Art. 80: The Chamber of Deputies discusses the bills which are passed to it, rejects, accepts or amends those points which concern financial affairs and the Basic Law, and, in accordance with the Budget Law, examines public expenditures and decides upon them jointly with the Ministers, as, again with the Ministers, it determines the nature, quantity, distribution and raising of the corresponding revenues.
The Courts
Art. 81: In accordance with the specific law, Judges appointed by the State and possessed of Imperial Letters Patent cannot be removed. They may, however, resign. Judges' promotion, careers, transfers, retirements, and, should they be convicted of an offence, their dismissals, are governed by the specific law, and the same law indicates the requisite qualifications of judges and court officials.
Art. 82: All cases in the courts are conducted publicly, and judgements may be published. However, a court may conduct a case in secret for reasons specified in the law.
Art. 83: Everyone may, in the presence of the court, employ the legal means he judges necessary for the praservation of his rights.
Art. 84: A court may not, on any pretext, prevent the hearing of a case which lies within its jurisdiction, and once the hearing, or the preliminary enquries necessary for the hearing, have begun, it is impermissible to suspend or delay it, unless it has renounced the case. However, in cases entailing penalties, the rights of the government are enforced in accordance with the regulation.
Art. 85: Every case is tried in the relevant court. Cases between individuals and the government are tried in the public courts.
Art. 86: The courts are free from any interference.
Art. 87: Şeri cases are tried in the Şeri courts, and Nizami cases are tried in the Nizami courts.
Art. 88: The classes, duties and competences of the courts, and the allowances of judges, are defined in the law.
Art. 89: It is categorically not permitted to establish, under whatever name, an extraordinary court or commission empowered to deliver judgements outside the established courts, in order to try and judge special matters. But the appointment of guardians and arbitrators, as defined in the law, is permitted.
Art. 90: No judge may combine his position with another salaried State office.
Art. 91: Public Prosecutors will be appointed to protect public rights in criminal cases, and their duties and functions will be defined by law.
The High Court
Art. 92: The High Court is composed of thirty members. Ten each will be selected by ballot from among the presidents end members of the Senate, the Council of State and the Court of Appeal. [The Court] is convened, by imperial İrade, in the building of the Senate, whenever required. Its function is to try Ministers, Presidents and members of the Court of Appeal, and those who act against Imperial rights end bring the State into danger.
Art. 93: The High Court is divided into two: a bureau of accusation and a court of judgement. The Bureau of Accusation has nine members, selected by ballot from among three each of those members of the Senate, Council of State and Court of Appeal appointed to the High Court.
Art. 94: This Bureau decides by a two-thirds majority whether individuals against whom complaint has been made should be accused. Those in the Bureau of Accusation may not be in the Court of Judgement.
Art. 95: The Court of Judgement is composed of twenty-one persons, drawn, seven each from presidents and members of the Senate, the Court of Appeal and the Council of State. It passes judgement, by a two-thirds majority, and in accordance with the established laws, in cases whose trial has been judged necessary by the Bureau of Accusation. Its judgements cannot be appealed against.
Financial Affairs
Art. 96: State taxes may not be imposed, distributed and collected unless specified by law.
Art. 97: The State Budget is a law declaring estimates of revenues and expenditures. This law governs the imposition, distribution and collection of taxes.
Art. 95: The Budget Law is examined clause by clause and accepted in Parliament. Tables concerning the particulars of important revenues and expenditures are, in accordance with an exemplar defined by regulation, divided into sections, chapters and individual points, and are discussed one by one.
Art. 99: In order that the Budget Law may be applied within the year to which it refers, the bill is given to the Chamber of Deputies following the opening of Parliament.
Art. 100: Unless defined by a specific law, expenditures may not be made from State sources outside the budget.
Art. l0l: If, at a time when Parliament is not in session, it should prove, for extraordinary and compelling reasons, that there is a grave necessity to make expenditures not covered by the budget, the sums necessary to cover these expenditures may, upon submission to His Imperial Majesty and upon the issuing of an Imperial İrade, may be raised and expended, on the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, and on condition that a bill concerning the matter is submitted to Parliament after it has convened.
Art. 102: The Budget Law is valid for one year. Although it cannot be valid beyond that year, should, for some extraordinary reason, Parliament be dissolved before the budget is approved, the Ministers may, with the sanction of an Imperial İrade, extend the validity of the previous year's budget by decree, until the next session of Parliament, on condition that this extension does not exceed one year.
Art. 103: The Law of Final Accounts will reveal the true total of sums raised in revenue and disbursed as expenditures in any year, and its form and divisions will conform entirely to the Budget Law
Art. 104: The bill for the Law of Final Accounts is submitted to Parliament within four years at most from the end of the year it concerns.
Art. 105: A Court of Accounts will be set up to oversee the accounts of those charged with receiving and expending State resources, and to examine the annual accounts drawn up by government departments. Each year it will submit a statement of its findings and conclusions in a special report to Parliament. Once every three months, the Court will submit, through the Grand Vizier, a report on the state of the finances to His Imperial Majesty
Art. 106: The members of the Court of Accounts will be twelve persons, each of whom will be appointed by Imperial İrade, and will maintain his post for life, unless the necessity for his removal is confirmed by a majority of the Chamber of Deputies.
Art. 107: The details of the qualifications and duties of members of the Court of Accounts, the issues of their resignation, transfer, promotion and retirement, and the Court's sub-divisions, will be defined in a specific regulation.
The Provinces
Art. 108: The administration of the provinces is based upon the principles of the devolution of powers and the divisions of functions: the details will be defined in a specific regulation.
Art. !09: The form of election of the members of the Administrative Councils in the centres of the Provinces, Sub-Provinces and Kazas, and of the General Council which meets once a year in the Province’s centre, will be set forth in a special law.
Art. 110: The functions of the Provincial General Councils, as will be set forth in a specific law, will comprise the discussions of aspects of public works, such as the organisation of roads and passages, the formation of credit funds, and the facilitating of industry, commerce and agriculture, and also the dissemination of education among the public; they will also provide for the communication to the relevant authorities of matters concerning the violation of the provisions of the established laws and regulations concerning the apportionment and collection of taxes and other matters, with requests for their improvement
Art. 111: In each kaza there will be a Community Council for each millet, which will supervise the distribution to the rightful beneficiaries of the revenues of endowments in the form of houses, land and cash, in accordance with the terms of the endowment and ancient practice, and the distribution to the rightful legatees of revenues which have been left, in wills, for expenditure upon charitable purposes, and will also supervise the property of orphans in accordance with the specific regulation. These Councils will be composed of persons chosen from the millet in question in accordance with specific regulations which will be drawn up. These Councils will acknowledge the authority of the governmental authorities of their districts and of the Provincial General Councils
Art. 112: Municipal affairs nill be administered by Municipal Councils which will he established by election in the Capital and the provinces: the organisation and duties of these Municipal Councils, and the manner of election of their members, will be defined in a specific law.
Various Articles
Art. 113: Should, in any quarter of the country, there appear signs of an impending revolutionary outbreak, the Imperial government has the right to temporarily proclaim a state of siege specifically in that region. A state of siege entails the temporary suspension of the civil laws and regulations; the form of administration of a region under [a state of siege] will be defined in a specific regulation. It lies within the exclusive power of His Imperial Majesty to expel and exile from the Imperial Domains these who are proved by reliable police investigation to threaten the security of the government.
Art 114 The primary education of all Ottoman individuals will be compulsory; the detai!s of this will be defined in a specific regulation.
Art. 115: Not a single Article of the Basic Law may be suspended or waived on any grounds or pretext whatsoever.
Art. 116: Should the necessity for the changing or amendment of certain Articles of the Basic Law in accordance with circumstances become clear end absolute, it may be amended upon the following conditions: a proposal for such amendment having been made by the Council of Ministers, or the Senate, or the Chamber of Deputies, the amendment comes into force if, first of all, it is accepted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Chamber of Deputies, and then, having been confirmed likewise by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Senate, an imperial İrade is issued in that sense. An Article of the Basic Law whose amendment is proposed remains in force, losing none of its validity, until such time as, in the fashion explained, the necessary discussions have been completed and the imperial İrade has been issued.
Art. 117: Should any aspect of the law require interpretation. the definition of its meaning is settled, should it concern judicial matters, by the Court of Appeal; should it concern administrative matters, by the Council of State: and should it concern this Basic Law, by the Senate.
Art. 118: The regulations, practices and customs currently in force will remain so unless amended or abrogated by law or regulation in the future.
Art. 119: The Provisional Ordinance of 30 October 1876 concerning the Parliament is valid only until the end of the session of the Parliament which will meet for the first time.
The Sunni Jihad in the Contemporary World.
The jihadi tendency in contemporary Sunni Islamic activism has come to prominence in three distinct contexts and has been guided by three distinct strategic visions:
The resort to jihad in the sense of the armed defence of the umma was a salient feature of the relationship between the Muslim world and the West at both the onset and close of the colonial era, as well as during the centuries that preceded it. Resistance to colonial conquest often assumed the explicit form of jihad, notably in Algeria, Libya and the Sudan. The ending of colonial rule was not always a violent affair. In so far as modernist and secular ideologies entered into and complicated Muslim nationalists' conception of their struggle, this was not necessarily conceived as a jihad in the traditional sense even where it assumed a primarily military form. Since the provisional resolution of the political conflict between Western powers and the Muslim world at the end of the colonial era in the 1950s and early 1960s, the revival of the jihadi current with Sunni Islamic activism has occurred slowly and in a complex process which has exhibited four main -- if overlapping -- stages:
Qutb was executed in 1966 before he could specify precisely how this jihad was to be conducted, much less organise and lead it himself, but a violent jihadi tendency began to manifest itself on the radical fringe of Egyptian Islamic activism in the mid-1970s. One striking feature of its outlook was the centrality of the Palestinian question. The failure of successive Egyptian governments to secure a resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict in the latter's favour -- notably the military débacle under Nasser in June 1967 but also Sadat's choice of a separate peace in 1978 -- was attributed to their un-Islamic character. The jihadis argued that in order to defeat "the further enemy" (Israel) it was first necessary to deal with "the nearer enemy", the infidel Egyptian state.
A second key feature was the doctrinal innovation that posited jihad as an individual obligation (fard 'ayn) incumbent on each Muslim, in opposition to the traditional conception of it as a collective duty (fard kifaya). It is likely these two features were historically linked, that the doctrinal innovation authorising individual Muslims to take jihad into their own hands arose, in part, precisely because the Egyptian state had signalled that it was no longer in the business of conducting jihad as a collective duty. This was the outlook of Tanzim al-Jihad ("the Jihad Organisation"), the group which assassinated Sadat in October 1981 and waged a campaign of killings and bombings in Egypt between 1981 and 1997. The same outlook was broadly shared by a separate organization, al-Jama'a al-islamiyya ("the Islamic Group"), which conducted a parallel campaign between 1992 and 1997.
Between the crystallisation of Egyptian jihadi ideology around 1980 and the dramatic intensification of the insurgency in the 1990s, however, the second stage of the development of jihadi activism had occurred with the war in Afghanistan. In doctrinal terms, this was a simpler and arguably quite traditional affair, in that the Soviet invasion in December 1979 was naturally perceived as the conquest of a Muslim country by a non-Muslim (indeed atheistic) power. As such it was possible for the least radical, most conservative, tendencies in Sunni Islam to be mobilised by the call to jihad. It was in fact Sunni Muslims from the Arabian peninsular, most if not all of a Salafi outlook, who furnished the main element of the Arab fighters who flocked to Peshawar throughout the 1980s, although North Africans (especially Egyptians and Algerians) were also well represented. While the Afghan jihad did not involve any radicalisation in doctrine, it had a radicalising effect, in three respects:
The ideology of al-Qaeda is not a simple affair, and it is a serious mistake to reduce it to Wahhabism. To do so is to ignore the extent to which al-Qaeda broke with the traditional geo-political outlook of Wahhabism, which had never entered into politico-military opposition to the West and was indeed in alliance with the U.S. from 1945 onwards. Far from being a straightforward product of the Wahhabi tradition, al-Qaeda's jihad is in part rather the product of the crisis and fracturing of Wahhabism and of its relationships both to the Saudi royal family and to the U.S. since the early 1990s. To focus exclusively on the Wahhabi roots of al-Qaeda is also to ignore the crucial role of Egyptian radicalism, mediated by bin Laden's lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the eventual leader of Tanzim al-Jihad, in determining the movement's vision and strategy. These exhibit the following key features:
The first lumps all forms of violent Islamic activism together as a single phenomenon, problem, threat and target: "terrorism". Quite apart from the problem of establishing a definition of terrorism on which all potential supporters of the "war against terrorism" might agree, and the difficulty (for example) of situating the Palestinian movement Hamas in this category, the main drawback is the failure to take account of the single most important feature differentiating the global jihad from both the internal and irredentist jihads -- the fact that it has no clear-cut, intelligible and in principle attainable objective.
The internal jihad has posited objectives -- the revolutionary overthrow of impious regimes and the constitution of properly Islamic states -- which the Iranian experience demonstrated to be, at least under certain conditions, theoretically attainable. Equally, irredentist jihads by their very nature posit what are in principle specific, measurable and attainable ends: the liberation from non-Muslim rule of the territories in question. The global jihad instigated by al-Qaeda is another matter. While its discourse intermittently invokes the desirability of re-establishing the political unity of the Muslim world under a restored Caliphate, little or no thought has been given to how this might actually be done or to defining other, more easily realisable, political objectives at the global level. As a result, it tends to feed on local, primarily irredentist but also occasionally internal, struggles in the Muslim world and on the emergence of identity politics among disaffected elements of the Muslim populations in the West, in Europe above all. Likewise, it tends to retreat from or at least qualify its global political objectives and ambitions.
The second declares respect for Islam as a religion of peace and suggests by implication that Islamic activism in general is un-Islamic, a perverse exploitation of religion for political ends, and that jihadi activism in particular -- conceived as merely the extremist end of the Islamist spectrum -- is simply evil. But while it is rooted in the understandable concern of Western governments to make clear that "the war against terrorism" is not a war of religion, this approach renders jihadi activism inexplicable in terms of cause and effect. However reassuring to certain (mainly Western) audiences, this discourse is wholly inappropriate to prosecuting, let alone winning, the battle of ideas in the Muslim world, for two reasons.
First, since Islam is above all a religion of law, all forms of Islamic activism -- including the government-sponsored activism of "official Islam" -- are naturally political to a degree. Secondly, to suggest that Islam is a religion of peace that has been "hijacked" by jihadis is in effect to imply that jihad has no place in the Islamic tradition, whereas it has a very clear and time-honoured -- but also rule-bound -- place. For the U.S. president or the British prime minister to deny this is for them to claim to be the arbiters of what true Islam is, a remarkable claim by any standard, and one which ensures that official Western discourse can have little or no purchase on the reflexes of the populations of the Muslim world.
What is at issue in key debates in the Muslim world since the rise of al-Qaeda is whether particular conceptions of jihad are licit in terms of Islamic law. By suggesting that all jihadis are inexplicably evil, by equating all forms of armed struggle with "terrorism" and by denying that any jihad can be licit, Western policy-makers send the clear message that such discussions are futile and can have no effect whatsoever on their policies, thereby undermining a crucial debate. The danger is that, in doing so, the West may convert "the war against terrorism" into precisely what it claims it is not, a war against Islam -- that is, to make a gift of the defence of Islam to the extreme, global variety of jihadism exemplified by al-Qaeda, at the expense of all non-jihadi varieties of Islamic activism, including those of friendly Muslim governments and modernist and democratically inclined Islamic political movements.
To brand all armed struggle by Muslims -- even that arising out of opposition to foreign occupation -- as terrorism is to strengthen the arguments of al-Qaeda that the problem is "the further enemy", i.e., the U.S. and its allies, with whom it is useless to argue or try to negotiate and who only understand the language of brute force.
- internal: the jihad against nominally Muslim regimes which the jihadis hold to be "impious" and thus licit targets for subversion (Egypt, Algeria, etc.); this variant of jihad has a problematical relationship to Sunni political doctrine and has clearly proved a failure in Egypt and Algeria to date;
- irredentist: the struggle to redeem land considered to be part of Dar al-Islam from non-Muslim rule or occupation (Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Mindanao and above all Palestine). This type of struggle is sometimes the object of rivalry between nationalist forces, who may not conceive of it as a jihad at all (notably in the Palestinian case) and Islamist forces and, within the latter, between 'local' and 'international' elements, e.g. the distinction between the Afghan mujahidin and the "Arab" forces which flocked to their struggle in the 1980s; similar complexities have been discernible in other irredentist conflicts, notably Bosnia 1992-1996, Mindanao and now Iraq.
- global: the new jihad against the West, or more specifically against the United States and its allies (first among the latter, Israel) pioneered since 1998 by al-Qaeda but now also conducted by autonomous networks benefiting from al-Qaeda's endorsement.
The resort to jihad in the sense of the armed defence of the umma was a salient feature of the relationship between the Muslim world and the West at both the onset and close of the colonial era, as well as during the centuries that preceded it. Resistance to colonial conquest often assumed the explicit form of jihad, notably in Algeria, Libya and the Sudan. The ending of colonial rule was not always a violent affair. In so far as modernist and secular ideologies entered into and complicated Muslim nationalists' conception of their struggle, this was not necessarily conceived as a jihad in the traditional sense even where it assumed a primarily military form. Since the provisional resolution of the political conflict between Western powers and the Muslim world at the end of the colonial era in the 1950s and early 1960s, the revival of the jihadi current with Sunni Islamic activism has occurred slowly and in a complex process which has exhibited four main -- if overlapping -- stages:
- the emergence of a doctrinaire jihadi tendency in Egypt in the 1970s and 1980s based on the radical thought of Sayyid Qutb and especially the concept of takfir;
- the mobilisation of jihadi energies across the Muslim world for the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet presence and the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul (1979-1989);
- the protracted but unsuccessful insurgencies against allegedly un-Islamic regimes, notably in Algeria (since 1991) and Egypt (to 1997); and
- the jihad launched by al-Qaeda against the West since the late 1990s.
Qutb was executed in 1966 before he could specify precisely how this jihad was to be conducted, much less organise and lead it himself, but a violent jihadi tendency began to manifest itself on the radical fringe of Egyptian Islamic activism in the mid-1970s. One striking feature of its outlook was the centrality of the Palestinian question. The failure of successive Egyptian governments to secure a resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict in the latter's favour -- notably the military débacle under Nasser in June 1967 but also Sadat's choice of a separate peace in 1978 -- was attributed to their un-Islamic character. The jihadis argued that in order to defeat "the further enemy" (Israel) it was first necessary to deal with "the nearer enemy", the infidel Egyptian state.
A second key feature was the doctrinal innovation that posited jihad as an individual obligation (fard 'ayn) incumbent on each Muslim, in opposition to the traditional conception of it as a collective duty (fard kifaya). It is likely these two features were historically linked, that the doctrinal innovation authorising individual Muslims to take jihad into their own hands arose, in part, precisely because the Egyptian state had signalled that it was no longer in the business of conducting jihad as a collective duty. This was the outlook of Tanzim al-Jihad ("the Jihad Organisation"), the group which assassinated Sadat in October 1981 and waged a campaign of killings and bombings in Egypt between 1981 and 1997. The same outlook was broadly shared by a separate organization, al-Jama'a al-islamiyya ("the Islamic Group"), which conducted a parallel campaign between 1992 and 1997.
Between the crystallisation of Egyptian jihadi ideology around 1980 and the dramatic intensification of the insurgency in the 1990s, however, the second stage of the development of jihadi activism had occurred with the war in Afghanistan. In doctrinal terms, this was a simpler and arguably quite traditional affair, in that the Soviet invasion in December 1979 was naturally perceived as the conquest of a Muslim country by a non-Muslim (indeed atheistic) power. As such it was possible for the least radical, most conservative, tendencies in Sunni Islam to be mobilised by the call to jihad. It was in fact Sunni Muslims from the Arabian peninsular, most if not all of a Salafi outlook, who furnished the main element of the Arab fighters who flocked to Peshawar throughout the 1980s, although North Africans (especially Egyptians and Algerians) were also well represented. While the Afghan jihad did not involve any radicalisation in doctrine, it had a radicalising effect, in three respects:
- its intoxicating success in precipitating the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 laid the basis for belief in the efficacy of jihad, even against a superpower;
- it was a life-changing experience for participants, presenting surviving veterans with major problems of social reinsertion in their countries of origin; and
- it facilitated the formation of an international network of jihadis from Morocco to the Philippines, and thus established the nucleus of what has since become known as al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya, the jihadi wing of the Salafiyya movement.
The ideology of al-Qaeda is not a simple affair, and it is a serious mistake to reduce it to Wahhabism. To do so is to ignore the extent to which al-Qaeda broke with the traditional geo-political outlook of Wahhabism, which had never entered into politico-military opposition to the West and was indeed in alliance with the U.S. from 1945 onwards. Far from being a straightforward product of the Wahhabi tradition, al-Qaeda's jihad is in part rather the product of the crisis and fracturing of Wahhabism and of its relationships both to the Saudi royal family and to the U.S. since the early 1990s. To focus exclusively on the Wahhabi roots of al-Qaeda is also to ignore the crucial role of Egyptian radicalism, mediated by bin Laden's lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the eventual leader of Tanzim al-Jihad, in determining the movement's vision and strategy. These exhibit the following key features:
- the reorientation of the traditionalist, Salafi, conception of jihad from an alliance with the West (notably against Soviet Communism but also against secular Arab nationalism) to a frontal antagonism with its former Western sponsors;
- the reorientation of takfiri jihadi energies from "the nearer enemy" (local, insufficiently Muslim, regimes) to "the further enemy" (Israel and especially the U.S. as Israel's principal sponsor, but also other Western states allied to the U.S.);
- the recycling of the traditional Wahhabi (and latter-day Salafi) vision of Christians and Jews as infidels to be combated, as opposed to earlier (notably Ottoman) conceptions of them as "People of the Book" -- Ahl al-Kitab -- to be tolerated and protected;
- the strategic reorientation of jihad from a single, geographically limited, terrain to the global level; and
- the tactical reorientation from popular-based guerrilla warfare (as practiced notably by the mujahidin in Afghanistan) to highly elitist urban terrorism (the hallmark of Tanzim al-Jihad's insurgency in Egypt between 1981 and 1997).
The first lumps all forms of violent Islamic activism together as a single phenomenon, problem, threat and target: "terrorism". Quite apart from the problem of establishing a definition of terrorism on which all potential supporters of the "war against terrorism" might agree, and the difficulty (for example) of situating the Palestinian movement Hamas in this category, the main drawback is the failure to take account of the single most important feature differentiating the global jihad from both the internal and irredentist jihads -- the fact that it has no clear-cut, intelligible and in principle attainable objective.
The internal jihad has posited objectives -- the revolutionary overthrow of impious regimes and the constitution of properly Islamic states -- which the Iranian experience demonstrated to be, at least under certain conditions, theoretically attainable. Equally, irredentist jihads by their very nature posit what are in principle specific, measurable and attainable ends: the liberation from non-Muslim rule of the territories in question. The global jihad instigated by al-Qaeda is another matter. While its discourse intermittently invokes the desirability of re-establishing the political unity of the Muslim world under a restored Caliphate, little or no thought has been given to how this might actually be done or to defining other, more easily realisable, political objectives at the global level. As a result, it tends to feed on local, primarily irredentist but also occasionally internal, struggles in the Muslim world and on the emergence of identity politics among disaffected elements of the Muslim populations in the West, in Europe above all. Likewise, it tends to retreat from or at least qualify its global political objectives and ambitions.
The second declares respect for Islam as a religion of peace and suggests by implication that Islamic activism in general is un-Islamic, a perverse exploitation of religion for political ends, and that jihadi activism in particular -- conceived as merely the extremist end of the Islamist spectrum -- is simply evil. But while it is rooted in the understandable concern of Western governments to make clear that "the war against terrorism" is not a war of religion, this approach renders jihadi activism inexplicable in terms of cause and effect. However reassuring to certain (mainly Western) audiences, this discourse is wholly inappropriate to prosecuting, let alone winning, the battle of ideas in the Muslim world, for two reasons.
First, since Islam is above all a religion of law, all forms of Islamic activism -- including the government-sponsored activism of "official Islam" -- are naturally political to a degree. Secondly, to suggest that Islam is a religion of peace that has been "hijacked" by jihadis is in effect to imply that jihad has no place in the Islamic tradition, whereas it has a very clear and time-honoured -- but also rule-bound -- place. For the U.S. president or the British prime minister to deny this is for them to claim to be the arbiters of what true Islam is, a remarkable claim by any standard, and one which ensures that official Western discourse can have little or no purchase on the reflexes of the populations of the Muslim world.
What is at issue in key debates in the Muslim world since the rise of al-Qaeda is whether particular conceptions of jihad are licit in terms of Islamic law. By suggesting that all jihadis are inexplicably evil, by equating all forms of armed struggle with "terrorism" and by denying that any jihad can be licit, Western policy-makers send the clear message that such discussions are futile and can have no effect whatsoever on their policies, thereby undermining a crucial debate. The danger is that, in doing so, the West may convert "the war against terrorism" into precisely what it claims it is not, a war against Islam -- that is, to make a gift of the defence of Islam to the extreme, global variety of jihadism exemplified by al-Qaeda, at the expense of all non-jihadi varieties of Islamic activism, including those of friendly Muslim governments and modernist and democratically inclined Islamic political movements.
To brand all armed struggle by Muslims -- even that arising out of opposition to foreign occupation -- as terrorism is to strengthen the arguments of al-Qaeda that the problem is "the further enemy", i.e., the U.S. and its allies, with whom it is useless to argue or try to negotiate and who only understand the language of brute force.
Wednesday, 28 January 2009
Islamist contradictions. A few points.
• The first argument holds that Islamic fundamentalism, whatever its past, has entered upon an evolution, and has already started to reconcile Islam with democratic values.
As one academic apologist claims:
Many Islamic activists have "Islamized" parliamentary democracy, asserting an Islamic rationale for it, and appeal to democracy in their opposition to incumbent regimes.
• The distortion here does not lie in the claim of compatibility between Islam and democracy. Although the dominant interpretation of Islam has historically sanctioned authoritarian rule, the reinterpretation of Islamic sources, done with enough imagination, could conceivably produce an opposing argument for Islamic democracy.
• Here and there, intrepid Muslims have searched the divine word of the Qur'an, the traditions of the Prophet, and the early history of Islam in order to establish the democratic essence of Islam, buried deep beneath the chronicles of despotism.
• But these are not the Muslims leading the fundamentalist movements now bidding for power. Fundamentalists insist they have not demanded free elections to promote democracy or the individual freedoms that underpin it, but to promote Islam.
• Indeed, when leading fundamentalist thinkers do address the broader question of democracy, it is not to argue its compatibility with Islam but to demonstrate democracy's inferiority to Islamic government. Such a virtuous government, they affirm, can rest only on obedience to the divinely-given law of Islam, the shari'a.
• A deception lurks in any description of the fundamentalists as being committed to the rule of law, for the shari'a is not legislated but revealed law
• As such, in the eyes of the fundamentalists it has already achieved perfection, and while it is not above some reinterpretation, neither is it infinitely elastic. If anything, fundamentalist exegesis has rejected reformist attempts to stretch the law much beyond its letter, and has even magnified the differences between Islamic and universal law.
• At the heart of these differences reside Islamic law's principled affirmations of inequality, primarily between Muslims and non-Muslims, secondarily between men and women.
• This has made fundamentalists into the most unyielding critics of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees the freedom to choose one's religion and one's spouse. Both freedoms indisputably contradict Islamic law, which defines conversion out of Islam as a capital offense, and forbids marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man.
• (In 1981, the leading fundamentalists met in Paris and put out an Islamic Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which omits all freedoms that contradict the shari'a.)
• The shari'a, as a perfect law, cannot be abrogated or altered, and certainly not by the shifting moods of an electorate. Accordingly, every major fundamentalist thinker had repudiated popular sovereignty as rebellion against God, the sole legislator
• In the changed circumstances of the 1990s, some activists do allow that an election can serve a useful one-time purpose, as a collective referendum of allegiance to Islam, and as an act of submission to a regime of divine justice. But once such a regime gains power, its true measure is not how effectively it implements the will of the people but how efficiently it applies Islamic law
• The ideal of Islamic government most often evoked by the fundamentalists harks back to the rule of a just commander, ruling in consultation with experts in the law.
• There is a revulsion against the combat of parties and personalities in democratic politics, best expressed by the Sudan's Turabi, fundamentalism best-known spokesman in the West. In a tract on the Islamic state, Turabi explains that such a state, once established, really has no need of party politics or political campaigns
• While Islamic law does not expressly oppose a multi-party system,
• this is a form of factionalism that can be very oppressive of individual freedom and divisive of the community, and it is therefore, antithetical to a Muslim's ultimate responsibility to God
• As for election campaigns:
• In Islam, no one is entitled to conduct a campaign for themselves directly or indirectly in the manner of Western electoral campaigns. The presentation of candidates would be entrusted to a neutral institution that would explain to the people the options offered in policies and personalities.
• Through this elaborate hedging, Turabi arrives at a tacit justification for one-party rule, which is the actual form of government he now justifies and supports in the Sudan.
• Of the vast complex of democratic values and institutions offered by the West, the fundamentalists have thus seized upon only one, the free plebiscite, and even that is to be discarded after successful one-time use.
• When asked which existing regime most closely approximates an ideal Islamic order, fundamentalists most often cite the governments of the Sudan or Iran — the first a military regime, the second a hierocracy ruled by an increasingly autocratic cleric, and both first-order violators of human rights.
• The second argument holds that Islamic fundamentalism drives many movements and represents a wide spectrum of views, not all of them extreme.
• This claim for the diversity of fundamentalist movements — again labelled expectantly as movements of "reform" — is most convincingly countered by the fundamentalists themselves, with their uncanny knack for refuting every Western argument made on their behalf
• The awakening of Islam, he said, has produced a world movement notable for its uniformity. If there appear to be differences, it is because "God in His wisdom is varying and distributing the phenomenon to let people know that it is coming everywhere at all times
• The leading fundamentalists insist that their movement is pan-Islamic as a matter of principle
• The greatest success of their joint efforts has been the aid they collectively mobilized for the Afghan mujahidin during the 1980s — aid that included money, material, and thousands of volunteers who fought in the Islamic jihad against the Soviet occupation
• The Sudan has run Algerian voting data through its computers for the FIS, it has provided diplomatic passports for foreign fundamentalists, and it has brought the foremost fundamentalists to Khartoum to create an Islamic Arab Popular Conference, of which Turabi is secretary. Iran is still more active, and not only continues to finance Hizbullah in Lebanon, but includes a line item in its budget for support of the Palestinian Intifada — monies which have gone largely to fundamentalists who battle the peace process. Visitors to Khartoum and Tehran are astonished at the odd mix of foreign fundamentalists who can be spotted in hotel lobbies and government ministries.
• The apologists, preoccupied with imaginary changes in the substance of the fundamentalist message, overlook perhaps the most important transformation of all: the emergence of a global village of Islamic fundamentalism
• Once in power, promises another Western apologist, fundamentalists will
• generally operate on the basis of national interests and demonstrate a flexibility that reflects acceptance of the realities of a globally interdependent world.
• But where their apologists see an interdependent world, the fundamentalists themselves see a starkly divided world. During the Gulf crisis, they championed the view that any partnership between believers and nonbelievers constituted a violation of divine order. Therefore, while Saddam may have done wrong when he invaded Kuwait, King Fahd, who depended on American "Crusaders" to defend Saudi Arabia, most certainly sinned
• Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, official spokesman of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, announced that "Islamic law does not permit any enlisting of assistance from polytheists [mushrikun]." According to Rashid al-Ghannushi, the exiled leader of the Tunisian fundamentalist movement, Saudi Arabia had committed a colossal crime. Of Saddam, no friend of Islam before the crisis, he said:
• We are not worshipping personalities, but anyone who confronts the enemies of Islam is my friend and anyone who puts himself in the service of the enemies of Islam is my enemy.
• We may not have the actual power the U.S. has, but we had the power previously and we have now the foundations to develop that power in the future
• Unlike several Arab regimes and the PLO, which have grudgingly accepted the reality of the Jewish state, the fundamentalists remain uncompromisingly theological in their understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestine is a land sacred to Islam, a land stolen by the Jews. Not an inch may be alienated. Israel is a cancer in the Islamic world, implanted by imperialism and nurtured by the U.S. The Jewish state has to be fought, passively through non-recognition, actively through jihad
• Democracy, diversity, accommodation — the fundamentalists have repudiated them all. In appealing to the masses who fill their mosques, they promise, instead, to institute a regime of Islamic law, make common cause with like-minded "brethren" everywhere, and struggle against the hegemony of the West and the existence of Israel.
• These principles bear no resemblance to the ideals of Europe's democracy movements; if anything, they evoke more readily the atavism of Europe's burgeoning nationalist Right.
• In this instance, the myth of fundamentalism as a movement of democratic reform assures the West that no society on earth has the moral resources to challenge the supremacy of Western values: even Islam's fundamentalists, cursing the ways of foreigners, will end up embracing them.
• As for the fundamentalists themselves, they and their apologists warn against the futility of resisting the fundamentalist surge. "Islam is a new force that is going to come anyway, because it's a wave of history," Turabi assures his Western listeners, and "superficial obstacles will certainly not stand in the way." In fact, fundamentalism will triumph no matter what the West does, because it "thrives" on repression.
• The same fundamentalists who condemned Saudi Arabia's enlisting of assistance from "polytheists" would enlist some of it themselves, if they could. Their approach has been to tug at the conscience of the Western democracies.
• In particular, they ask that the United States intervene to protect the rights of free speech and assembly so precious to the West, and press for free elections throughout the region. "I am trying to tell my audiences that the values which are dear to them are also common to Islam," said a disingenuous Turabi in Washington, especially citing "free government based on consultation and participation."
• If those hands are joined, the overture to fundamentalism promises to be the riskiest policy venture of the next decade in the Middle East and North Africa. According to one academic analyst,
• The twenty-first century will test the ability of political analysts and policymakers to distinguish between Islamic movements that are a threat and those that represent legitimate indigenous attempts to reform and redirect their societies.
• Every movement combines threat and "reform" in a seamless message, and much of the supposed "reform" is threatening as well — to women, minorities, and the occasional novelist who would write a book on Islam.
• Political pluralism and peace do have true friends in the Middle East and North Africa. They are beleaguered and dazed by the generational surge of Islamic fundamentalism, and they are divided over the fate of Algeria and its implications. Some have been ridiculed by the democracy theorists as self-styled liberals, guilty of pedaling the view that existing governments are preferable to the anointed fundamentalists.
As one academic apologist claims:
Many Islamic activists have "Islamized" parliamentary democracy, asserting an Islamic rationale for it, and appeal to democracy in their opposition to incumbent regimes.
• The distortion here does not lie in the claim of compatibility between Islam and democracy. Although the dominant interpretation of Islam has historically sanctioned authoritarian rule, the reinterpretation of Islamic sources, done with enough imagination, could conceivably produce an opposing argument for Islamic democracy.
• Here and there, intrepid Muslims have searched the divine word of the Qur'an, the traditions of the Prophet, and the early history of Islam in order to establish the democratic essence of Islam, buried deep beneath the chronicles of despotism.
• But these are not the Muslims leading the fundamentalist movements now bidding for power. Fundamentalists insist they have not demanded free elections to promote democracy or the individual freedoms that underpin it, but to promote Islam.
• Indeed, when leading fundamentalist thinkers do address the broader question of democracy, it is not to argue its compatibility with Islam but to demonstrate democracy's inferiority to Islamic government. Such a virtuous government, they affirm, can rest only on obedience to the divinely-given law of Islam, the shari'a.
• A deception lurks in any description of the fundamentalists as being committed to the rule of law, for the shari'a is not legislated but revealed law
• As such, in the eyes of the fundamentalists it has already achieved perfection, and while it is not above some reinterpretation, neither is it infinitely elastic. If anything, fundamentalist exegesis has rejected reformist attempts to stretch the law much beyond its letter, and has even magnified the differences between Islamic and universal law.
• At the heart of these differences reside Islamic law's principled affirmations of inequality, primarily between Muslims and non-Muslims, secondarily between men and women.
• This has made fundamentalists into the most unyielding critics of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees the freedom to choose one's religion and one's spouse. Both freedoms indisputably contradict Islamic law, which defines conversion out of Islam as a capital offense, and forbids marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man.
• (In 1981, the leading fundamentalists met in Paris and put out an Islamic Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which omits all freedoms that contradict the shari'a.)
• The shari'a, as a perfect law, cannot be abrogated or altered, and certainly not by the shifting moods of an electorate. Accordingly, every major fundamentalist thinker had repudiated popular sovereignty as rebellion against God, the sole legislator
• In the changed circumstances of the 1990s, some activists do allow that an election can serve a useful one-time purpose, as a collective referendum of allegiance to Islam, and as an act of submission to a regime of divine justice. But once such a regime gains power, its true measure is not how effectively it implements the will of the people but how efficiently it applies Islamic law
• The ideal of Islamic government most often evoked by the fundamentalists harks back to the rule of a just commander, ruling in consultation with experts in the law.
• There is a revulsion against the combat of parties and personalities in democratic politics, best expressed by the Sudan's Turabi, fundamentalism best-known spokesman in the West. In a tract on the Islamic state, Turabi explains that such a state, once established, really has no need of party politics or political campaigns
• While Islamic law does not expressly oppose a multi-party system,
• this is a form of factionalism that can be very oppressive of individual freedom and divisive of the community, and it is therefore, antithetical to a Muslim's ultimate responsibility to God
• As for election campaigns:
• In Islam, no one is entitled to conduct a campaign for themselves directly or indirectly in the manner of Western electoral campaigns. The presentation of candidates would be entrusted to a neutral institution that would explain to the people the options offered in policies and personalities.
• Through this elaborate hedging, Turabi arrives at a tacit justification for one-party rule, which is the actual form of government he now justifies and supports in the Sudan.
• Of the vast complex of democratic values and institutions offered by the West, the fundamentalists have thus seized upon only one, the free plebiscite, and even that is to be discarded after successful one-time use.
• When asked which existing regime most closely approximates an ideal Islamic order, fundamentalists most often cite the governments of the Sudan or Iran — the first a military regime, the second a hierocracy ruled by an increasingly autocratic cleric, and both first-order violators of human rights.
• The second argument holds that Islamic fundamentalism drives many movements and represents a wide spectrum of views, not all of them extreme.
• This claim for the diversity of fundamentalist movements — again labelled expectantly as movements of "reform" — is most convincingly countered by the fundamentalists themselves, with their uncanny knack for refuting every Western argument made on their behalf
• The awakening of Islam, he said, has produced a world movement notable for its uniformity. If there appear to be differences, it is because "God in His wisdom is varying and distributing the phenomenon to let people know that it is coming everywhere at all times
• The leading fundamentalists insist that their movement is pan-Islamic as a matter of principle
• The greatest success of their joint efforts has been the aid they collectively mobilized for the Afghan mujahidin during the 1980s — aid that included money, material, and thousands of volunteers who fought in the Islamic jihad against the Soviet occupation
• The Sudan has run Algerian voting data through its computers for the FIS, it has provided diplomatic passports for foreign fundamentalists, and it has brought the foremost fundamentalists to Khartoum to create an Islamic Arab Popular Conference, of which Turabi is secretary. Iran is still more active, and not only continues to finance Hizbullah in Lebanon, but includes a line item in its budget for support of the Palestinian Intifada — monies which have gone largely to fundamentalists who battle the peace process. Visitors to Khartoum and Tehran are astonished at the odd mix of foreign fundamentalists who can be spotted in hotel lobbies and government ministries.
• The apologists, preoccupied with imaginary changes in the substance of the fundamentalist message, overlook perhaps the most important transformation of all: the emergence of a global village of Islamic fundamentalism
• Once in power, promises another Western apologist, fundamentalists will
• generally operate on the basis of national interests and demonstrate a flexibility that reflects acceptance of the realities of a globally interdependent world.
• But where their apologists see an interdependent world, the fundamentalists themselves see a starkly divided world. During the Gulf crisis, they championed the view that any partnership between believers and nonbelievers constituted a violation of divine order. Therefore, while Saddam may have done wrong when he invaded Kuwait, King Fahd, who depended on American "Crusaders" to defend Saudi Arabia, most certainly sinned
• Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, official spokesman of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, announced that "Islamic law does not permit any enlisting of assistance from polytheists [mushrikun]." According to Rashid al-Ghannushi, the exiled leader of the Tunisian fundamentalist movement, Saudi Arabia had committed a colossal crime. Of Saddam, no friend of Islam before the crisis, he said:
• We are not worshipping personalities, but anyone who confronts the enemies of Islam is my friend and anyone who puts himself in the service of the enemies of Islam is my enemy.
• We may not have the actual power the U.S. has, but we had the power previously and we have now the foundations to develop that power in the future
• Unlike several Arab regimes and the PLO, which have grudgingly accepted the reality of the Jewish state, the fundamentalists remain uncompromisingly theological in their understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestine is a land sacred to Islam, a land stolen by the Jews. Not an inch may be alienated. Israel is a cancer in the Islamic world, implanted by imperialism and nurtured by the U.S. The Jewish state has to be fought, passively through non-recognition, actively through jihad
• Democracy, diversity, accommodation — the fundamentalists have repudiated them all. In appealing to the masses who fill their mosques, they promise, instead, to institute a regime of Islamic law, make common cause with like-minded "brethren" everywhere, and struggle against the hegemony of the West and the existence of Israel.
• These principles bear no resemblance to the ideals of Europe's democracy movements; if anything, they evoke more readily the atavism of Europe's burgeoning nationalist Right.
• In this instance, the myth of fundamentalism as a movement of democratic reform assures the West that no society on earth has the moral resources to challenge the supremacy of Western values: even Islam's fundamentalists, cursing the ways of foreigners, will end up embracing them.
• As for the fundamentalists themselves, they and their apologists warn against the futility of resisting the fundamentalist surge. "Islam is a new force that is going to come anyway, because it's a wave of history," Turabi assures his Western listeners, and "superficial obstacles will certainly not stand in the way." In fact, fundamentalism will triumph no matter what the West does, because it "thrives" on repression.
• The same fundamentalists who condemned Saudi Arabia's enlisting of assistance from "polytheists" would enlist some of it themselves, if they could. Their approach has been to tug at the conscience of the Western democracies.
• In particular, they ask that the United States intervene to protect the rights of free speech and assembly so precious to the West, and press for free elections throughout the region. "I am trying to tell my audiences that the values which are dear to them are also common to Islam," said a disingenuous Turabi in Washington, especially citing "free government based on consultation and participation."
• If those hands are joined, the overture to fundamentalism promises to be the riskiest policy venture of the next decade in the Middle East and North Africa. According to one academic analyst,
• The twenty-first century will test the ability of political analysts and policymakers to distinguish between Islamic movements that are a threat and those that represent legitimate indigenous attempts to reform and redirect their societies.
• Every movement combines threat and "reform" in a seamless message, and much of the supposed "reform" is threatening as well — to women, minorities, and the occasional novelist who would write a book on Islam.
• Political pluralism and peace do have true friends in the Middle East and North Africa. They are beleaguered and dazed by the generational surge of Islamic fundamentalism, and they are divided over the fate of Algeria and its implications. Some have been ridiculed by the democracy theorists as self-styled liberals, guilty of pedaling the view that existing governments are preferable to the anointed fundamentalists.
Saturday, 24 January 2009
Middle Eastern History in the making.
Lyndon Johnson's Meeting with Abba Eban, 26 May 1967: An Introduction
Zaki Shalom
[Israel Foreign Ministry Memo, HZ 5937/30]
________________________________________
As a military parade was marching through the streets of Jerusalem on 15 May 1967 during the celebration of the State of Israel's nineteenth Independence Day, Israeli intelligence authorities received information about a massive Egyptian troop movement into the Sinai Peninsula. According to Egyptian spokesmen, the deployment was a tactical necessity in order to deter Israel from attacking Egypt's chief ally, Syria. At this stage, Israeli officials still believed that Nasser's maneuvering was merely a smokescreen to mask his primary goal: boosting his stature in the Arab world. They assumed he would then march his troops back into Egypt. However, in a matter of days, the crisis escalated ominously when the Egyptian government suddenly demanded the withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) which had been stationed in Sinai as a buffer between Israel and Egypt since 1957. This resulted in a precarious standoff between the troops of the two sides.
Under these circumstances, Israel's assessment of Nasser's intentions took a dramatic volte-face on May 19. The realization now hit the Israelis that the Egyptian President was seriously considering the feasibility of war with Israel even if he himself was not yet convinced that Egypt should be committed to hostilities. Four days later, on May 23, the crisis reached a boiling point with Nasser's announcement that the Straits of Tiran (at the southern entrance to the Gulf of Eilat) would be closed to Israeli shipping. Egypt harbored no doubts that Israel would regard this declaration as an act of war. Over the years, Israel had made it clear that free navigation through the Straits was in her vital interest and any obstruction of her maritime rights would be viewed as a casus belli. 1
On that same fateful day, under darkening war clouds, the Israeli cabinet convened to weigh the gravity of their response to the rapidly [End Page 221] unfolding events. Some Ministers believed that sooner or later a military operation against Egypt was unavoidable, while the majority retained hope in a diplomatic solution. The majority was also apprehensive of incurring a severe American response to any Israeli act of aggression. When the crisis broke, the United States urged Israel to demonstrate restraint in the face of Egyptian provocation. In his May 17 message to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, President Johnson had made it clear that he could "not accept responsibility for situations which arise as the result of actions on which we are not consulted." 2
While the Israeli cabinet was in the midst of choosing which course of action to take, the U.S. ambassador, Walworth Barbour, delivered a message to Eshkol pledging that the United States and other nations would make moves to guarantee unimpeded Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. This message arrived none too late. Although it did not specify how the U.S. would ensure Israeli navigation rights, most Ministers interpreted the dispatch to mean that Israel could refrain from a military strike against Egypt without losing face. The Cabinet decided that the American "proposal" should be explored in depth by sending the Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, on a short visit to the United States to examine the feasibility of the U.S. pledge.
At the same time, however, the Cabinet was aware that great risks were involved in the Eban mission to Washington, and the decision was not an easy one. In the first place, Israel's wide degree of freedom of action could be drastically reduced. There was also the possibility that Eban would learn that Johnson's proposals were not feasible in the immediate future and that the American President would continue to urge Israel to exhibit restraint. In this scenario, Israel would be faced with a serious dilemma: to launch a preemptive strike and risk incurring a major crisis with its most important ally, the United States, or refrain from acting and lose both its credibility and deterrent power.
Indications reveal that Eshkol was concerned over the choice of Abba Eban as the envoy to engage in the dialogue. It was felt that Eban's personality was too diplomatic and restrained. The extremely dangerous situation entrapping Israel called for an extraordinary course of action, one not limited by diplomatic niceties. Eshkol also sought a personality who could rouse the emotions of American Jewry and spur them to exert swift and unrelenting pressure on the administration. He preferred Golda Meir, who had served as Foreign Minister between 1956-1966. However, Eshkol yielded to the choice of Eban in order to avoid insulting the Foreign Minister and creating an internal political crisis. [End Page 222]
Eban began his mission by meeting with President De Gaulle in Paris. The encounter proved fruitless for Israel. De Gaulle feared a Middle East military confrontation and warned Eban that Israel should not dare to launch a preemptive strike against Egypt. The same day Eban flew to London for talks with Prime Minister Harold Wilson. It gratified him to hear solid expressions of support for Israel in her struggle for free navigation in an international waterway. Wilson, however, clarified his position by claiming that only the United States could initiate moves in this direction.
On Thursday, May 25, Eban arrived in New York, where the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Abraham Harman, handed him a top-secret message from Eshkol. The note stated that Israeli intelligence services had just learned that Israel was facing an "all-out, general U.A.R.-Syrian attack [which was] imminent and would occur at any moment." 3
Faced with the threat of national survival, the question of maritime rights was relegated to secondary importance. Eban was instructed to ask for "an immediate application of the U.S. pledge to Israel, backed up by a public declaration as well as practical actions." Eban was further told to demand an official statement by the United States that an attack on Israel would be equivalent to an attack on the United States. He was ordered to insist that the announcement be accompanied by a command to American forces in the region to co-ordinate their activity with the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) against any possible attack. 4
It seems, however, that Eban held reservations about the veracity of Eshkol's alarming message. Just prior to his departure, Israeli intelligence authorities had not foreseen the danger of imminent war. It did not seem plausible to him "that such an extreme change could have come over our military positions since I heard our generals' report in Tel-Aviv on May 23, 1967." 5
The content of Eshkol's message was soon relayed to American officials, and Johnson personally ordered all U.S. intelligence branches to verify its accuracy. They all returned with the conclusion that an "imminent all-out attack" was not feasible. Israel's credibility was damaged, and Eban's suspicions of the motives behind Eshkol's message were further heightened. In his autobiography, Eban does not hesitate to refer to the specious report as a demonstration of "momentous irresponsibility." 6 Following this, Eban went so far as to criticize his own government at a meeting held with high-ranking U.S. officials, stating that "the telegram would not have been written as it was, had he [Eban] been there." 7
Eban's visit to the United States placed the Johnson administration in an embarrassing position. Since 1957, the United States had agreed to [End Page 223] safeguard Israeli maritime rights through the Straits. This commitment was given in exchange for Israel's readiness to withdraw from Sinai in the aftermath of the 1956 Sinai Campaign. The United States also promised to guarantee the security of Israel against an Arab attack. The validity of these commitments derived, not from their legal weight alone, but from their political and moral status. There was no way the U.S. administration could ignore these pledges. Furthermore, the administration was all too aware that American failure to defend an ally in the Middle East in a clear case of aggression by pro-Soviet states would be a very dismal reflection of the value of U.S. security commitments.
Nevertheless, the United States also had strategic considerations preventing her from pursuing an active pro-Israeli stand in the crisis. For years the U.S. had been investing energy and resources in rehabilitating relations with the Arab world. Signs of success began to emerge. A pro-Israeli policy would undoubtedly endanger the burgeoning fruits of the U.S. effort. Weighing the huge economic investments it had made in the Arab world, an active American policy favorable to Israel could seriously harm the U.S. economy. In addition, it should be recalled that the U.S. was deeply involved in the publicly unpopular Vietnam War. An attempt on the part of the Johnson administration to guarantee Israel's freedom of navigation could have led to a second military confrontation whose consequences could not be calculated.
The administration, especially the White House, reached the conclusion that the only manageable solution was to allow Israel to realize that it would have to go it alone. Only an Israeli initiative in the crisis could release the United States from the complexities of its previous commitments. The Johnson administration, however, could not make an open statement to this effect, otherwise it would be accused of pushing Israel into a war with her neighbors. The U.S. had to get its message across without giving the impression what its real aim was. This could only be accomplished in a secretive, low-key manner.
In light of this, the Americans viewed Eban's presence in Washington as detrimental to their interests. Eban was a senior member in the Israeli government and a high-profile, media-wise, international personality. He arrived in the U.S. Capitol in the midst of a full-blown international crisis, and it can be assumed that the world press would be tracking his visit very closely. Statements by American officials would be widely followed in an attempt to gain insight into the U.S. position.
The President made every effort to avoid meeting Eban by postponing the encounter a number of times in the hope that the Israeli Foreign [End Page 224] Minister would conclude his mission with lower level officials. Eban, however, was resistant to these obstructions, believing that Israel's dire position demanded that he reach Johnson personally. Eban's obstinacy and pressure from American Jewish organization finally forced the President's hand, and a meeting between the two men was scheduled for the night of May 26.
Before talking with Eban, Johnson invited another Israeli official to the White House, Effie [Ephraim] Evron, the number two man at the Israeli Embassy. The President had a close relationship with Evron, and felt more at ease conveying through him his message to the Israeli government. 8 His words to Evron left little doubt that the United States was in fact sending Israel a "green light" for a military operation. "With regard to the possibility of an Israeli assault," the President told Evron, "Israel is of course a sovereign state. If it decided to act independently, it could obviously do so. However, this will be made on her own responsibility, and she will bear all the consequences of such a decision. He, the President, could not believe that Israel would undertake a unilateral action, which could only bring damage, but this is her own business. He, as the President of the United States must act in the best way which would serve the American interests." 9 Later, meeting with Eban, the President seemed to convey the same message in a more reserved and vague manner.
In my view, the "green light" message was delivered in the following ways:
1. It was explained to Eban that the President had no alternative but to act within the framework of American constitutional procedures. This meant gaining Congressional approval for any strategic decisions regarding U.S. involvement in the crisis. Yet, even if Congress eventually agreed to such a course, it would take a long, perhaps exceedingly long, time. The administration was well aware that Israel could not afford to wait at length for the American decision.
2. The President made it clear to Eban that, while the United States rejected any unilateral Israeli operation against an Arab state, it recognized Israel's independence to make her own decisions and bear full responsibility for their consequences. Recalling the administration's bold warnings to Israel at the start of the crisis to refrain from any unilateral action, Johnson's words could only be interpreted as an indirect message to Israel to initiate whatever was necessary but without mentioning the United States' "contribution" to that decision.
3. Time and again the Johnson administration had declared that, according to all their intelligence estimates, Israel enjoyed military superiority over Egypt. In a showdown, Israel could defeat her and the other Arab [End Page 225] states as well. The message was clear: no need for Israel to "beg for her life"; she could accomplish the task by herself. Furthermore, Israel must also come to realize that a "victory" gained through Great Power intervention would detract from her own stature and deterrent power. The Arab states would be convinced that Israel's existence was dependent on the Great Powers. In 1956, Israel had been in collusion with two Great Powers, Britain and France, and now too she was in alliance with a Great Power, the United States.
The protocol of the conversation between the Israeli Foreign Minister and the American President sheds light on the gravity and complexity of the crisis. It is my conviction that conflicting interests eventually led the Johnson Administration to realize that an independent Israeli military operation was the only way the United States could break the stalemate and at the same time safeguard her enormous investments in the region. Concretely, this meant flashing Israel the "green light," tacitly signaling her to understand that the United States would not object to a preemptive strike against Egypt. However, Israel was expected to be aware that the American Government would not formally acknowledge her unspoken approval and would probably deny it altogether.
Zaki Shalom is Senior Research Fellow at the Ben-Gurion Research Center, Sde-Boker. Recent publications include David Ben-Gurion, The State of Israel and the Arab World, 1949-1956 (Sde-Boker, 1995) [Hebrew]. His research focuses on the Arab-Israel conXict and Israel's defense policy.
Notes
1. Approximately 90 percent of Israel's oil came from Iran through the Straits. See U.S. State Department memo, 25 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 2185, U.S. National Archives (hereafter, USNA).
2. U.S. State Department memo, 17 May 1996, NND 969000, Box 2185, USNA.
3. U.S. State Department memo, 25 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1795, USNA.
4. U.S. State department memo, 26 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1795, USNA. See also Abba Eban, An Autobiography (London, 1979) 349.
5. Ibid., 349.
6. Abba Eban, Personal Witness (New York, 1992) 382.
7. U.S. State Department memo, 16 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1795, USNA.
8. In his memoirs, Eban states that "Evron was a cherished friend of President Johnson. Sometimes Johnson would prefer conversation with Effie to formal encounters with our ambassador." Personal Witness, 386.
9. Report from the Israeli Embassy in the United States to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 27 May 1967, HZ 5937/30, Israeli State Archives
Israel Foreign Ministry Memo, HZ 5937/30
Israel State Archives
[Lyndon Johnson's Meeting with Abba Eban, 26 May 1967: An Introduction]
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MOST SECRET
Notes OF A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND FOREIGN MINISTER ABBA EBAN AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MAY 26, 1967
The meeting began just after 7:00 p.m. and went on until 8:45 p.m.
Present: The President
Secretary [of Defense] McNamara
Walt Rostow [Presidential Advisor]
Eugene Rostow [Under-Secretary of State]
Joseph Sisco [Director of UN Affairs in the State Department]
George Christian [Media Advisor to the President]
Foreign Minister Eban
Ambassador Harman
Minister Evron [Deputy Ambassador]
A. Eban: There has never been a moment for my country such as at this time. We are on a footing of grave and anxious expectancy. I came to see you to discuss the question of the Gulf of Aqaba, but meanwhile a second, and even graver, issue has arisen [reports of an imminent Egyptian attack].
On the question of Tiran I would make it clear that what Nasser has done can change the entire character of our country. Ten years ago [following the Sinai Campaign], there was a solemn pact between the US and Israel, before each other and before the world, that the Straits of Tiran would be opened to all shipping, including Israeli shipping. At that time it was a prospect, but since then it has become a legal situation and a fact. It is enshrined in the 1958 Law of the Sea and in hundreds of sailings under dozens of flags, in trade with Asia and Africa, and in vital economic and political interests. What he has done is to try to cancel that in five minutes. I would make it clear that the act of aggression has already been committed. [End Page 227] Some people ask us why we have not yet reacted to this. Most countries do react immediately when they are subjected to an act of blockade of his kind.
I would tell you in all frankness, Mr. President, that when our Cabinet met to discuss this, it seemed that we were faced with a clear-cut choice between surrender and fighting. We were unanimous in the decision that we could not and would not surrender. If we have to fight, this is the best issue on which to make a stand. It would be a bloody business, but we could hope to win the war. But we thought it worth[while] to have a look at the possibility of a third alternative: namely, that there might be an international solution. We looked to the US to see if it would take a special initiative. If the US could say that if the straits were closed that they would be opened again; if such an alternative could be developed it would protect legality while avoiding war.
On my way here I saw De Gaulle. For general reasons he talked about a Four Power agreement. I think that by now this is out of his system. The Soviets are not in a mood for harmonious action. I would stress that the French have opened their armories to us and are giving us every help that we asked for. In London I was pleasantly surprised that there was a readiness to act, but obviously only together with you. It is quite clear that the crux lies here in the US. I would emphasize that there was an explicit commitment on the Straits of Tiran. This was an American-Israeli adventure--to open up the sea as it should be open for international traffic. The very character of our country depends on this link being opened up. All our links with African and Asia depend on this. Our Prime Minister at that time wrote to President Eisenhower that, in pulling out of the Sinai, he was basing himself upon the good faith of the US, and President Eisenhower wrote to him that we would never have cause to regret placing our reliance upon that good faith. It is a question of good faith.
There is no doubt on the part of my Government as to your policy. You have given it a forceful and impressive expression. The policy is there. The question to which I have to bring the answer is: do you have the will and determination to enforce that policy, to open the straits? What Nasser has done in Aqaba is an outrage. Killing somebody by strangulation is as much murder, and as much the use of force, as killing someone by shooting. This is tantamount to one saying to you that you can only trade in the Pacific but that the Atlantic would be closed to you.
After my arrival here I was apprised by the Prime Minister of a change in the situation since I left Israel. I received from him a series of most urgent messages advising me that it is our appraisal based on knowledge that Nasser is ready for an imminent overall attack together with Syria. This is [End Page 228] our well-founded appraisal. It received public evidence in the speech which Nasser made today. I have never seen documents from the Prime Minister as urgent and as deliberate as those which have reached me since I arrived here yesterday.
There are thus two questions:
(a) Aqaba: do we fight alone or are you with us?
(b) What is the practical expression of the US commitment to us? And here what my Prime Minister was asking for was essentially very simple--a public statement by you that you stood with us, and that [there will be] coordination between your military and our own based on the assumption that our estimate of the situation is correct, and what you would do to help us in the event of that estimate proving realistic. If it did not occur, so much the better for all of us.
I would emphasize, Mr. President, that both of these problems relate not to our welfare as a country but to our very existence as a country.
The President: I thought it wise the other day to say publicly that an illegal action had occurred and make it quite clear that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway. Maybe it has not had the effect that I thought it would have. There have been parades in Cairo today against me. I am not concerned about that. I feel very strongly on this issue and I stated what I feel to the American people and to the world. The question is what to do and when to do it. A man's judgement is only as good as his information. I can only be of value to you if my Cabinet, my Congress and my people feel that you have been wronged and that we have been done wrong, and that neither of us have precipitated this situation. We have a vital interest in clearing this waterway. The question is how to do it? You have informed me of the concern of your Cabinet, which is meeting on Sunday. There is not much that I can do about that. Whatever they do, they will have to do on their own. What I could tell you is that our best forces and influence will be used to keep this waterway open. The Senate is out of town for the Memorial Day weekend and will not be back until Sunday. All of us have concluded that we ought to pursue this aim of keeping the waterway open, and that we should not jump. You don't have to be learned to know what I think of the Secretary General. I said publicly what I thought about what he did about the UNEF and I think the same about other things he has done. What I want to do is strengthen my friends and not the Secretary General. I would be less than frank if I were to tell you that I thought the Secretary General has come back with a solution, or that, if he has, that it is not the wrong one. But we have got to exhaust the UN. We have to go through this. I have very great doubts [End Page 229] as to whether anything will come out of the UN. We have tried several times in the UN on Vietnam and we have never seen the UN find an answer to anything. But this has to be done. When it becomes apparent--and I mean without filibuster--that the UN cannot do the job of opening this waterway, then it is going to be up to Israel and all its friends and all those who feel that an injustice has been done, and all those who give us some indication of what they are prepared to do, and we will do likewise. We have had some experience in rounding up people. We did it on Dominica [the Dominican Republic] and we sent [Henry Cabot] Lodge [special emissary to the President] around the world to line up help for Vietnam from the contribution of troops to the contribution of baby bottles. You in Israel have the best intelligence [agencies] and the best embassies, so put them to work to line up all those who are concerned with keeping the waterway open. Go out and get some judgments. I am glad to hear that the French have opened their armories, but I would hope that they would also open up their arms and give us a ship or two. The British are willing and we are trying to formulate a plan with them. It is unwise to do this yesterday--to jump the gun. If we try to jump the gun nothing will happen. Maybe we can get Canada, Italy and Argentina.
A. Eban: I think the Dutch and maybe the Norwegians.
The President: The Dutch will come along.
A. Eban: On the theoretical aspect of support for the principle we can get more people, but the real question is to make up a team and that cannot be done without you.
The President: Believe me I have raised this question. I didn't want to be quoted. Pearson [the Canadian Prime Minister] has been quoting me today about our conversation of yesterday about a lot of things that I have never said. I see that I am being quoted as being in favor of a Four Power arrangement in which I don't believe. What Pearson did say is that he would give a ship or two. What we need is a very short time with your leadership and British leadership to evolve an effort with some effectiveness. How soon and how effective depends on events. There is the Secretary General's report. We have many hawks and doves in this country. Now there are some new hawks being formed and some new doves, but maybe it will all wind up for the general good. We reviewed everything that this country has said in relation to Israel. Truman through Eisenhower and Kennedy and what I have said. [End Page 230] All this is important, but I tell you that this is not worth five cents unless I have the people with me. We are going to have to see what comes out of the statement of the Secretary General and the Security Council next week. Let us get busy on these 17 nations that you talk about who came out in support of freedom and navigation. We want to do that and we want to keep the waterway free for Israel shipping. It will not be too long until we will have to do it, but would it be wise at this moment, as we say in the language of poker, to call Nasser and raise his hand? If your Cabinet decides to do that, they will have to do it on their own. I want to make it clear that we are not retreating; not backtracking, and I am not forgetting anything I have said. I would be less than frank with you if I were not to tell you that your Prime Minister's suggestion to me as to what I should do now is not realistic. I want to be in a position to be of help. But I am not a king in this country and I am not good to you or to your Prime Minister if all I can lead is myself. I don't think we can help until we go through the business of the Secretary General's report and the discussion in the Security Council. The next stop and the best hope is that we would then proceed to bring the matter to a head and to its ultimate solution. I know that your blood and lives are at stake. My blood and lives are at stake in many places and may be in others. I have got to have a chance to let my people come with me.
We don't believe that the procedure we have outlined for building up an international force is going to take too long. The purpose is to see to it that the Israeli ships can go through.
We have been into all aspects of the military situation. We are aware of what this is costing you today. But it is less costly than to be precipitate while the jury is still out and have the world against us. And so I can tell you that what you have heard is friendship and similarity of views. I have spent hours of work on this and we have got the determination. But I have got to line my people up. And that depends on our going through the necessary processes and to keep on appearing to be in the right. By working in this way, I build the bridges which, in spite of all the Morses and Lippmanns [Wayne Morse, Senator from Oregon, harsh critic of the President; Walter Lippmann, acerbic columnist], led to there being only 18 votes against me for stopping the bombing. This way of doing things is much more productive. I can tell you at this moment I do not have one vote and one dollar for taking action before thrashing this mater out in the UN in a reasonable time and trying to work out some kind of a multilateral group. Other nations could and should help. It may well be that the report of the Secretary General and the nature of the discussions in the Council will drive some Senators in the right direction, and I think that Mr. Nasser will drive some [End Page 231] in the right direction. There can be no doubt about my own feelings. The purpose is to get Israeli shipping through the Gulf. This is what I have said in my statement, that the Gulf is an international waterway.
(At this point the President read the relevant passages from his statement.)
What you must tell your Cabinet is that we have hawks and doves here, and there are some who are hawks on Asia and doves on the Middle East, and the other way around. We have our constitutional process and I know what I can do. (Eppie [Efraim Evron] knows almost as much about it as I do!)
What you can tell your Cabinet is that the President, the Congress and the country will support a plan to use any or all measures to open the straits to ships of all nations. We have to go through with the Secretary General and the Security Council and build up support among the nations. I think it is a necessity that Israel should never make itself seem responsible in the eyes of America and the world for making war. Here the President said with very great emphasis: "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone."
I've had a good deal of association with you. I know the Prime Minister and the President and many others. I cannot imagine that you will take such a decision. In the last few days I have spent practically all of my time on this. I'm not worried by Nasser's parades or the Soviet Union. I'm going to do what's right if I'm permitted to.
I'm not a feeble mouse or a coward and we're going to try. What we need is a group, five or four or less or, if we can't do that then on our own. We've already said that it's illegal. No one here has gone against our position. Forty Congressmen came out with a good statement. It's going reasonably well. About De Gaulle, get him to give us ideas. He gives you arms. How much will he give of himself? Will he give a ship? I spoke to Pearson. He said today that I want a Four Power deal. That's the last thing I want. What isn't in the paper is that he said he'd give some ships.
We have constitutional processes. (Here he quoted examples of Woodrow Wilson and Roosevelt.) I'm not a King. I'm trying to bring them along. I've done it on other things. I got a resolution from them on wheat to India. There are other things I did before this came along. [The] State [Department] suggested I give you a package of $40 million. I made it over $70 million.
How to take Congress with me I've got my own views. I'm not an enemy or a coward. I'm going to plan and pursue vigorously every lead I can find in concern with others to assure, and I repeat, to assure this waterway stays open. [End Page 232]
While we're doing it, we think it's absolutely necessary for Israel not to make itself responsible for instituting hostilities.
Mr. Eban: We should be part of the group that plans this.
The President: You should be an initiator.
Mr. Eban: Your voice reverberates more than ours.
The President: We are doing it now.
Mr. Eban: The UN is not enough.
The President: I agree.
Mr. Eban: U Thant has delivered a grievous blow to our country and the world.
The President: I think so and I said so.
Mr. Eban: U Thant talks of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. The two holes in this Agreement are the blockade of Suez and the Egyptian doctrine of belligerence. Unless these are repaired, there is nothing to talk about.
The President: Pearson said something today about my agreeing to the Mixed Armistice Commission. I don't even know what it's all about.
Mr. Eban: The UN has no relevance today to any security problem. It's like going to the Chicago Council on Foreign affairs.
I want to refer again to the time problem. It must be done as quickly as possible.
The President: I agree.
Mr. Eban: There are many maritime nations which will go along in principle. But I don't know what they'll be prepared to do. They have to be asked by you and Britain. You can do it alone. Anyone can do it alone. In 1957, you said you would. There is no question of our being preemptive. There is already in existence right now an act of aggression, an illegal blockade. Our [End Page 233] Cabinet knows of your policy. What they want to know is your disposition to take action. I've heard from you now that there is such a disposition. Time is of the essence. If Nasser sees your flag or a British flag, he's going to think twice before he blockades.
The President: We think so and especially if there are some armed ships around.
Mr. Eban: If there's a real plan, you will get a lot of patience from Israel.
The President: You mentioned seventeen countries.
Mr. Eban: In 1957, there were seventeen maritime countries which [sic] asserted the principle and there are new countries like Madagascar, Ethiopia, Japan.
McNamara: Japan has enunciated this principle.
Mr. Eban: [Has anyone] mentioned the importance of our trade with Iran[?]
The President: I spoke on this subject at length today with the Iranian Ambassador.
Mr. Eban: The shipping from Iran is not with Israeli ships.
The President: We have to establish your shipping. We are not going to say it's alright if all the rest go through but Israel can't. The issue is getting Israel's ships through. How about the Norwegians?
Mr. Eban: I know the Swedes have put out a very strong statement.
The President: Put all your Ambassadors to work.
Mr. Eban: Can I summarize on this point that you are going to use every effort to get Aqaba open[?]
Now on the general problem. I cannot understand how you can be so certain our feeling is wrong.
McNamara: The CIA, the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], and the Intelligence and Research Division of State have appraised at [sic] developments, [End Page 234] and we see neither the capability nor the intention of imminent offensive action.
Eugene Rostow: I remind you that we issued a clear warning to the Egyptians last night, so it's not that we are doing nothing.
Mr. Eban: Your policy is that if Israel is attacked you will intervene to stop it. (President nods assent.) Surely there must be some planning, some joint link.
The President: That could be. [Arthur] Goldberg [US Ambassador to the UN] told me he didn't believe our estimates, so I had them all checked and rechecked. We could be wrong. I remember MacArthur was wrong on the Chinese intervening in Korea. But on this thing I told them that they should assume all the facts the Israelis have given us to be true and still the unanimous view was that there was no capability for imminent attack and that, if there were, you would knock them out.
Mr. Eban: Hasn't [Walworth] Barbour [US Ambassador to Israel] conveyed the mood in Israel?
Walt Rostow: Mood isn't intelligence.
Mr. Eban: I'm not talking only of mood.
Harman: If I can return to the question of a military link. There are two aspects. First there is no joint center, no one place where we try to appraise what is going on. Cables fly back and forth, but we are not looking at it together. Then there is the American Commitment to come to our help, but for five years I've been saying that, in a military sense, there is no telephone number for us to call.
The President: to McNamara: Would you look into this and see what can be done[?]
McNamara: Yes. Military liaison or something like that, but of course it would have to be secret.
(Both the President and McNamara mentioned that there had been an arm's length attitude from us on intelligence.) [End Page 235]
Harman: We have a good record for secrecy in these matters.
As the President rose to go, he said to Harman that there are some people on the fringes we could help with, and then he stood with Eppy Evron for a moment and developed this point.
The President referred constantly to the following paper which he then gave us:
"The US has its own constitutional processes which are basic to its action on matters involving war and peace. The Secretary General has not yet reported to the Security Council and the Council has not yet demonstrated what it may or may not be able, or willing, to do, although the US will press for prompt action in the UN.
"I have already publicly stated this week our views on the safety of travel and on the Straits of Tiran. Regarding the Strait, we plan to pursue vigorously the measures which can be taken by maritime nations to assure the Strait and the Gulf remain open to free and innocent passage of the vessels of all nations.
"I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to do it alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision
Zaki Shalom
[Israel Foreign Ministry Memo, HZ 5937/30]
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As a military parade was marching through the streets of Jerusalem on 15 May 1967 during the celebration of the State of Israel's nineteenth Independence Day, Israeli intelligence authorities received information about a massive Egyptian troop movement into the Sinai Peninsula. According to Egyptian spokesmen, the deployment was a tactical necessity in order to deter Israel from attacking Egypt's chief ally, Syria. At this stage, Israeli officials still believed that Nasser's maneuvering was merely a smokescreen to mask his primary goal: boosting his stature in the Arab world. They assumed he would then march his troops back into Egypt. However, in a matter of days, the crisis escalated ominously when the Egyptian government suddenly demanded the withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) which had been stationed in Sinai as a buffer between Israel and Egypt since 1957. This resulted in a precarious standoff between the troops of the two sides.
Under these circumstances, Israel's assessment of Nasser's intentions took a dramatic volte-face on May 19. The realization now hit the Israelis that the Egyptian President was seriously considering the feasibility of war with Israel even if he himself was not yet convinced that Egypt should be committed to hostilities. Four days later, on May 23, the crisis reached a boiling point with Nasser's announcement that the Straits of Tiran (at the southern entrance to the Gulf of Eilat) would be closed to Israeli shipping. Egypt harbored no doubts that Israel would regard this declaration as an act of war. Over the years, Israel had made it clear that free navigation through the Straits was in her vital interest and any obstruction of her maritime rights would be viewed as a casus belli. 1
On that same fateful day, under darkening war clouds, the Israeli cabinet convened to weigh the gravity of their response to the rapidly [End Page 221] unfolding events. Some Ministers believed that sooner or later a military operation against Egypt was unavoidable, while the majority retained hope in a diplomatic solution. The majority was also apprehensive of incurring a severe American response to any Israeli act of aggression. When the crisis broke, the United States urged Israel to demonstrate restraint in the face of Egyptian provocation. In his May 17 message to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, President Johnson had made it clear that he could "not accept responsibility for situations which arise as the result of actions on which we are not consulted." 2
While the Israeli cabinet was in the midst of choosing which course of action to take, the U.S. ambassador, Walworth Barbour, delivered a message to Eshkol pledging that the United States and other nations would make moves to guarantee unimpeded Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. This message arrived none too late. Although it did not specify how the U.S. would ensure Israeli navigation rights, most Ministers interpreted the dispatch to mean that Israel could refrain from a military strike against Egypt without losing face. The Cabinet decided that the American "proposal" should be explored in depth by sending the Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, on a short visit to the United States to examine the feasibility of the U.S. pledge.
At the same time, however, the Cabinet was aware that great risks were involved in the Eban mission to Washington, and the decision was not an easy one. In the first place, Israel's wide degree of freedom of action could be drastically reduced. There was also the possibility that Eban would learn that Johnson's proposals were not feasible in the immediate future and that the American President would continue to urge Israel to exhibit restraint. In this scenario, Israel would be faced with a serious dilemma: to launch a preemptive strike and risk incurring a major crisis with its most important ally, the United States, or refrain from acting and lose both its credibility and deterrent power.
Indications reveal that Eshkol was concerned over the choice of Abba Eban as the envoy to engage in the dialogue. It was felt that Eban's personality was too diplomatic and restrained. The extremely dangerous situation entrapping Israel called for an extraordinary course of action, one not limited by diplomatic niceties. Eshkol also sought a personality who could rouse the emotions of American Jewry and spur them to exert swift and unrelenting pressure on the administration. He preferred Golda Meir, who had served as Foreign Minister between 1956-1966. However, Eshkol yielded to the choice of Eban in order to avoid insulting the Foreign Minister and creating an internal political crisis. [End Page 222]
Eban began his mission by meeting with President De Gaulle in Paris. The encounter proved fruitless for Israel. De Gaulle feared a Middle East military confrontation and warned Eban that Israel should not dare to launch a preemptive strike against Egypt. The same day Eban flew to London for talks with Prime Minister Harold Wilson. It gratified him to hear solid expressions of support for Israel in her struggle for free navigation in an international waterway. Wilson, however, clarified his position by claiming that only the United States could initiate moves in this direction.
On Thursday, May 25, Eban arrived in New York, where the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Abraham Harman, handed him a top-secret message from Eshkol. The note stated that Israeli intelligence services had just learned that Israel was facing an "all-out, general U.A.R.-Syrian attack [which was] imminent and would occur at any moment." 3
Faced with the threat of national survival, the question of maritime rights was relegated to secondary importance. Eban was instructed to ask for "an immediate application of the U.S. pledge to Israel, backed up by a public declaration as well as practical actions." Eban was further told to demand an official statement by the United States that an attack on Israel would be equivalent to an attack on the United States. He was ordered to insist that the announcement be accompanied by a command to American forces in the region to co-ordinate their activity with the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) against any possible attack. 4
It seems, however, that Eban held reservations about the veracity of Eshkol's alarming message. Just prior to his departure, Israeli intelligence authorities had not foreseen the danger of imminent war. It did not seem plausible to him "that such an extreme change could have come over our military positions since I heard our generals' report in Tel-Aviv on May 23, 1967." 5
The content of Eshkol's message was soon relayed to American officials, and Johnson personally ordered all U.S. intelligence branches to verify its accuracy. They all returned with the conclusion that an "imminent all-out attack" was not feasible. Israel's credibility was damaged, and Eban's suspicions of the motives behind Eshkol's message were further heightened. In his autobiography, Eban does not hesitate to refer to the specious report as a demonstration of "momentous irresponsibility." 6 Following this, Eban went so far as to criticize his own government at a meeting held with high-ranking U.S. officials, stating that "the telegram would not have been written as it was, had he [Eban] been there." 7
Eban's visit to the United States placed the Johnson administration in an embarrassing position. Since 1957, the United States had agreed to [End Page 223] safeguard Israeli maritime rights through the Straits. This commitment was given in exchange for Israel's readiness to withdraw from Sinai in the aftermath of the 1956 Sinai Campaign. The United States also promised to guarantee the security of Israel against an Arab attack. The validity of these commitments derived, not from their legal weight alone, but from their political and moral status. There was no way the U.S. administration could ignore these pledges. Furthermore, the administration was all too aware that American failure to defend an ally in the Middle East in a clear case of aggression by pro-Soviet states would be a very dismal reflection of the value of U.S. security commitments.
Nevertheless, the United States also had strategic considerations preventing her from pursuing an active pro-Israeli stand in the crisis. For years the U.S. had been investing energy and resources in rehabilitating relations with the Arab world. Signs of success began to emerge. A pro-Israeli policy would undoubtedly endanger the burgeoning fruits of the U.S. effort. Weighing the huge economic investments it had made in the Arab world, an active American policy favorable to Israel could seriously harm the U.S. economy. In addition, it should be recalled that the U.S. was deeply involved in the publicly unpopular Vietnam War. An attempt on the part of the Johnson administration to guarantee Israel's freedom of navigation could have led to a second military confrontation whose consequences could not be calculated.
The administration, especially the White House, reached the conclusion that the only manageable solution was to allow Israel to realize that it would have to go it alone. Only an Israeli initiative in the crisis could release the United States from the complexities of its previous commitments. The Johnson administration, however, could not make an open statement to this effect, otherwise it would be accused of pushing Israel into a war with her neighbors. The U.S. had to get its message across without giving the impression what its real aim was. This could only be accomplished in a secretive, low-key manner.
In light of this, the Americans viewed Eban's presence in Washington as detrimental to their interests. Eban was a senior member in the Israeli government and a high-profile, media-wise, international personality. He arrived in the U.S. Capitol in the midst of a full-blown international crisis, and it can be assumed that the world press would be tracking his visit very closely. Statements by American officials would be widely followed in an attempt to gain insight into the U.S. position.
The President made every effort to avoid meeting Eban by postponing the encounter a number of times in the hope that the Israeli Foreign [End Page 224] Minister would conclude his mission with lower level officials. Eban, however, was resistant to these obstructions, believing that Israel's dire position demanded that he reach Johnson personally. Eban's obstinacy and pressure from American Jewish organization finally forced the President's hand, and a meeting between the two men was scheduled for the night of May 26.
Before talking with Eban, Johnson invited another Israeli official to the White House, Effie [Ephraim] Evron, the number two man at the Israeli Embassy. The President had a close relationship with Evron, and felt more at ease conveying through him his message to the Israeli government. 8 His words to Evron left little doubt that the United States was in fact sending Israel a "green light" for a military operation. "With regard to the possibility of an Israeli assault," the President told Evron, "Israel is of course a sovereign state. If it decided to act independently, it could obviously do so. However, this will be made on her own responsibility, and she will bear all the consequences of such a decision. He, the President, could not believe that Israel would undertake a unilateral action, which could only bring damage, but this is her own business. He, as the President of the United States must act in the best way which would serve the American interests." 9 Later, meeting with Eban, the President seemed to convey the same message in a more reserved and vague manner.
In my view, the "green light" message was delivered in the following ways:
1. It was explained to Eban that the President had no alternative but to act within the framework of American constitutional procedures. This meant gaining Congressional approval for any strategic decisions regarding U.S. involvement in the crisis. Yet, even if Congress eventually agreed to such a course, it would take a long, perhaps exceedingly long, time. The administration was well aware that Israel could not afford to wait at length for the American decision.
2. The President made it clear to Eban that, while the United States rejected any unilateral Israeli operation against an Arab state, it recognized Israel's independence to make her own decisions and bear full responsibility for their consequences. Recalling the administration's bold warnings to Israel at the start of the crisis to refrain from any unilateral action, Johnson's words could only be interpreted as an indirect message to Israel to initiate whatever was necessary but without mentioning the United States' "contribution" to that decision.
3. Time and again the Johnson administration had declared that, according to all their intelligence estimates, Israel enjoyed military superiority over Egypt. In a showdown, Israel could defeat her and the other Arab [End Page 225] states as well. The message was clear: no need for Israel to "beg for her life"; she could accomplish the task by herself. Furthermore, Israel must also come to realize that a "victory" gained through Great Power intervention would detract from her own stature and deterrent power. The Arab states would be convinced that Israel's existence was dependent on the Great Powers. In 1956, Israel had been in collusion with two Great Powers, Britain and France, and now too she was in alliance with a Great Power, the United States.
The protocol of the conversation between the Israeli Foreign Minister and the American President sheds light on the gravity and complexity of the crisis. It is my conviction that conflicting interests eventually led the Johnson Administration to realize that an independent Israeli military operation was the only way the United States could break the stalemate and at the same time safeguard her enormous investments in the region. Concretely, this meant flashing Israel the "green light," tacitly signaling her to understand that the United States would not object to a preemptive strike against Egypt. However, Israel was expected to be aware that the American Government would not formally acknowledge her unspoken approval and would probably deny it altogether.
Zaki Shalom is Senior Research Fellow at the Ben-Gurion Research Center, Sde-Boker. Recent publications include David Ben-Gurion, The State of Israel and the Arab World, 1949-1956 (Sde-Boker, 1995) [Hebrew]. His research focuses on the Arab-Israel conXict and Israel's defense policy.
Notes
1. Approximately 90 percent of Israel's oil came from Iran through the Straits. See U.S. State Department memo, 25 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 2185, U.S. National Archives (hereafter, USNA).
2. U.S. State Department memo, 17 May 1996, NND 969000, Box 2185, USNA.
3. U.S. State Department memo, 25 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1795, USNA.
4. U.S. State department memo, 26 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1795, USNA. See also Abba Eban, An Autobiography (London, 1979) 349.
5. Ibid., 349.
6. Abba Eban, Personal Witness (New York, 1992) 382.
7. U.S. State Department memo, 16 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1795, USNA.
8. In his memoirs, Eban states that "Evron was a cherished friend of President Johnson. Sometimes Johnson would prefer conversation with Effie to formal encounters with our ambassador." Personal Witness, 386.
9. Report from the Israeli Embassy in the United States to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 27 May 1967, HZ 5937/30, Israeli State Archives
Israel Foreign Ministry Memo, HZ 5937/30
Israel State Archives
[Lyndon Johnson's Meeting with Abba Eban, 26 May 1967: An Introduction]
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MOST SECRET
Notes OF A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND FOREIGN MINISTER ABBA EBAN AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MAY 26, 1967
The meeting began just after 7:00 p.m. and went on until 8:45 p.m.
Present: The President
Secretary [of Defense] McNamara
Walt Rostow [Presidential Advisor]
Eugene Rostow [Under-Secretary of State]
Joseph Sisco [Director of UN Affairs in the State Department]
George Christian [Media Advisor to the President]
Foreign Minister Eban
Ambassador Harman
Minister Evron [Deputy Ambassador]
A. Eban: There has never been a moment for my country such as at this time. We are on a footing of grave and anxious expectancy. I came to see you to discuss the question of the Gulf of Aqaba, but meanwhile a second, and even graver, issue has arisen [reports of an imminent Egyptian attack].
On the question of Tiran I would make it clear that what Nasser has done can change the entire character of our country. Ten years ago [following the Sinai Campaign], there was a solemn pact between the US and Israel, before each other and before the world, that the Straits of Tiran would be opened to all shipping, including Israeli shipping. At that time it was a prospect, but since then it has become a legal situation and a fact. It is enshrined in the 1958 Law of the Sea and in hundreds of sailings under dozens of flags, in trade with Asia and Africa, and in vital economic and political interests. What he has done is to try to cancel that in five minutes. I would make it clear that the act of aggression has already been committed. [End Page 227] Some people ask us why we have not yet reacted to this. Most countries do react immediately when they are subjected to an act of blockade of his kind.
I would tell you in all frankness, Mr. President, that when our Cabinet met to discuss this, it seemed that we were faced with a clear-cut choice between surrender and fighting. We were unanimous in the decision that we could not and would not surrender. If we have to fight, this is the best issue on which to make a stand. It would be a bloody business, but we could hope to win the war. But we thought it worth[while] to have a look at the possibility of a third alternative: namely, that there might be an international solution. We looked to the US to see if it would take a special initiative. If the US could say that if the straits were closed that they would be opened again; if such an alternative could be developed it would protect legality while avoiding war.
On my way here I saw De Gaulle. For general reasons he talked about a Four Power agreement. I think that by now this is out of his system. The Soviets are not in a mood for harmonious action. I would stress that the French have opened their armories to us and are giving us every help that we asked for. In London I was pleasantly surprised that there was a readiness to act, but obviously only together with you. It is quite clear that the crux lies here in the US. I would emphasize that there was an explicit commitment on the Straits of Tiran. This was an American-Israeli adventure--to open up the sea as it should be open for international traffic. The very character of our country depends on this link being opened up. All our links with African and Asia depend on this. Our Prime Minister at that time wrote to President Eisenhower that, in pulling out of the Sinai, he was basing himself upon the good faith of the US, and President Eisenhower wrote to him that we would never have cause to regret placing our reliance upon that good faith. It is a question of good faith.
There is no doubt on the part of my Government as to your policy. You have given it a forceful and impressive expression. The policy is there. The question to which I have to bring the answer is: do you have the will and determination to enforce that policy, to open the straits? What Nasser has done in Aqaba is an outrage. Killing somebody by strangulation is as much murder, and as much the use of force, as killing someone by shooting. This is tantamount to one saying to you that you can only trade in the Pacific but that the Atlantic would be closed to you.
After my arrival here I was apprised by the Prime Minister of a change in the situation since I left Israel. I received from him a series of most urgent messages advising me that it is our appraisal based on knowledge that Nasser is ready for an imminent overall attack together with Syria. This is [End Page 228] our well-founded appraisal. It received public evidence in the speech which Nasser made today. I have never seen documents from the Prime Minister as urgent and as deliberate as those which have reached me since I arrived here yesterday.
There are thus two questions:
(a) Aqaba: do we fight alone or are you with us?
(b) What is the practical expression of the US commitment to us? And here what my Prime Minister was asking for was essentially very simple--a public statement by you that you stood with us, and that [there will be] coordination between your military and our own based on the assumption that our estimate of the situation is correct, and what you would do to help us in the event of that estimate proving realistic. If it did not occur, so much the better for all of us.
I would emphasize, Mr. President, that both of these problems relate not to our welfare as a country but to our very existence as a country.
The President: I thought it wise the other day to say publicly that an illegal action had occurred and make it quite clear that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway. Maybe it has not had the effect that I thought it would have. There have been parades in Cairo today against me. I am not concerned about that. I feel very strongly on this issue and I stated what I feel to the American people and to the world. The question is what to do and when to do it. A man's judgement is only as good as his information. I can only be of value to you if my Cabinet, my Congress and my people feel that you have been wronged and that we have been done wrong, and that neither of us have precipitated this situation. We have a vital interest in clearing this waterway. The question is how to do it? You have informed me of the concern of your Cabinet, which is meeting on Sunday. There is not much that I can do about that. Whatever they do, they will have to do on their own. What I could tell you is that our best forces and influence will be used to keep this waterway open. The Senate is out of town for the Memorial Day weekend and will not be back until Sunday. All of us have concluded that we ought to pursue this aim of keeping the waterway open, and that we should not jump. You don't have to be learned to know what I think of the Secretary General. I said publicly what I thought about what he did about the UNEF and I think the same about other things he has done. What I want to do is strengthen my friends and not the Secretary General. I would be less than frank if I were to tell you that I thought the Secretary General has come back with a solution, or that, if he has, that it is not the wrong one. But we have got to exhaust the UN. We have to go through this. I have very great doubts [End Page 229] as to whether anything will come out of the UN. We have tried several times in the UN on Vietnam and we have never seen the UN find an answer to anything. But this has to be done. When it becomes apparent--and I mean without filibuster--that the UN cannot do the job of opening this waterway, then it is going to be up to Israel and all its friends and all those who feel that an injustice has been done, and all those who give us some indication of what they are prepared to do, and we will do likewise. We have had some experience in rounding up people. We did it on Dominica [the Dominican Republic] and we sent [Henry Cabot] Lodge [special emissary to the President] around the world to line up help for Vietnam from the contribution of troops to the contribution of baby bottles. You in Israel have the best intelligence [agencies] and the best embassies, so put them to work to line up all those who are concerned with keeping the waterway open. Go out and get some judgments. I am glad to hear that the French have opened their armories, but I would hope that they would also open up their arms and give us a ship or two. The British are willing and we are trying to formulate a plan with them. It is unwise to do this yesterday--to jump the gun. If we try to jump the gun nothing will happen. Maybe we can get Canada, Italy and Argentina.
A. Eban: I think the Dutch and maybe the Norwegians.
The President: The Dutch will come along.
A. Eban: On the theoretical aspect of support for the principle we can get more people, but the real question is to make up a team and that cannot be done without you.
The President: Believe me I have raised this question. I didn't want to be quoted. Pearson [the Canadian Prime Minister] has been quoting me today about our conversation of yesterday about a lot of things that I have never said. I see that I am being quoted as being in favor of a Four Power arrangement in which I don't believe. What Pearson did say is that he would give a ship or two. What we need is a very short time with your leadership and British leadership to evolve an effort with some effectiveness. How soon and how effective depends on events. There is the Secretary General's report. We have many hawks and doves in this country. Now there are some new hawks being formed and some new doves, but maybe it will all wind up for the general good. We reviewed everything that this country has said in relation to Israel. Truman through Eisenhower and Kennedy and what I have said. [End Page 230] All this is important, but I tell you that this is not worth five cents unless I have the people with me. We are going to have to see what comes out of the statement of the Secretary General and the Security Council next week. Let us get busy on these 17 nations that you talk about who came out in support of freedom and navigation. We want to do that and we want to keep the waterway free for Israel shipping. It will not be too long until we will have to do it, but would it be wise at this moment, as we say in the language of poker, to call Nasser and raise his hand? If your Cabinet decides to do that, they will have to do it on their own. I want to make it clear that we are not retreating; not backtracking, and I am not forgetting anything I have said. I would be less than frank with you if I were not to tell you that your Prime Minister's suggestion to me as to what I should do now is not realistic. I want to be in a position to be of help. But I am not a king in this country and I am not good to you or to your Prime Minister if all I can lead is myself. I don't think we can help until we go through the business of the Secretary General's report and the discussion in the Security Council. The next stop and the best hope is that we would then proceed to bring the matter to a head and to its ultimate solution. I know that your blood and lives are at stake. My blood and lives are at stake in many places and may be in others. I have got to have a chance to let my people come with me.
We don't believe that the procedure we have outlined for building up an international force is going to take too long. The purpose is to see to it that the Israeli ships can go through.
We have been into all aspects of the military situation. We are aware of what this is costing you today. But it is less costly than to be precipitate while the jury is still out and have the world against us. And so I can tell you that what you have heard is friendship and similarity of views. I have spent hours of work on this and we have got the determination. But I have got to line my people up. And that depends on our going through the necessary processes and to keep on appearing to be in the right. By working in this way, I build the bridges which, in spite of all the Morses and Lippmanns [Wayne Morse, Senator from Oregon, harsh critic of the President; Walter Lippmann, acerbic columnist], led to there being only 18 votes against me for stopping the bombing. This way of doing things is much more productive. I can tell you at this moment I do not have one vote and one dollar for taking action before thrashing this mater out in the UN in a reasonable time and trying to work out some kind of a multilateral group. Other nations could and should help. It may well be that the report of the Secretary General and the nature of the discussions in the Council will drive some Senators in the right direction, and I think that Mr. Nasser will drive some [End Page 231] in the right direction. There can be no doubt about my own feelings. The purpose is to get Israeli shipping through the Gulf. This is what I have said in my statement, that the Gulf is an international waterway.
(At this point the President read the relevant passages from his statement.)
What you must tell your Cabinet is that we have hawks and doves here, and there are some who are hawks on Asia and doves on the Middle East, and the other way around. We have our constitutional process and I know what I can do. (Eppie [Efraim Evron] knows almost as much about it as I do!)
What you can tell your Cabinet is that the President, the Congress and the country will support a plan to use any or all measures to open the straits to ships of all nations. We have to go through with the Secretary General and the Security Council and build up support among the nations. I think it is a necessity that Israel should never make itself seem responsible in the eyes of America and the world for making war. Here the President said with very great emphasis: "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone."
I've had a good deal of association with you. I know the Prime Minister and the President and many others. I cannot imagine that you will take such a decision. In the last few days I have spent practically all of my time on this. I'm not worried by Nasser's parades or the Soviet Union. I'm going to do what's right if I'm permitted to.
I'm not a feeble mouse or a coward and we're going to try. What we need is a group, five or four or less or, if we can't do that then on our own. We've already said that it's illegal. No one here has gone against our position. Forty Congressmen came out with a good statement. It's going reasonably well. About De Gaulle, get him to give us ideas. He gives you arms. How much will he give of himself? Will he give a ship? I spoke to Pearson. He said today that I want a Four Power deal. That's the last thing I want. What isn't in the paper is that he said he'd give some ships.
We have constitutional processes. (Here he quoted examples of Woodrow Wilson and Roosevelt.) I'm not a King. I'm trying to bring them along. I've done it on other things. I got a resolution from them on wheat to India. There are other things I did before this came along. [The] State [Department] suggested I give you a package of $40 million. I made it over $70 million.
How to take Congress with me I've got my own views. I'm not an enemy or a coward. I'm going to plan and pursue vigorously every lead I can find in concern with others to assure, and I repeat, to assure this waterway stays open. [End Page 232]
While we're doing it, we think it's absolutely necessary for Israel not to make itself responsible for instituting hostilities.
Mr. Eban: We should be part of the group that plans this.
The President: You should be an initiator.
Mr. Eban: Your voice reverberates more than ours.
The President: We are doing it now.
Mr. Eban: The UN is not enough.
The President: I agree.
Mr. Eban: U Thant has delivered a grievous blow to our country and the world.
The President: I think so and I said so.
Mr. Eban: U Thant talks of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. The two holes in this Agreement are the blockade of Suez and the Egyptian doctrine of belligerence. Unless these are repaired, there is nothing to talk about.
The President: Pearson said something today about my agreeing to the Mixed Armistice Commission. I don't even know what it's all about.
Mr. Eban: The UN has no relevance today to any security problem. It's like going to the Chicago Council on Foreign affairs.
I want to refer again to the time problem. It must be done as quickly as possible.
The President: I agree.
Mr. Eban: There are many maritime nations which will go along in principle. But I don't know what they'll be prepared to do. They have to be asked by you and Britain. You can do it alone. Anyone can do it alone. In 1957, you said you would. There is no question of our being preemptive. There is already in existence right now an act of aggression, an illegal blockade. Our [End Page 233] Cabinet knows of your policy. What they want to know is your disposition to take action. I've heard from you now that there is such a disposition. Time is of the essence. If Nasser sees your flag or a British flag, he's going to think twice before he blockades.
The President: We think so and especially if there are some armed ships around.
Mr. Eban: If there's a real plan, you will get a lot of patience from Israel.
The President: You mentioned seventeen countries.
Mr. Eban: In 1957, there were seventeen maritime countries which [sic] asserted the principle and there are new countries like Madagascar, Ethiopia, Japan.
McNamara: Japan has enunciated this principle.
Mr. Eban: [Has anyone] mentioned the importance of our trade with Iran[?]
The President: I spoke on this subject at length today with the Iranian Ambassador.
Mr. Eban: The shipping from Iran is not with Israeli ships.
The President: We have to establish your shipping. We are not going to say it's alright if all the rest go through but Israel can't. The issue is getting Israel's ships through. How about the Norwegians?
Mr. Eban: I know the Swedes have put out a very strong statement.
The President: Put all your Ambassadors to work.
Mr. Eban: Can I summarize on this point that you are going to use every effort to get Aqaba open[?]
Now on the general problem. I cannot understand how you can be so certain our feeling is wrong.
McNamara: The CIA, the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], and the Intelligence and Research Division of State have appraised at [sic] developments, [End Page 234] and we see neither the capability nor the intention of imminent offensive action.
Eugene Rostow: I remind you that we issued a clear warning to the Egyptians last night, so it's not that we are doing nothing.
Mr. Eban: Your policy is that if Israel is attacked you will intervene to stop it. (President nods assent.) Surely there must be some planning, some joint link.
The President: That could be. [Arthur] Goldberg [US Ambassador to the UN] told me he didn't believe our estimates, so I had them all checked and rechecked. We could be wrong. I remember MacArthur was wrong on the Chinese intervening in Korea. But on this thing I told them that they should assume all the facts the Israelis have given us to be true and still the unanimous view was that there was no capability for imminent attack and that, if there were, you would knock them out.
Mr. Eban: Hasn't [Walworth] Barbour [US Ambassador to Israel] conveyed the mood in Israel?
Walt Rostow: Mood isn't intelligence.
Mr. Eban: I'm not talking only of mood.
Harman: If I can return to the question of a military link. There are two aspects. First there is no joint center, no one place where we try to appraise what is going on. Cables fly back and forth, but we are not looking at it together. Then there is the American Commitment to come to our help, but for five years I've been saying that, in a military sense, there is no telephone number for us to call.
The President: to McNamara: Would you look into this and see what can be done[?]
McNamara: Yes. Military liaison or something like that, but of course it would have to be secret.
(Both the President and McNamara mentioned that there had been an arm's length attitude from us on intelligence.) [End Page 235]
Harman: We have a good record for secrecy in these matters.
As the President rose to go, he said to Harman that there are some people on the fringes we could help with, and then he stood with Eppy Evron for a moment and developed this point.
The President referred constantly to the following paper which he then gave us:
"The US has its own constitutional processes which are basic to its action on matters involving war and peace. The Secretary General has not yet reported to the Security Council and the Council has not yet demonstrated what it may or may not be able, or willing, to do, although the US will press for prompt action in the UN.
"I have already publicly stated this week our views on the safety of travel and on the Straits of Tiran. Regarding the Strait, we plan to pursue vigorously the measures which can be taken by maritime nations to assure the Strait and the Gulf remain open to free and innocent passage of the vessels of all nations.
"I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to do it alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision
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