Middle Eastern History in the making.

Lyndon Johnson's Meeting with Abba Eban, 26 May 1967: An Introduction
Zaki Shalom
[Israel Foreign Ministry Memo, HZ 5937/30]
________________________________________
As a military parade was marching through the streets of Jerusalem on 15 May 1967 during the celebration of the State of Israel's nineteenth Independence Day, Israeli intelligence authorities received information about a massive Egyptian troop movement into the Sinai Peninsula. According to Egyptian spokesmen, the deployment was a tactical necessity in order to deter Israel from attacking Egypt's chief ally, Syria. At this stage, Israeli officials still believed that Nasser's maneuvering was merely a smokescreen to mask his primary goal: boosting his stature in the Arab world. They assumed he would then march his troops back into Egypt. However, in a matter of days, the crisis escalated ominously when the Egyptian government suddenly demanded the withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) which had been stationed in Sinai as a buffer between Israel and Egypt since 1957. This resulted in a precarious standoff between the troops of the two sides.
Under these circumstances, Israel's assessment of Nasser's intentions took a dramatic volte-face on May 19. The realization now hit the Israelis that the Egyptian President was seriously considering the feasibility of war with Israel even if he himself was not yet convinced that Egypt should be committed to hostilities. Four days later, on May 23, the crisis reached a boiling point with Nasser's announcement that the Straits of Tiran (at the southern entrance to the Gulf of Eilat) would be closed to Israeli shipping. Egypt harbored no doubts that Israel would regard this declaration as an act of war. Over the years, Israel had made it clear that free navigation through the Straits was in her vital interest and any obstruction of her maritime rights would be viewed as a casus belli. 1
On that same fateful day, under darkening war clouds, the Israeli cabinet convened to weigh the gravity of their response to the rapidly [End Page 221] unfolding events. Some Ministers believed that sooner or later a military operation against Egypt was unavoidable, while the majority retained hope in a diplomatic solution. The majority was also apprehensive of incurring a severe American response to any Israeli act of aggression. When the crisis broke, the United States urged Israel to demonstrate restraint in the face of Egyptian provocation. In his May 17 message to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, President Johnson had made it clear that he could "not accept responsibility for situations which arise as the result of actions on which we are not consulted." 2
While the Israeli cabinet was in the midst of choosing which course of action to take, the U.S. ambassador, Walworth Barbour, delivered a message to Eshkol pledging that the United States and other nations would make moves to guarantee unimpeded Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. This message arrived none too late. Although it did not specify how the U.S. would ensure Israeli navigation rights, most Ministers interpreted the dispatch to mean that Israel could refrain from a military strike against Egypt without losing face. The Cabinet decided that the American "proposal" should be explored in depth by sending the Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, on a short visit to the United States to examine the feasibility of the U.S. pledge.
At the same time, however, the Cabinet was aware that great risks were involved in the Eban mission to Washington, and the decision was not an easy one. In the first place, Israel's wide degree of freedom of action could be drastically reduced. There was also the possibility that Eban would learn that Johnson's proposals were not feasible in the immediate future and that the American President would continue to urge Israel to exhibit restraint. In this scenario, Israel would be faced with a serious dilemma: to launch a preemptive strike and risk incurring a major crisis with its most important ally, the United States, or refrain from acting and lose both its credibility and deterrent power.
Indications reveal that Eshkol was concerned over the choice of Abba Eban as the envoy to engage in the dialogue. It was felt that Eban's personality was too diplomatic and restrained. The extremely dangerous situation entrapping Israel called for an extraordinary course of action, one not limited by diplomatic niceties. Eshkol also sought a personality who could rouse the emotions of American Jewry and spur them to exert swift and unrelenting pressure on the administration. He preferred Golda Meir, who had served as Foreign Minister between 1956-1966. However, Eshkol yielded to the choice of Eban in order to avoid insulting the Foreign Minister and creating an internal political crisis. [End Page 222]
Eban began his mission by meeting with President De Gaulle in Paris. The encounter proved fruitless for Israel. De Gaulle feared a Middle East military confrontation and warned Eban that Israel should not dare to launch a preemptive strike against Egypt. The same day Eban flew to London for talks with Prime Minister Harold Wilson. It gratified him to hear solid expressions of support for Israel in her struggle for free navigation in an international waterway. Wilson, however, clarified his position by claiming that only the United States could initiate moves in this direction.
On Thursday, May 25, Eban arrived in New York, where the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Abraham Harman, handed him a top-secret message from Eshkol. The note stated that Israeli intelligence services had just learned that Israel was facing an "all-out, general U.A.R.-Syrian attack [which was] imminent and would occur at any moment." 3
Faced with the threat of national survival, the question of maritime rights was relegated to secondary importance. Eban was instructed to ask for "an immediate application of the U.S. pledge to Israel, backed up by a public declaration as well as practical actions." Eban was further told to demand an official statement by the United States that an attack on Israel would be equivalent to an attack on the United States. He was ordered to insist that the announcement be accompanied by a command to American forces in the region to co-ordinate their activity with the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) against any possible attack. 4
It seems, however, that Eban held reservations about the veracity of Eshkol's alarming message. Just prior to his departure, Israeli intelligence authorities had not foreseen the danger of imminent war. It did not seem plausible to him "that such an extreme change could have come over our military positions since I heard our generals' report in Tel-Aviv on May 23, 1967." 5
The content of Eshkol's message was soon relayed to American officials, and Johnson personally ordered all U.S. intelligence branches to verify its accuracy. They all returned with the conclusion that an "imminent all-out attack" was not feasible. Israel's credibility was damaged, and Eban's suspicions of the motives behind Eshkol's message were further heightened. In his autobiography, Eban does not hesitate to refer to the specious report as a demonstration of "momentous irresponsibility." 6 Following this, Eban went so far as to criticize his own government at a meeting held with high-ranking U.S. officials, stating that "the telegram would not have been written as it was, had he [Eban] been there." 7
Eban's visit to the United States placed the Johnson administration in an embarrassing position. Since 1957, the United States had agreed to [End Page 223] safeguard Israeli maritime rights through the Straits. This commitment was given in exchange for Israel's readiness to withdraw from Sinai in the aftermath of the 1956 Sinai Campaign. The United States also promised to guarantee the security of Israel against an Arab attack. The validity of these commitments derived, not from their legal weight alone, but from their political and moral status. There was no way the U.S. administration could ignore these pledges. Furthermore, the administration was all too aware that American failure to defend an ally in the Middle East in a clear case of aggression by pro-Soviet states would be a very dismal reflection of the value of U.S. security commitments.
Nevertheless, the United States also had strategic considerations preventing her from pursuing an active pro-Israeli stand in the crisis. For years the U.S. had been investing energy and resources in rehabilitating relations with the Arab world. Signs of success began to emerge. A pro-Israeli policy would undoubtedly endanger the burgeoning fruits of the U.S. effort. Weighing the huge economic investments it had made in the Arab world, an active American policy favorable to Israel could seriously harm the U.S. economy. In addition, it should be recalled that the U.S. was deeply involved in the publicly unpopular Vietnam War. An attempt on the part of the Johnson administration to guarantee Israel's freedom of navigation could have led to a second military confrontation whose consequences could not be calculated.
The administration, especially the White House, reached the conclusion that the only manageable solution was to allow Israel to realize that it would have to go it alone. Only an Israeli initiative in the crisis could release the United States from the complexities of its previous commitments. The Johnson administration, however, could not make an open statement to this effect, otherwise it would be accused of pushing Israel into a war with her neighbors. The U.S. had to get its message across without giving the impression what its real aim was. This could only be accomplished in a secretive, low-key manner.
In light of this, the Americans viewed Eban's presence in Washington as detrimental to their interests. Eban was a senior member in the Israeli government and a high-profile, media-wise, international personality. He arrived in the U.S. Capitol in the midst of a full-blown international crisis, and it can be assumed that the world press would be tracking his visit very closely. Statements by American officials would be widely followed in an attempt to gain insight into the U.S. position.
The President made every effort to avoid meeting Eban by postponing the encounter a number of times in the hope that the Israeli Foreign [End Page 224] Minister would conclude his mission with lower level officials. Eban, however, was resistant to these obstructions, believing that Israel's dire position demanded that he reach Johnson personally. Eban's obstinacy and pressure from American Jewish organization finally forced the President's hand, and a meeting between the two men was scheduled for the night of May 26.
Before talking with Eban, Johnson invited another Israeli official to the White House, Effie [Ephraim] Evron, the number two man at the Israeli Embassy. The President had a close relationship with Evron, and felt more at ease conveying through him his message to the Israeli government. 8 His words to Evron left little doubt that the United States was in fact sending Israel a "green light" for a military operation. "With regard to the possibility of an Israeli assault," the President told Evron, "Israel is of course a sovereign state. If it decided to act independently, it could obviously do so. However, this will be made on her own responsibility, and she will bear all the consequences of such a decision. He, the President, could not believe that Israel would undertake a unilateral action, which could only bring damage, but this is her own business. He, as the President of the United States must act in the best way which would serve the American interests." 9 Later, meeting with Eban, the President seemed to convey the same message in a more reserved and vague manner.
In my view, the "green light" message was delivered in the following ways:
1. It was explained to Eban that the President had no alternative but to act within the framework of American constitutional procedures. This meant gaining Congressional approval for any strategic decisions regarding U.S. involvement in the crisis. Yet, even if Congress eventually agreed to such a course, it would take a long, perhaps exceedingly long, time. The administration was well aware that Israel could not afford to wait at length for the American decision.
2. The President made it clear to Eban that, while the United States rejected any unilateral Israeli operation against an Arab state, it recognized Israel's independence to make her own decisions and bear full responsibility for their consequences. Recalling the administration's bold warnings to Israel at the start of the crisis to refrain from any unilateral action, Johnson's words could only be interpreted as an indirect message to Israel to initiate whatever was necessary but without mentioning the United States' "contribution" to that decision.
3. Time and again the Johnson administration had declared that, according to all their intelligence estimates, Israel enjoyed military superiority over Egypt. In a showdown, Israel could defeat her and the other Arab [End Page 225] states as well. The message was clear: no need for Israel to "beg for her life"; she could accomplish the task by herself. Furthermore, Israel must also come to realize that a "victory" gained through Great Power intervention would detract from her own stature and deterrent power. The Arab states would be convinced that Israel's existence was dependent on the Great Powers. In 1956, Israel had been in collusion with two Great Powers, Britain and France, and now too she was in alliance with a Great Power, the United States.
The protocol of the conversation between the Israeli Foreign Minister and the American President sheds light on the gravity and complexity of the crisis. It is my conviction that conflicting interests eventually led the Johnson Administration to realize that an independent Israeli military operation was the only way the United States could break the stalemate and at the same time safeguard her enormous investments in the region. Concretely, this meant flashing Israel the "green light," tacitly signaling her to understand that the United States would not object to a preemptive strike against Egypt. However, Israel was expected to be aware that the American Government would not formally acknowledge her unspoken approval and would probably deny it altogether.



Zaki Shalom is Senior Research Fellow at the Ben-Gurion Research Center, Sde-Boker. Recent publications include David Ben-Gurion, The State of Israel and the Arab World, 1949-1956 (Sde-Boker, 1995) [Hebrew]. His research focuses on the Arab-Israel conXict and Israel's defense policy.
Notes
1. Approximately 90 percent of Israel's oil came from Iran through the Straits. See U.S. State Department memo, 25 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 2185, U.S. National Archives (hereafter, USNA).
2. U.S. State Department memo, 17 May 1996, NND 969000, Box 2185, USNA.
3. U.S. State Department memo, 25 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1795, USNA.
4. U.S. State department memo, 26 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1795, USNA. See also Abba Eban, An Autobiography (London, 1979) 349.
5. Ibid., 349.
6. Abba Eban, Personal Witness (New York, 1992) 382.
7. U.S. State Department memo, 16 May 1967, NND 969000, Box 1795, USNA.
8. In his memoirs, Eban states that "Evron was a cherished friend of President Johnson. Sometimes Johnson would prefer conversation with Effie to formal encounters with our ambassador." Personal Witness, 386.
9. Report from the Israeli Embassy in the United States to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 27 May 1967, HZ 5937/30, Israeli State Archives
Israel Foreign Ministry Memo, HZ 5937/30
Israel State Archives
[Lyndon Johnson's Meeting with Abba Eban, 26 May 1967: An Introduction]
________________________________________
MOST SECRET
Notes OF A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND FOREIGN MINISTER ABBA EBAN AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MAY 26, 1967
The meeting began just after 7:00 p.m. and went on until 8:45 p.m.
Present: The President
Secretary [of Defense] McNamara
Walt Rostow [Presidential Advisor]
Eugene Rostow [Under-Secretary of State]
Joseph Sisco [Director of UN Affairs in the State Department]
George Christian [Media Advisor to the President]
Foreign Minister Eban
Ambassador Harman
Minister Evron [Deputy Ambassador]
A. Eban: There has never been a moment for my country such as at this time. We are on a footing of grave and anxious expectancy. I came to see you to discuss the question of the Gulf of Aqaba, but meanwhile a second, and even graver, issue has arisen [reports of an imminent Egyptian attack].
On the question of Tiran I would make it clear that what Nasser has done can change the entire character of our country. Ten years ago [following the Sinai Campaign], there was a solemn pact between the US and Israel, before each other and before the world, that the Straits of Tiran would be opened to all shipping, including Israeli shipping. At that time it was a prospect, but since then it has become a legal situation and a fact. It is enshrined in the 1958 Law of the Sea and in hundreds of sailings under dozens of flags, in trade with Asia and Africa, and in vital economic and political interests. What he has done is to try to cancel that in five minutes. I would make it clear that the act of aggression has already been committed. [End Page 227] Some people ask us why we have not yet reacted to this. Most countries do react immediately when they are subjected to an act of blockade of his kind.
I would tell you in all frankness, Mr. President, that when our Cabinet met to discuss this, it seemed that we were faced with a clear-cut choice between surrender and fighting. We were unanimous in the decision that we could not and would not surrender. If we have to fight, this is the best issue on which to make a stand. It would be a bloody business, but we could hope to win the war. But we thought it worth[while] to have a look at the possibility of a third alternative: namely, that there might be an international solution. We looked to the US to see if it would take a special initiative. If the US could say that if the straits were closed that they would be opened again; if such an alternative could be developed it would protect legality while avoiding war.
On my way here I saw De Gaulle. For general reasons he talked about a Four Power agreement. I think that by now this is out of his system. The Soviets are not in a mood for harmonious action. I would stress that the French have opened their armories to us and are giving us every help that we asked for. In London I was pleasantly surprised that there was a readiness to act, but obviously only together with you. It is quite clear that the crux lies here in the US. I would emphasize that there was an explicit commitment on the Straits of Tiran. This was an American-Israeli adventure--to open up the sea as it should be open for international traffic. The very character of our country depends on this link being opened up. All our links with African and Asia depend on this. Our Prime Minister at that time wrote to President Eisenhower that, in pulling out of the Sinai, he was basing himself upon the good faith of the US, and President Eisenhower wrote to him that we would never have cause to regret placing our reliance upon that good faith. It is a question of good faith.
There is no doubt on the part of my Government as to your policy. You have given it a forceful and impressive expression. The policy is there. The question to which I have to bring the answer is: do you have the will and determination to enforce that policy, to open the straits? What Nasser has done in Aqaba is an outrage. Killing somebody by strangulation is as much murder, and as much the use of force, as killing someone by shooting. This is tantamount to one saying to you that you can only trade in the Pacific but that the Atlantic would be closed to you.
After my arrival here I was apprised by the Prime Minister of a change in the situation since I left Israel. I received from him a series of most urgent messages advising me that it is our appraisal based on knowledge that Nasser is ready for an imminent overall attack together with Syria. This is [End Page 228] our well-founded appraisal. It received public evidence in the speech which Nasser made today. I have never seen documents from the Prime Minister as urgent and as deliberate as those which have reached me since I arrived here yesterday.
There are thus two questions:
(a) Aqaba: do we fight alone or are you with us?
(b) What is the practical expression of the US commitment to us? And here what my Prime Minister was asking for was essentially very simple--a public statement by you that you stood with us, and that [there will be] coordination between your military and our own based on the assumption that our estimate of the situation is correct, and what you would do to help us in the event of that estimate proving realistic. If it did not occur, so much the better for all of us.
I would emphasize, Mr. President, that both of these problems relate not to our welfare as a country but to our very existence as a country.
The President: I thought it wise the other day to say publicly that an illegal action had occurred and make it quite clear that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway. Maybe it has not had the effect that I thought it would have. There have been parades in Cairo today against me. I am not concerned about that. I feel very strongly on this issue and I stated what I feel to the American people and to the world. The question is what to do and when to do it. A man's judgement is only as good as his information. I can only be of value to you if my Cabinet, my Congress and my people feel that you have been wronged and that we have been done wrong, and that neither of us have precipitated this situation. We have a vital interest in clearing this waterway. The question is how to do it? You have informed me of the concern of your Cabinet, which is meeting on Sunday. There is not much that I can do about that. Whatever they do, they will have to do on their own. What I could tell you is that our best forces and influence will be used to keep this waterway open. The Senate is out of town for the Memorial Day weekend and will not be back until Sunday. All of us have concluded that we ought to pursue this aim of keeping the waterway open, and that we should not jump. You don't have to be learned to know what I think of the Secretary General. I said publicly what I thought about what he did about the UNEF and I think the same about other things he has done. What I want to do is strengthen my friends and not the Secretary General. I would be less than frank if I were to tell you that I thought the Secretary General has come back with a solution, or that, if he has, that it is not the wrong one. But we have got to exhaust the UN. We have to go through this. I have very great doubts [End Page 229] as to whether anything will come out of the UN. We have tried several times in the UN on Vietnam and we have never seen the UN find an answer to anything. But this has to be done. When it becomes apparent--and I mean without filibuster--that the UN cannot do the job of opening this waterway, then it is going to be up to Israel and all its friends and all those who feel that an injustice has been done, and all those who give us some indication of what they are prepared to do, and we will do likewise. We have had some experience in rounding up people. We did it on Dominica [the Dominican Republic] and we sent [Henry Cabot] Lodge [special emissary to the President] around the world to line up help for Vietnam from the contribution of troops to the contribution of baby bottles. You in Israel have the best intelligence [agencies] and the best embassies, so put them to work to line up all those who are concerned with keeping the waterway open. Go out and get some judgments. I am glad to hear that the French have opened their armories, but I would hope that they would also open up their arms and give us a ship or two. The British are willing and we are trying to formulate a plan with them. It is unwise to do this yesterday--to jump the gun. If we try to jump the gun nothing will happen. Maybe we can get Canada, Italy and Argentina.
A. Eban: I think the Dutch and maybe the Norwegians.
The President: The Dutch will come along.
A. Eban: On the theoretical aspect of support for the principle we can get more people, but the real question is to make up a team and that cannot be done without you.
The President: Believe me I have raised this question. I didn't want to be quoted. Pearson [the Canadian Prime Minister] has been quoting me today about our conversation of yesterday about a lot of things that I have never said. I see that I am being quoted as being in favor of a Four Power arrangement in which I don't believe. What Pearson did say is that he would give a ship or two. What we need is a very short time with your leadership and British leadership to evolve an effort with some effectiveness. How soon and how effective depends on events. There is the Secretary General's report. We have many hawks and doves in this country. Now there are some new hawks being formed and some new doves, but maybe it will all wind up for the general good. We reviewed everything that this country has said in relation to Israel. Truman through Eisenhower and Kennedy and what I have said. [End Page 230] All this is important, but I tell you that this is not worth five cents unless I have the people with me. We are going to have to see what comes out of the statement of the Secretary General and the Security Council next week. Let us get busy on these 17 nations that you talk about who came out in support of freedom and navigation. We want to do that and we want to keep the waterway free for Israel shipping. It will not be too long until we will have to do it, but would it be wise at this moment, as we say in the language of poker, to call Nasser and raise his hand? If your Cabinet decides to do that, they will have to do it on their own. I want to make it clear that we are not retreating; not backtracking, and I am not forgetting anything I have said. I would be less than frank with you if I were not to tell you that your Prime Minister's suggestion to me as to what I should do now is not realistic. I want to be in a position to be of help. But I am not a king in this country and I am not good to you or to your Prime Minister if all I can lead is myself. I don't think we can help until we go through the business of the Secretary General's report and the discussion in the Security Council. The next stop and the best hope is that we would then proceed to bring the matter to a head and to its ultimate solution. I know that your blood and lives are at stake. My blood and lives are at stake in many places and may be in others. I have got to have a chance to let my people come with me.
We don't believe that the procedure we have outlined for building up an international force is going to take too long. The purpose is to see to it that the Israeli ships can go through.
We have been into all aspects of the military situation. We are aware of what this is costing you today. But it is less costly than to be precipitate while the jury is still out and have the world against us. And so I can tell you that what you have heard is friendship and similarity of views. I have spent hours of work on this and we have got the determination. But I have got to line my people up. And that depends on our going through the necessary processes and to keep on appearing to be in the right. By working in this way, I build the bridges which, in spite of all the Morses and Lippmanns [Wayne Morse, Senator from Oregon, harsh critic of the President; Walter Lippmann, acerbic columnist], led to there being only 18 votes against me for stopping the bombing. This way of doing things is much more productive. I can tell you at this moment I do not have one vote and one dollar for taking action before thrashing this mater out in the UN in a reasonable time and trying to work out some kind of a multilateral group. Other nations could and should help. It may well be that the report of the Secretary General and the nature of the discussions in the Council will drive some Senators in the right direction, and I think that Mr. Nasser will drive some [End Page 231] in the right direction. There can be no doubt about my own feelings. The purpose is to get Israeli shipping through the Gulf. This is what I have said in my statement, that the Gulf is an international waterway.
(At this point the President read the relevant passages from his statement.)
What you must tell your Cabinet is that we have hawks and doves here, and there are some who are hawks on Asia and doves on the Middle East, and the other way around. We have our constitutional process and I know what I can do. (Eppie [Efraim Evron] knows almost as much about it as I do!)
What you can tell your Cabinet is that the President, the Congress and the country will support a plan to use any or all measures to open the straits to ships of all nations. We have to go through with the Secretary General and the Security Council and build up support among the nations. I think it is a necessity that Israel should never make itself seem responsible in the eyes of America and the world for making war. Here the President said with very great emphasis: "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone."
I've had a good deal of association with you. I know the Prime Minister and the President and many others. I cannot imagine that you will take such a decision. In the last few days I have spent practically all of my time on this. I'm not worried by Nasser's parades or the Soviet Union. I'm going to do what's right if I'm permitted to.
I'm not a feeble mouse or a coward and we're going to try. What we need is a group, five or four or less or, if we can't do that then on our own. We've already said that it's illegal. No one here has gone against our position. Forty Congressmen came out with a good statement. It's going reasonably well. About De Gaulle, get him to give us ideas. He gives you arms. How much will he give of himself? Will he give a ship? I spoke to Pearson. He said today that I want a Four Power deal. That's the last thing I want. What isn't in the paper is that he said he'd give some ships.
We have constitutional processes. (Here he quoted examples of Woodrow Wilson and Roosevelt.) I'm not a King. I'm trying to bring them along. I've done it on other things. I got a resolution from them on wheat to India. There are other things I did before this came along. [The] State [Department] suggested I give you a package of $40 million. I made it over $70 million.
How to take Congress with me I've got my own views. I'm not an enemy or a coward. I'm going to plan and pursue vigorously every lead I can find in concern with others to assure, and I repeat, to assure this waterway stays open. [End Page 232]
While we're doing it, we think it's absolutely necessary for Israel not to make itself responsible for instituting hostilities.
Mr. Eban: We should be part of the group that plans this.
The President: You should be an initiator.
Mr. Eban: Your voice reverberates more than ours.
The President: We are doing it now.
Mr. Eban: The UN is not enough.
The President: I agree.
Mr. Eban: U Thant has delivered a grievous blow to our country and the world.
The President: I think so and I said so.
Mr. Eban: U Thant talks of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. The two holes in this Agreement are the blockade of Suez and the Egyptian doctrine of belligerence. Unless these are repaired, there is nothing to talk about.
The President: Pearson said something today about my agreeing to the Mixed Armistice Commission. I don't even know what it's all about.
Mr. Eban: The UN has no relevance today to any security problem. It's like going to the Chicago Council on Foreign affairs.
I want to refer again to the time problem. It must be done as quickly as possible.
The President: I agree.
Mr. Eban: There are many maritime nations which will go along in principle. But I don't know what they'll be prepared to do. They have to be asked by you and Britain. You can do it alone. Anyone can do it alone. In 1957, you said you would. There is no question of our being preemptive. There is already in existence right now an act of aggression, an illegal blockade. Our [End Page 233] Cabinet knows of your policy. What they want to know is your disposition to take action. I've heard from you now that there is such a disposition. Time is of the essence. If Nasser sees your flag or a British flag, he's going to think twice before he blockades.
The President: We think so and especially if there are some armed ships around.
Mr. Eban: If there's a real plan, you will get a lot of patience from Israel.
The President: You mentioned seventeen countries.
Mr. Eban: In 1957, there were seventeen maritime countries which [sic] asserted the principle and there are new countries like Madagascar, Ethiopia, Japan.
McNamara: Japan has enunciated this principle.
Mr. Eban: [Has anyone] mentioned the importance of our trade with Iran[?]
The President: I spoke on this subject at length today with the Iranian Ambassador.
Mr. Eban: The shipping from Iran is not with Israeli ships.
The President: We have to establish your shipping. We are not going to say it's alright if all the rest go through but Israel can't. The issue is getting Israel's ships through. How about the Norwegians?
Mr. Eban: I know the Swedes have put out a very strong statement.
The President: Put all your Ambassadors to work.
Mr. Eban: Can I summarize on this point that you are going to use every effort to get Aqaba open[?]
Now on the general problem. I cannot understand how you can be so certain our feeling is wrong.
McNamara: The CIA, the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], and the Intelligence and Research Division of State have appraised at [sic] developments, [End Page 234] and we see neither the capability nor the intention of imminent offensive action.
Eugene Rostow: I remind you that we issued a clear warning to the Egyptians last night, so it's not that we are doing nothing.
Mr. Eban: Your policy is that if Israel is attacked you will intervene to stop it. (President nods assent.) Surely there must be some planning, some joint link.
The President: That could be. [Arthur] Goldberg [US Ambassador to the UN] told me he didn't believe our estimates, so I had them all checked and rechecked. We could be wrong. I remember MacArthur was wrong on the Chinese intervening in Korea. But on this thing I told them that they should assume all the facts the Israelis have given us to be true and still the unanimous view was that there was no capability for imminent attack and that, if there were, you would knock them out.
Mr. Eban: Hasn't [Walworth] Barbour [US Ambassador to Israel] conveyed the mood in Israel?
Walt Rostow: Mood isn't intelligence.
Mr. Eban: I'm not talking only of mood.
Harman: If I can return to the question of a military link. There are two aspects. First there is no joint center, no one place where we try to appraise what is going on. Cables fly back and forth, but we are not looking at it together. Then there is the American Commitment to come to our help, but for five years I've been saying that, in a military sense, there is no telephone number for us to call.
The President: to McNamara: Would you look into this and see what can be done[?]
McNamara: Yes. Military liaison or something like that, but of course it would have to be secret.
(Both the President and McNamara mentioned that there had been an arm's length attitude from us on intelligence.) [End Page 235]
Harman: We have a good record for secrecy in these matters.
As the President rose to go, he said to Harman that there are some people on the fringes we could help with, and then he stood with Eppy Evron for a moment and developed this point.
The President referred constantly to the following paper which he then gave us:
"The US has its own constitutional processes which are basic to its action on matters involving war and peace. The Secretary General has not yet reported to the Security Council and the Council has not yet demonstrated what it may or may not be able, or willing, to do, although the US will press for prompt action in the UN.
"I have already publicly stated this week our views on the safety of travel and on the Straits of Tiran. Regarding the Strait, we plan to pursue vigorously the measures which can be taken by maritime nations to assure the Strait and the Gulf remain open to free and innocent passage of the vessels of all nations.
"I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to do it alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision