How have you judged Israel's actions against Hamas? Do you think Israel used disproportionate force against Hamas?
There is an obligation to live, which means that Israel has not just the right but the obligation to defend herself. Judging the proportionality of the Israeli actions runs into a complication, though - something of a logical bind.
It is now and then noted in the press that Hamas, in its charter, calls for the elimination of Israel - though, actually, the charter goes further yet, which is almost never noted. Article Seven of the charter, citing one of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, makes clear that Hamas acknowledges a religious duty to kill the Jews. It's all pretty explicit. Which Jews in particular must be killed, in order to bring about, as the charter puts it, the "Last Hour?" Article Seven merely stipulates "the Jews" - which leaves open the possibility, I would think, of killing all of the Jews, or at least (judging from other sections of the charter) the Jews who inhabit any place that is now or used to be Islamic. In any case, the Jews of Israel.
History has some experience with political movements that proclaim in their founding documents the intention of killing the Jews
What is Israel trying to fend off, then? Two possibilities. First: it's not so hard to imagine that, if Hamas were allowed to prosper unimpeded, and if its allies and fellow-thinkers in Hezbollah and the Iranian government and its nuclear program likewise prospered, the goal announced in Article Seven could be largely achieved. History has some experience with political movements that proclaim in their founding documents the intention of killing the Jews. And so, a first possibility is that Israel is up against military enemies who have every intention of committing a genocide, and who might conceivably succeed. The possibility that Israel is defending itself against a genocide ought to lead any reasonable person to grant the Israelis a degree of latitude in judging what is a proportionate action - even if, as Michael Walzer points out, an invocation of genocidal dangers could also end up as a justification for doing too much.
However, a second possibility. The Hamas charter is full of wild language - not just the part about killing the Jews, but also the invocation of the Protocols of Zion and of an antisemitic theory of history. But maybe all of this stuff should be regarded merely as an overwrought cry of pain - an expression of powerlessness. Maybe there is a kind of pathos of victimhood and suffering in Hamas' ideas, and not much more.
I think that, around the world, a lot of people look at Hamas in that light. They see in Hamas the ugliness that clings to the powerless, and, out of compassion, they excuse the ugliness. Or they choose to overlook it, in the way that, out of courtesy, you might choose not even to notice a dreadful deformity on someone's face or body.
Now, if Hamas were, in fact, extremely weak and doomed to remain so - if Hamas were capable of nothing more than lobbing primitive rockets at Israel, which might kill a few people but not more than a few - well, the question of proportionality in Israel's military response would look a little different. Israel, in that case, would have acted just now in a grotesquely criminal way, like some deranged police force that, in its efforts to put down a street gang, has ended up leveling an entire city.
A lot of people...see in Hamas the ugliness that clings to the powerless, and, out of compassion, they excuse the ugliness
But which of these is the correct analysis - that Hamas poses a genocidal threat in the making? Or that Hamas expresses mostly the ugliness of the powerless, and poses a relatively small danger? Everything hangs on the answer to that question. People tend to assume that the proportionality of a military action should be measured against what has already taken place - that somebody who has been attacked has the right to counter-attack on roughly the same level. "The law of even-Steven," in Walzer's dismissive phrase. But it is the future that has to be taken into account.
Unfortunately, we cannot predict the future. We stand in the dark, and we make guesses. Those of us who look on the Gaza war from thousands of miles of away enjoy the luxury of speculating this way or that way. But if you were in the Israeli government, it wouldn't be so easy to gamble on the answer. So Israel is in a bind. No matter what the Israelis choose to do, they have to recognize that they might be tragically wrong - either in their failure to defend themselves, or in the suffering they inflict on other people.
One aspect of the proportionality debate has been pretty much ignored, and this has to do with the rest of the world, and not Israel - the rest of us. People ought to have noticed by now that any number of humanitarian catastrophes lie just over the horizon and are perfectly predictable - the catastrophes that will follow ineluctably from any future wars in Gaza or Lebanon, or from an attack that Israel, out of fear of the Iranian nuclear program, could conceivably launch on Iran.
No matter what the Israelis choose to do, they might be tragically wrong - either in their failure to defend themselves, or in the suffering they inflict on other people
Now, if the rest of the world really wants to worry and be upset over humanitarian disasters, there would be every reason to start worrying right now over the prospect of those future wars. A humanitarian logic ought to lead us to ask, how can those wars be stopped, pre-emptively, so to speak - instead of merely deploring them, after the fact. I know that a lot of people would say that, well, Israel ought to dismantle its West Bank settlements and do a thousand other things to allow their enemies to calm down. Me, I've never had any patience for West Bank settlements, and I can picture a lot of ways that Israel could improve.
Still, it would be disingenuous not to notice another obvious reality. An Iran without a nuclear program would be in no danger of Israeli attack. Here is an impending war that rests on a single variable. Why not alter the variable? Equally obvious: Israel is not going to launch a war against any of the groups on its own borders that remain at peace. Why not do everything possible to disarm those groups? Protests, moral pressures, diplomatic pressures, not to mention grand international alliances, not to mention human rights reports!. There are a lot of things that could be done. But it may be that, around the world, some of the people who weep over the sufferings caused by war would rather see still further wars than undertake even the simplest and most obvious steps to avoid the wars.
You laid out two interpretations of Hamas. Why do you think so many outside observers are wedded to the interpretation of Hamas as a weak, powerless organization?
It's human nature to believe that a political movement like Hamas is weak - or, if it is strong, that its wild language is merely blather, and not to be taken seriously.
Back in the 1930s, people used to assume that, once the Nazis had found their way into a position of responsibility for the well-being of Germany, they would stop saying wild things and would certainly think twice about putting their program into action. Power was supposed to sober the Nazis up. But maybe there is something about ideologies of group hatred that makes it hard to sober up.
Then again, I think that a certain number of people see nothing especially crazy or hateful in Hamas' arguments and goals. They see points that are fairly reasonable, even if Hamas' way of expressing those points seems a little crude. The Jews should not be killed, all reasonable people agree; but (so goes a very popular argument) neither do the Jews have a right to defend themselves. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion is not a sophisticated document; but Walt and Mearsheimer's book "The Israel Lobby" is (in some people's view) a sophisticated document. And the sophisticated document makes the unsophisticated one seem like it is on to something. By reasoning in this fashion, people end up concluding that Hamas' doctrines have a purchase on truth - something that quite a few people believe. But they choose not to say it because they don't want to look unsophisticated or coarse.
Power was supposed to sober the Nazis up. But maybe there is something about ideologies of group hatred that makes it hard to sober up
Anyway, history does not lack for genocides, and we have to assume that a lot of people have figured that, for one reason or another, genocide is a good idea. The people who think in this fashion are not just the fanatics who engage in the massacres, but also a larger public that gazes from the sidelines without objecting, and sometimes even applauds.
During the Gaza conflict, there were several anti-Israel protests where Israel was routinely demonized as a Nazi or Apartheid state. Why do you think so many activists, especially on the left, demonize Israel? Is it a sign of antisemitism?
Oh, as Irving Howe said, "There is no heart so warm that it doesn't have a cold spot for the Jews." We like to think of hatred of the Jews as a low, base sentiment that is entertained by nasty, ignorant people, wallowing in their own hatefulness. But normally it's not like that. Hatred for the Jews has generally taken the form of a lofty sentiment, instead of a lowly one - a noble feeling embraced by people who believe they stand for the highest and most admirable of moral views.
In the Middle Ages, Christians felt they were upholding the principles of universal redemption, and they looked on the Jews as terrible people because the Jews had refused the word of God - had insisted on remaining Jews. And so, the loftiest of religious sentiments led to hatred of the Jews.
In the 18th century, the Enlightenment philosophers looked on the Enlightenment itself as the loftiest form of thought - the truest of all possible guides to universal justice and happiness. The Enlightenment philosophers detested Christianity because it was a font of superstition and oppression. But this only led them to despise the Jews even more - no longer because the Jews had refused the message of Christianity, but because the Jews had engendered the message of Christianity. And the damnable Jews insisted on remaining Jews, instead of repudiating religion altogether.
The religious wars wreaked all kinds of damage on Europe. But the Treaty of Westphalia came along in 1648 and put an end to religious wars by establishing a system of states with recognized borders, each state with its own religion. The new Westphalian system embodied yet another Enlightenment idea of lofty ideals - the grandest guarantee of universal peace and justice. But the Jews were scattered throughout Europe, instead of being gathered together in a single state. The new state system was supposed to be a comfortable shoe, and the Jews were a pebble. And they insisted on remaining Jews, instead of helpfully disappearing. So one hated the Jews for failing to conform to the new system of states.
Today we have arrived at yet another idea about how to bring about universal peace and justice - the loftiest, most advanced idea of our own time. Instead of looking on well-established states with solid borders to keep the peace, Westphalia-style, we look on states as a formula for oppression and war. Lofty opinion nowadays calls for post-state political systems, like the European Union. Unfortunately, nowadays the Jews possess a state. Thus one hates the Jews in the name of lofty opinion, no longer because the Jews lack a state but because, on the contrary, they have a state. They seem keen on keeping their state. And once again the Jews are seen to be affirming a principle that high-minded people used to uphold but have now rejected as antiquated.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, people with advanced ideas began to look on Christian hatred of the Jews as a retrograde prejudice - and the advanced thinkers embraced, instead, the pseudo-science of racism. They no longer hated the Jews on religious grounds - they hated the Jews on racial grounds. The word "racism" originally applied to hatred of the Jews. Racial hatred seemed up to date. Today, however, racism itself has come to seem like a retrograde prejudice. And so, people with advanced opinions hate the Jews on anti-racist grounds, and they regard the Jews as the world's leading racists.
And so forth. The unstated assumption is always the same. To wit: the universal system for man's happiness has already arrived (namely, Christianity, or else Enlightenment anti-Christianity; the Westphalian state system, or else the post-modern system of international institutions; racial theory, or else the anti-racist doctrine in a certain interpretation). And the universal system for man's happiness would right now have achieved perfection - were it not for the Jews. The Jews are always standing in the way. The higher one's opinion of oneself, the more one detests the Jews.
The political left has always been of two minds on these matters. An opposition to anti-Semitism (and to all kinds of bigotry) did use to be one of the pillars of the modern left. But the left has always rested on more than one pillar, and some of those pillars are a little wobbly. And there is the left-wing conceit that, today at last, the system for universal justice and happiness has been discovered, and should be embraced by all advanced thinkers. The cosmopolitan abolition of states, let us say. And here are the Jews resisting it. In short, nothing leads more quickly to a disdain for the Jews than a feeling of smug loftiness.
The Jews are always standing in the way. The higher one's opinion of oneself, the more one detests the Jews
To be sure, lofty disdain comes in different versions. In its respectable version, lofty disdain right now adopts a position of long-faced sadness over Israel for being such a reprehensible place, for existing at a moment when states ought to fade away, for being racist, for perpetuating religion, for being an example of European imperialism, and so forth. One shakes one's head in sorrowful regret that the Israelis are the way they are.
But the disdain takes another shape, too, which is cruder, though it follows more or less from the first version. In the cruder version, the Jews are not just regrettable for being retrograde. Much worse: the Jews have done something really terrible. By forming their state and standing by it, they have set out actively to oppose the principle of universal justice and happiness - the principle that decrees that a people like the Jews should not have a state.
So, yes, the comparisons to apartheid - or, more radically and these days more typically, to the Nazis. The comparison to the Nazis began to emerge in the 1970s in Western Europe and also in the Arab world, and by now it is pretty much everywhere you look.
It's a remarkable comparison in all kinds of ways, but I'll point out just one aspect. The Nazis are generally regarded as the worst, most evil political movement in all of history - a political movement that not only committed crimes but stood for the principle of crime. By comparing Israel to the Nazis, people mean to suggest that Israel is likewise one of the worst, most evil political institutions that could possibly exist. The accusation is cosmically huge. And the cosmically huge accusation makes perfect sense - if you keep in mind the venerable idea that the Jews stand in the way of mankind's achievement of a perfected system of universal justice and happiness.
From the standpoint of the venerable idea, Israel's problems with its borders and its neighbors do not resemble the difficulties that other states have with their own borders and neighbors. There is no point in making statistical comparisons - the comparisons that might show how many people have been killed in Israel's wars, or how many people have been displaced from their homes by Israel, compared to the number of people killed and displaced by other wars and other states around the world. The statistics, if you looked at them, would reflect the fact that Israel is a small place, and its borders none too large, and its wars and disasters are not among the hugest that have taken place in the last sixty years, or even the last six years.
In the end, [antisemitism] is the grand accusation against the Jews, in ever newer versions: the Jews as cosmic enemy of the universal good
But the statistics, as I say, are irrelevant, given the peculiar philosophical light that people shine on Israel. Israel's struggle puts it at odds with the entire principle of universal justice and happiness, as people imagine it - no matter how they choose to define the principle. Other countries commit relative crimes, which can be measured and compared. But Israel commits an absolute crime. In the end, it is the grand accusation against the Jews, in ever newer versions: the Jews as cosmic enemy of the universal good.
You sound like you might be talking about human rights activists. Are you suggesting that human rights activists are now acting in the service of an antisemitic agenda?
In the service of an antisemitic agenda? No, no, the phrase is wrong. The only conscious program in the human rights movement is a good program. I hugely respect the Israeli human rights activists. To try to keep track of what has taken place during the Gaza war and may still be taking place - this is totally necessary. We know very well that the IDF has done terrible things in Gaza - perhaps by not taking judicious care, or by falling into the temptations of blind hatred, but mostly because any kind of warfare at all is what it is. But how will we ever learn what exactly has been done, if the human rights groups don't work up their reports?
There is a human value merely in recording what has taken place. If I myself had suffered in Gaza, I would definitely want human rights groups to come record what I had been through. Anyway, the Israeli human rights groups help keep the IDF honest. And so forth with other human rights organizations - at least in principle, even if there is a lot to say about the practise.
Still, even those of us who think of ourselves as the friends and champions of the human rights movement - even we ought to be able to look around and, in a spirit of lucidity, notice a couple of peculiarities. I do think that, in some of the human rights reports on Israeli military action in the past, you could see a kind of in-built analytic distortion. The human rights investigators work up analyses of what they ascertain to be facts; but their notion of facts excludes political motivations. And yet, if you ignore the political reasoning behind certain kinds of violent acts, you really cannot account for what has happened. Once you have ruled out making an examination of political motivations, you are absolutely guaranteed to conclude that Israel has acted with disproportionate force. It's predictable in advance.
The human-rights investigators work up analyses of what they ascertain to be facts; but their notion of facts excludes political motivations
A further problem: the human rights groups make their reports or accusations - and, somehow or another, the reports and accusations end up resonating all over the world. During the Gaza war, the front page of every major newspaper in the world was filled with reports and photos of Israeli violence, which became, not for the first time, a world-wide controversy. The same thing will happen, on a smaller scale, when the human rights reports come out with their accusations of Israeli war crimes, in a few weeks or months. It is as if all the news organizations of the world have agreed that, if a major problem with human rights exists anywhere in the Middle East, it comes from the one country in the region that most obviously cares about human rights. The greater is someone's high-mindedness about this kind of thing, the more that person is likely to end up singling out Israel for its assault on human rights. Statistics make up a big part of the human rights picture of reality; and yet, judged statistically, something has got to be very odd in the repeated emphatic focus on a single place. These are the peculiarities of the human rights movement right now.
Some of the most serious criticisms of Israel and Zionism come from Jews themselves. How do you interpret this response?
Well, sometimes the criticisms are rightly made. But, yes, a very curious phenomenon does pop up now and then. An old phenomenon. Back in the time of the European ghettos, most of the Jews were stuck behind the walls, and were despised for being there. But some of the Jews got out, and they did their best to blend into the majority population, and they even did their best to highlight the difference between themselves and their despised ghetto brethren. I happen just now to be reading Bernard Lewis on Lessing, the German writer.
I quote Bernard Lewis: "Lessing, perhaps the greatest of European philosemites, subtly realizes this attitude. In one of his plays, a vulgar and loud-mouthed antisemitic servant, suddenly discovering that his revered master is a Jew, tries to atone for his previously hostile remarks by observing in defense of the Jews that 'there are Jews who are not at all Jewish.' Some Jews responded to this kind of defense and implied invitation with eager enthusiasm, others with outrage. Both kinds of responses can still be found among Jews in the present day."
Lessing lived in the 18th century, and Lewis wrote the lines I've just quoted in the 1980s, in his book Semites & Anti-Semites. But it's really about our own moment, isn't it? There do seem to be a fair number of Jews who are tremendously eager to show how innocent they are - unlike the other Jews, the guilty ones.
What does the election of Barack Obama mean for America? Do you think that American support for Israel will continue under his Administration?
I'm enthused by Obama. And, in my enthusiasm, I find myself thinking: this election has been the most inspiring event in American history. The American Revolution was inspiring, and the Civil War and Lincoln likewise, and Franklin Roosevelt and the victory over fascism, and all that - inspiring events because they signaled big forward steps for democracy. But there has always been something wrong with America, and the claim to be democratic has always contained an extra clause. And so, each of those big successes in the American past has been accompanied by a small, unobtrusive asterisk, which leads your eye to the bottom of the page, where you find the extra clause, which says: "Democracy is fine and good for most people, and yet, for various unfortunate reasons, one part of the American population is hereby excluded." The asterisk has meant that America is living a lie. Even at America's grandest moments. But no longer! Not on this one point, anyway. The election just now is the first large event in American history that can be recorded without an asterisk.
[T]his election has been the most inspiring event in American history
The old-fashioned antisemitic right-wing is completely on the outs, for now. As for the anti-Zionist left in America: The Nation magazine, the Answer movement, the professors who want to boycott Israel (now, that's an interesting phenomenon!) - these kinds of tendencies are pretty marginal, in America. The views of The Nation magazine on the Middle East are represented in the degree of about five percent in the Obama administration. We have every reason to believe that President Obama will be totally sympathetic to Israel's principle policy, namely, the policy of continuing to exist. I don't know everything that Obama will do - but he won't adopt his measures on the basis of an unstated antipathy to Israel.
Now, if the new administration were capable of taking a wider view of the problem in the Middle East than the Israelis themselves are sometimes capable of taking - would that be bad? It's good that Obama has expressed a compassion for the Israelis who have lately suffered - but also for the Palestinians.
As for the anti-Zionist left in America: "The Nation" magazine, the Answer movement... these kinds of tendencies are pretty marginal
There is every reason to weep for Gaza, even if we can understand why the government of Israel is not awash right now in those particular tears. And there is every reason for the United States to do whatever can be done to help the Palestinians to a better life, liberated from these pathological ideologies whose adherents keep condemning their fellow Palestinians to ever lower rungs of suffering and sorrow. I don't know how much the United States can do to help the Palestinians throw off Hamas and a number of other groups, but, however much it is, I hope that Obama does it. To be pro-Israel is good - but the United States should show herself to be pro-Palestinian, too, in the simple belief that, in the long run, a pro-Israel position has to be pro-Palestinian, too, and vice versa. end logo
Friday, 27 February 2009
Wednesday, 25 February 2009
major geo-political rupture.
On March 29, local elections will be held in Turkey. If the current government wins these municipal races, especially in Ankara and Istanbul, the country will be encouraged to go even further down the road toward Islamic extremism. Whatever happens internally (where the nature of Turkish society forces it to go more slowly), Ankara's foreign policy is increasingly aligned with that of the radicals in the region - not only Hamas but also Syria and Iran.
Turkey's many friends are hoping that moderation and its traditional political virtues win out. But what's happening there may well be the most important political event in the Middle East since the Iranian revolution 30 years ago. Think of what it means if, in whole or even in part, Turkey goes from the Western to the radical camp; clearly this is a major geo-political event. I hold out little hope for a change in the stream of events.
Turkey's many friends are hoping that moderation and its traditional political virtues win out. But what's happening there may well be the most important political event in the Middle East since the Iranian revolution 30 years ago. Think of what it means if, in whole or even in part, Turkey goes from the Western to the radical camp; clearly this is a major geo-political event. I hold out little hope for a change in the stream of events.
Sunday, 22 February 2009
proportionality in combat!
Once an armed conflict develops, international law does not require proportionality of response. A state defending itself may indeed strive to cause disproportionate damage to its enemy's military targets and military capabilities. Let the attacking state or organization beware.
Saturday, 21 February 2009
Media perception and Israel's centre.
on Israel’s supposed rightward drift, one should not call the two current religious parties right-wing as such. They represent the interests of their communities. Their goal is to maximize the resources—money and jobs—they get. They may go with left-of-center governments that offer them enough. At times, Shas has taken dovish stands. I am aware that Shas endorsed Netanyahu before the election to ensure no voters defected to him, but their voters are pretty loyal, and if Shas decided to go into a Livni-led government (if she had had a bigger margin) they would support it. Note that when the National Religious Party became a single-issue pro-settler party instead of the defender of “Modern Orthodoxy” (or what we would call national-religious interests) it fell apart. Moreover, Likud has moved toward the center. The moving-to-the-right thesis may obsess the media—in part because of their agenda of trying to prove Israelis are against peace or at least make peace impossible—but it is not true.
Friday, 20 February 2009
Thursday, 19 February 2009
Hafiz's Syria:
A presentation of mine on Hafiz's Syria and its true being.
The definition being used to give parameters to the presentation is that of Charles Tilly. This would entail a regime being military if the army is preponderant in any one sector of political society.
Syria leading up to the rule of Asad.
This section focuses on the social and political divisions within society and politics and the subsequent rise of the military as one of the few actors in Syria with any strength.
The Asad regime: the three orbits.
Syria under Asad is split into three orbits that are used as bases of legitimating authority and power. These three are the Sub-National, National and supra-National spheres in society. Or:
1. Alawi.
2. Syrian.
3. Arab.
The system of government in Syria under Asad.
Syria is split into two parallel structures of governance. These are:
1. The Formal. (The Ba’th Party, Government Bureaucracy, etc….)
2. The Informal. (The Personal Rule of Asad, the Defense organizations, etc….)
This hopes to show that although executive and legislative authority is channeled through the Formal institutions of state, the real power in the Regime lies in the informal structures.
The Military and Defense Organizations of Syria.
This will show that the military is Alawi dominated, with real power within the military residing in the Alawi “Barons”. Asad is shown to be above these groups and uses them to his own ends, by playing them off against each other.
Conclusion.
That though under the Parameters set out at the start, the Regime does have a military base, yet actual power is seen to reside in Alawi sectarian politics.
Can the Regime of Hafez al-Asad be Characterized as a Military Regime?
1. What is a military regime?
According to Elizabeth Piccard, “military intervention in politics had become commonplace in many Arab states, actually with a much higher frequency than in most third world countries during the 1950s and 1960s.”
This could be easily seen in the 1970s and 1980s where the military expenditure in terms of GNP in the Middle East was nearly twice that of the next most militarized region, and over three times the world average.
Yet the proportion of states under military control was just below the world average!
So what can we take as being a military state?
Here I shall be taking as my base the military regime as that defined by Charles Tilly, which could be one or more of the following:
• “Key political leadership by military officers,
• existence of martial law,
• extrajudicial authority exercised by security forces,
• lack of political control over the armed forces,
• Or occupation by foreign military forces.”
Thus while we look at the rule of Hafiz al-Asad’s regime in Syria, lets keep these parameters in mind.
2. Syria leading up to the rule of Asad:
Syria as a state lacked historical and real identity; it could be seen as a French invention in the 1920s.
Other problems included Syria’s demographic composition, and other social and political characteristics, such as:
• Its geographical location.
• Ethnic and sectarian divisions ( see table)
• The deep socio-political divisions of the Urban and rural populations.
• The challenge of the west. Its cultural and political influence and legacy.
• Lack of a tradition of sovereign independence.
• No accepted political center.
All these factors hindered the Damascus regimes from instituting a systematic and effective policy.
This led to radical and ill conceived policies. The perceived need to give priority to pan-Arab interests hurt the ability to build a true Syrian national identity.
Primary loyalties stayed on the regional level:
• Sectarian
• Tribal
• Or family.
This all led to instability and thus the intervention in the politics of Syria by other actors, especially the military which was the only strong institution in the country.
The Asad regime: the three orbits:
4. Alawi.
5. Syrian.
6. Arab.
Hafiz al-Asad managed to turn Syria into a stable state and a regional power, but how?
A popular way to characterize the regime of Asad is that it evolved from two factors:
1. The sectarian nature of the regime. It being based on Alawi affiliation and control of the army and security services.
2. And secondly its strength from its dictatorial and repressive nature.
Another view is that this obscures the political, economic and social processes that have unfolded in Syria since Asad took power.
That by 1970, the issue of stability was a reality, as most issues – (ideological, political, socio-economic, sectarian etc….) were exhausted, liquidized or neutralized.
And thus the regime could be seen as a truer representation of Syrian society than any before it.
The regime acted in three orbits:
1. Alawi. The internal core.
2. Syrian. The outer shell.
3. And Arab. Legitimating its authority.
The system of government in Syria under Asad:
The regime in Syria has two aspects:
1. the formal:
This is a system of legislative and executive institutions, as seen in the Ba’th Party, the Peoples Assembly, the government and the Presidency, and various other legal institutions of rule.
2. the second is the informal:
This includes the heads of security and senior military commanders who ensure the stability and protection of the regime.
The difference here of these two systems is one of Quantity versus quality.
With The formal system representing and reflecting the weight of coalition members.
While the informal system shows a qualitative relationship, and thus a truer reflection of the balance of power in Syria.
The formal apparatus:
In practice this contains two parallel integrative subsystems:
1. The Ba’th Party.
2. And the civilian government.
According to the Syrian constitution, the Ba’th party has priority. clause eight stating:
“The Ba’th Party leads society and the state and stands at the head of the National Progressive front, which acts to unite the forces of the masses and to mobilize them in the service of the goals of the Arab nation.”
The Ba’th party is organized in such a way (in branches, departments and cells) that it can reach throughout the country.
Every four years the Ba’th party holds elections for their branch representatives to go to the Congress. These in turn elect the central institutions of the party which in turn elect the 90 member central committee, and the 21 member regional command.
The regional command is the highest political body in the Syrian Ba’th Party.
The executive and legislative systems work alongside the party system, and is controlled almost totally by the high officials of the party.
The system of legislative bodies includes, The Public Assembly.
This can ratify laws, approve budgets and development programs.
The executive includes the Presidency and the government. The presidency
Is seen as the highest executive authority in the constitution.
Both the Prime Minister and the ministers of state are appointed by the president and are answerable to him as are the military.
Asad makes sure that the different groups in the country are all represented to their correct balance in the government. Thus the Sunnis will hold about 60% of seats in the Party institutions and government. (Though generally not the strategically sensitive ones).
(Table 2)
Here there is also a strong representation by the military wing of the Ba’th Party, with important posts in the Bath Party being held by the top Alawi generals.
The Informal Ruling Apparatus:
The informal system co-exists with the formal one.
It centers on the chiefs of the security apparatus and the senior army officers, whose contribution are critical to the stability and continuance of the regime.
The Ba’th party is used to bridge the gap between the formal and informal.
It provides an ideological cloak for all to fit into and allows for a meeting place between the civil and military establishments.
The Ba’th party has both military and security branches, each of which elects their own members to the Bath Party’s top institutions.
But in the past this has failed to ensure the rule of the civil over the military, as can be seen in Asad’s corrective revolution in 1970.
As president Asad is also commander in chief of the military.
Yet his standing and power don’t just come from the constitution, but from his mastery of the informal system and the command of the security services and military.
The Military and Defense Organizations in Syria:
(table 3)
Since 1970 the military has been generally subordinate to the president.
Yet it remains a very powerful actor within the Syrian state that can still shape outcomes, and is called upon repeatedly to ensure the regime’s stability – even existence.
The structure of the military is not monolithic, but can be divided into three groups.
Firstly there are the Alawi security ‘Barons’, who dominate in Asad’s inner circle.
Then there are the Ba’thist officers, who hold prominent positions in the Party.
Lastly there is the professional officer corps of the army.
The ‘Barons’ gave Asad a security base for his regime, and would assure him against any attempted coup.
This was Asad’s main instrument in his coup proofing of his regime
These security forces and the army in general can be seen as an Alawi institution, the Alawi control of the officer corps was always dominant under Asad.
Asad as a co-sectarian relied upon their support as the major power base of his rule.
Jaque Weulersse maintained, that a minority could dominate if it had political, military or economic superiority
The Ba’th Party military faction continued to send delegates to Congresses, the most senior went into the Regional Command council.
They all played politics and established client – patronage links into the Party and other government institutions as well as within their own personal fiefs.
If all else failed for the Asad regime it always had the security apparatus to fall back upon.
Their enormous repressive potential was seen especially in the multiple, pervasive and feared security and intelligence agencies.
They allowed little tolerance for dissent and were therefore effective in deadening any potential political plurality or life.
It was the Alawi ‘Barons’ who were seen as the Bulwark of the regime, most of whom were from Asad’s own Family or tribe.
A good analogy of their role is that of a “Godfather” and his associates.
These “Barons’ were viewed as above the law, they could ignore the regulations of the Ba’th Party and even held their own economic fiefs and patronage systems.
There was little opportunity for recompense against these groups, as for Asad to pursue them would mean undermining the main pillar his regime rested upon.
Conclusion:
The regime that came in, in 1970 could be seen as one of three things:
1. Ba’thists who happened to be Alawi officers.
2. or soldiers who happened to be Alawi Ba’thists
3. Or Alawis who happened to be Ba’thists and soldiers.
Of these the third is the most accurate, as both the military and the Ba’th party were critical, but in the end the transfer of power from the Sunnis to the Alawis is what counted the most.
It was this Alawi identity that ultimately defined and defended the rulers of this regime.
Above all this was Hafiz al-Asad. He had a Bonapartist autonomy, allowing him to stand above all the elite and play them off against each other. Leaving him room to maneuver within Syrian society.
Yet the foundation of his power rested not on the vote and will of the people, but was in the military, security services and formal institutions that he formed to rule the country!
Therefore going back to our parameter that we put down at the start, it has to be said, that although Asad tried to legitimize his rule via socio-political actions and pluralism, his state still can be seen as a military one.
Where the power held by the military and security services was disproportionate to that of civil politicians.
Yet at heart it was an Alawi regime.
Bibliography:
• Allan J.A.(ed.), Politics and the Economy in Syria: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London on 20 May 1987 / Conference Convened and the proceedings Edited by J.A. Allan; London; School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; 1987.
• Antoun & Quataert (eds.), Syria Society, Culture, and Polity; Albany NY; State University of New York Press; 1991.
• Batatu, Hanna, “Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria’s Ruling, military Group and the Causes for its Dominance”, in: Middle East Journal, Vol.35, No.3 Summer, 1981), 331-44.
• Ben-Tzur, Avraham, “The Neo-Ba’th Party of Syria”, in: Journal of contemporary History, Vol.3, No.3 The Middle East (Jul., 1968), 161-81.
• Bitar, Salah ed-Din; Marie-Christine Aulas; Eric Hooglund; Jim Paul, “The Major Deviation of the Ba’th Is having Renounced Democracy”, in: MERIP Reports, No.110, Syria’s Troubles (Nov. – Dec., 1982), 21-23.
• Bou-Nacklie, N.E., “Les Troupes Specials: Religious and Ethnic Recruitment, 1916-46”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.25, No.4 (Nov., 1993), 645-660.
• Bromley, Simon, Rethinking Middle East Politics: State Formation and development; Cambridge UK; Polity Press; 1994.
• Devlin, John, “The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis”, in: The American Historical Review, Vol.96, No.5 (Dec., 1991), 1396-1407.
• Drysdale, Alasdair, “The Asad Regime and its Troubles”, in: MERIP Reports, No.110, Syria’s Troubles (Nov. – Dec., 1982), 3-11 + 36.
• Dusen, Michael H., “Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria”, in: Middle East Journal, Vol.26, No.2, (Spring, 1972), 123-37.
• Faksk, M.A., “The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force”, in: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.20, No.2 (Apr., 1984).
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, Syria: Revolution from Above; London & New York; Routledge; 2001.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba’thist Syria: the Political Economy of Rural Development; Boulder, San Francisco & London; Westview Press; 1989.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, “Class and state in Ba’thist Syria”, in: Antoun & Quataert (eds.), Syria Society, Culture, and Polity; Albany NY; State University of New York Press; 1991, 38-46.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, “State and Civil Society in Syria”, in: Middle East Journal, Vol.47, No.2, (Spring, 1983), 243-58.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, “Political Recruitment and Socialization in Syria: The Case of the Revolutionary Youth Federation”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.11, No.2 (Apr., 1980), 143-174.
• Kaylani, Nabil, “The Rise of the Syrian Ba’th, 1940-1958: Political Success and Party Failure”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.3, No.1 (Jan., 1972), 3-23.
• Ma’oz, Moshe, “The Emergence of Modern Syria”, in: Ma’oz & Yaniv (ed.), Syria under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks; London & Sydney; Croom Helm; 1986.
• Ma’oz, Moshe & Yaniv (ed.), Syria under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks; London & Sydney; Croom Helm; 1986.
• Ma’oz, Zeev, “The Evolution of Syrian Power, 1948-1984”, in: Ma’oz, Moshe & Yaniv (ed.), Syria under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks; London & Sydney; Croom Helm; 1986.
• Perlmutter, Amos, “From Obscurity to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba’th Party”, in: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.22, No.4 (Dec., 1969), 827-45.
• Perthes, Volker, “A Look at Syria’s Upper Class: The Bourgeoisie and the Ba’th”, in: Middle East Report, No.170, Power, Poverty and Petrodollars (May. – Jun., 1991), 31-37.
• Pipes, Daniel, “Radical Politics and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.20, No.3 (Aug., 1988), 303-324.
• Pipes, Daniel, “The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria”, in: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.25, No.4 (Oct., 1989), 429-450.
• Quinlivan, James T., “Coup Proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East”, in: International Security, Vol.24, No.2 (autumn, 1999), 131-61.
• Roberts, D., “The Background and Role of the Baath Party”, in: Allan (ed.), Politics and the Economy in Syria: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London on 20 May 1987 / Conference Convened and the proceedings Edited by J.A. Allan; London; School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; 1987.
• Sadowski, Yahya, “Cadres, Guns and Money: The Eighth regional Congress of the Syrian Ba’th”, in: MERIP Reports, No.134, Asad’s Syria (Jul. – Aug., 1985), 3-8.
• Seale, Patrick, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; London; Tauris; 1988.
• Seale, Patrick, “Asad: Between Institutions and Autocracy”, in: Antoun & Quataert (eds.), Syria Society, Culture, and Polity; Albany NY; State University of New York Press; 1991.
• Van Dam, Nicolas, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba’th Party; London & New York; I.B. Tauris; 1996.
• Zisser, Eyal, Asad’s Legacy: Syria in Transition; London; Hurst & Company; 2001.
• Zisser, Eyal “The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and External Fronts”, in: Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol.5, No.1 (Mar., 2001), 1-12. http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/meria/journal/2001/issue1/zisser.pdf
• Zisser, Eyal, “Appearance and Reality: Syria’s Decision-making Structure”, in: Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol.2, No.2 (May, 1998), 29-42. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue2/zisser.pdf
Tables below:
Regional Command No.: » 1 - 4 5 - 8 9 - 13 1 -13
Period: » 3.63 2.66 3.66 11.70 11.70 1995 3.63 1995
District: Religion: % No. % No. % No. % No.
Damascus Sunni 2.0 1 - 21.4 21 10.4 22
(21)* Christian - - - -
Shi’i - - - -
Total 2.0 1 21.4 21 10.4 22
Aleppo Sunni 8.0 4 - 6.1 6 4.7 10
(20) Christian - - - -
Total 8.0 4 - 6.1 6 4.7 10
Idlib Sunni 4.0 2 - 5.1 5 3.3 7
(7) Total 4.0 2 - 5.1 5 3.3 7
Hama Sunni - - 4.1 4 1.9 4
(8) Isma’ili 10.0 5 9.4 6 - 5.2 11
Alawi - - 3.1 3 1.4 3
Christian - - 1.0 1 0.5 1
Total 10.0 5 9.4 6 8.2 8 9.0 19
Homs Sunni 10.0 5 9.4 6 6.1 6 8.0 17
(10) Alawi 2.0 1 - 1.0 1 1.0 1
Christian - - - -
Total 12.0 6 9.4 6 7.1 7 9.0 19
Latakia Sunni 10.0 5 6.3 4 5.1 5 6.6 14
(13) Alawi 12.0 6 23.4 15 16.3 16 17.4 37
Isma’ili - - - -
Christian - - 5.1 5 2.4 5
Total 22.0 11 29.7 19 26.5 16 26.4 56
Dayr al-Zur Sunni 12.0 6 15.6 10 7.1 7 10.8 23
(12) Total 12.0 6 15.6 10 7.1 7 10.8 23
Dar’a Sunni 6.0 3 14.0 9 9.2 9 9.9 21
(4) Christian 2.0 1 6.3 4 1.0 1 2.8 6
Total 8.0 4 20.3 13 10.2 10 12.7 27
Qunaytarah Sunni 2.0 1 6.3 4 1.0 1 2.8 6
(2) Druze - - - -
Total 2.0 1 6.3 4 1.0 1 2.8 6
Suwayda’ Sunni - - 2.0 2 1.02
(3) Druze 20.0 10 9.4 6 4.1 4 9.4 20
Christian - - - -
Total 20.0 10 9.4 6 6.1 6 10.4 22
Unknown Sunni - - 1.0 1 0.5 1
Total - - 1.0 1 0.5 1
TOTAL 100.0 50 100.0 64 100.0 98 100.0 212
Table 1: Regional and sectarian representation in Syrian regional Commands of the Ba’th Party (1963-95). * Represents the % of the total population.
Table:
Syrian Security Agencies:
Major Agencies: Branches: Character:
General intelligence Internal branch
External security
Counterespionage civilian
Political security Political Party
Students and Student activities
Surveillance and pursuit
City Civilian
Bureau of national security
Of the Ba’th Party Civilian
Military intelligence Palestine
Commando Police
Military interrogation
Military intelligence in Lebanon Military
Air force intelligence Military
Military police Military
Military security Military
Special forces Parallel Military
Presidential guard
Presidential Security Parallel Military
Source: Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights bu the Assad Regime (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), pp.48-53. as cited in: Quinlivan, James T., “Coup Proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East”, in: International Security, Vol.24, No.2 (autumn, 1999), p.152.
Religious Group: Estimated No.
of adherents: Percent of
group Percent of
total
Muslim: 4,631,000 100* 84.7
Sunnis 3,950,000 85.3 72.2
‘Alawis 600,000 13.0 11.0
Isma’ilis 56,000 1.2 1.0
Other Shi’ites 25,000 0.5 0.5
Christian: 654,000 100.0 12.0
Greek Orthodox 246,000 37.6 4.5
Armenian Orthodox 140,000 21.4 2.5
Greek Catholic† 80,000 12.2 1.5
Syrian Orthodox 72,000 11.0 1.3
Syrian Catholics† 30,000 4.6 0.6
Maronites† 25,000 3.8 0.5
Armenian Catholics† 24,000 3.7 0.4
Nestorians 15,000 2.3 0.3
Protestants 12,000 1.8 0.2
Roman Catholics 10,000 1.5 0.2
Others: 184,000 - 3.3
Druzes 170,000 - 3.0
Yazidis 10,000 - 0.2
Jews 4,000 - 0.1
Table Showing the religious Communities in Syria, 1964:
* Actual sum of percentages is 99.9 because of rounding
†Affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. Not included in this table are the Chaldeans, a small group historically derived from the Nestorians but affiliated with the Roman Catholics.
Source: U.S Army Area Handbook for Syria (Department of the Army Pamphlet, No.550-47, July 1965), p.124. cited in: Perlmutter, Amos, “From Obscurity to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba’th Party”, in: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.22, No.4 (Dec., 1969), p.829.
2. Syria before Asad:
Syria as a state lacked historical and real identity; it could be seen as a French invention in the 1920s.
The legacy of French mandatory rule was a handicap for the post independence regime.
Other problems included the countries demographic composition, and other social and political characteristics, such as:
• Its geographical location.
• Ethnic and sectarian divisions ( see table)
• The deep socio-political divisions of the Urban and rural populations.
• The challenge of the west. Its cultural and political influence and legacy.
• Lack of a tradition of sovereign independence.
• No accepted political center.
All these factors hindered the Damascus regimes from instituting a systematic and effective policy.
This led to radical and ill conceived policies. The need to give priority to pan-Arab interests hurt the ability to build a Syrian national identity.
Primary loyalties stayed on the regional level:
• Sectarian
• Tribal
• Or family.
This all led to instability and thus the intervention in the politics of the country by other actors, especially the military which was the only strong institution in the country, and external actors looking to influence the polity.
The big change in Syria came with the successful Ba’th coup in 1963.
This coup overturned the traditional Syrian pyramid of authority.
As the Ba’th Party garnered most of its strength from the lower disenfranchised classes.
The rulers here were divided between military and civilians, yet it was the military that held the upper hand, as the civilian Ba’th party gained only 15% of the vote in the 1963 election, and were handed the reigns of power by the Military junta that preformed the coup.
Yet it was the military under Salah Jadid that forced the next change in 1966, their more radical ideology forcing out the traditional ideologues of the Ba’th,
It was their radical policies and foreign policy adventurism that led to their downfall.
This was played out in the military sphere, as the radicals under Jadid and the moderates of Asad clashed.
There seemed little difference in the two groups as they were both;
• Petit bourgeoisie
• Cross-sectarian
• And civil-military coalitions led by Alawi generals.
Yet each were supported by distinct segments of society.
The Radicals by the Leftist intellectuals and trade unions.
The moderates by the military and bourgeoisie.
Thus Asad’s way to power can be seen as a victory of the military Ba’th party faction over the civil one.
The definition being used to give parameters to the presentation is that of Charles Tilly. This would entail a regime being military if the army is preponderant in any one sector of political society.
Syria leading up to the rule of Asad.
This section focuses on the social and political divisions within society and politics and the subsequent rise of the military as one of the few actors in Syria with any strength.
The Asad regime: the three orbits.
Syria under Asad is split into three orbits that are used as bases of legitimating authority and power. These three are the Sub-National, National and supra-National spheres in society. Or:
1. Alawi.
2. Syrian.
3. Arab.
The system of government in Syria under Asad.
Syria is split into two parallel structures of governance. These are:
1. The Formal. (The Ba’th Party, Government Bureaucracy, etc….)
2. The Informal. (The Personal Rule of Asad, the Defense organizations, etc….)
This hopes to show that although executive and legislative authority is channeled through the Formal institutions of state, the real power in the Regime lies in the informal structures.
The Military and Defense Organizations of Syria.
This will show that the military is Alawi dominated, with real power within the military residing in the Alawi “Barons”. Asad is shown to be above these groups and uses them to his own ends, by playing them off against each other.
Conclusion.
That though under the Parameters set out at the start, the Regime does have a military base, yet actual power is seen to reside in Alawi sectarian politics.
Can the Regime of Hafez al-Asad be Characterized as a Military Regime?
1. What is a military regime?
According to Elizabeth Piccard, “military intervention in politics had become commonplace in many Arab states, actually with a much higher frequency than in most third world countries during the 1950s and 1960s.”
This could be easily seen in the 1970s and 1980s where the military expenditure in terms of GNP in the Middle East was nearly twice that of the next most militarized region, and over three times the world average.
Yet the proportion of states under military control was just below the world average!
So what can we take as being a military state?
Here I shall be taking as my base the military regime as that defined by Charles Tilly, which could be one or more of the following:
• “Key political leadership by military officers,
• existence of martial law,
• extrajudicial authority exercised by security forces,
• lack of political control over the armed forces,
• Or occupation by foreign military forces.”
Thus while we look at the rule of Hafiz al-Asad’s regime in Syria, lets keep these parameters in mind.
2. Syria leading up to the rule of Asad:
Syria as a state lacked historical and real identity; it could be seen as a French invention in the 1920s.
Other problems included Syria’s demographic composition, and other social and political characteristics, such as:
• Its geographical location.
• Ethnic and sectarian divisions ( see table)
• The deep socio-political divisions of the Urban and rural populations.
• The challenge of the west. Its cultural and political influence and legacy.
• Lack of a tradition of sovereign independence.
• No accepted political center.
All these factors hindered the Damascus regimes from instituting a systematic and effective policy.
This led to radical and ill conceived policies. The perceived need to give priority to pan-Arab interests hurt the ability to build a true Syrian national identity.
Primary loyalties stayed on the regional level:
• Sectarian
• Tribal
• Or family.
This all led to instability and thus the intervention in the politics of Syria by other actors, especially the military which was the only strong institution in the country.
The Asad regime: the three orbits:
4. Alawi.
5. Syrian.
6. Arab.
Hafiz al-Asad managed to turn Syria into a stable state and a regional power, but how?
A popular way to characterize the regime of Asad is that it evolved from two factors:
1. The sectarian nature of the regime. It being based on Alawi affiliation and control of the army and security services.
2. And secondly its strength from its dictatorial and repressive nature.
Another view is that this obscures the political, economic and social processes that have unfolded in Syria since Asad took power.
That by 1970, the issue of stability was a reality, as most issues – (ideological, political, socio-economic, sectarian etc….) were exhausted, liquidized or neutralized.
And thus the regime could be seen as a truer representation of Syrian society than any before it.
The regime acted in three orbits:
1. Alawi. The internal core.
2. Syrian. The outer shell.
3. And Arab. Legitimating its authority.
The system of government in Syria under Asad:
The regime in Syria has two aspects:
1. the formal:
This is a system of legislative and executive institutions, as seen in the Ba’th Party, the Peoples Assembly, the government and the Presidency, and various other legal institutions of rule.
2. the second is the informal:
This includes the heads of security and senior military commanders who ensure the stability and protection of the regime.
The difference here of these two systems is one of Quantity versus quality.
With The formal system representing and reflecting the weight of coalition members.
While the informal system shows a qualitative relationship, and thus a truer reflection of the balance of power in Syria.
The formal apparatus:
In practice this contains two parallel integrative subsystems:
1. The Ba’th Party.
2. And the civilian government.
According to the Syrian constitution, the Ba’th party has priority. clause eight stating:
“The Ba’th Party leads society and the state and stands at the head of the National Progressive front, which acts to unite the forces of the masses and to mobilize them in the service of the goals of the Arab nation.”
The Ba’th party is organized in such a way (in branches, departments and cells) that it can reach throughout the country.
Every four years the Ba’th party holds elections for their branch representatives to go to the Congress. These in turn elect the central institutions of the party which in turn elect the 90 member central committee, and the 21 member regional command.
The regional command is the highest political body in the Syrian Ba’th Party.
The executive and legislative systems work alongside the party system, and is controlled almost totally by the high officials of the party.
The system of legislative bodies includes, The Public Assembly.
This can ratify laws, approve budgets and development programs.
The executive includes the Presidency and the government. The presidency
Is seen as the highest executive authority in the constitution.
Both the Prime Minister and the ministers of state are appointed by the president and are answerable to him as are the military.
Asad makes sure that the different groups in the country are all represented to their correct balance in the government. Thus the Sunnis will hold about 60% of seats in the Party institutions and government. (Though generally not the strategically sensitive ones).
(Table 2)
Here there is also a strong representation by the military wing of the Ba’th Party, with important posts in the Bath Party being held by the top Alawi generals.
The Informal Ruling Apparatus:
The informal system co-exists with the formal one.
It centers on the chiefs of the security apparatus and the senior army officers, whose contribution are critical to the stability and continuance of the regime.
The Ba’th party is used to bridge the gap between the formal and informal.
It provides an ideological cloak for all to fit into and allows for a meeting place between the civil and military establishments.
The Ba’th party has both military and security branches, each of which elects their own members to the Bath Party’s top institutions.
But in the past this has failed to ensure the rule of the civil over the military, as can be seen in Asad’s corrective revolution in 1970.
As president Asad is also commander in chief of the military.
Yet his standing and power don’t just come from the constitution, but from his mastery of the informal system and the command of the security services and military.
The Military and Defense Organizations in Syria:
(table 3)
Since 1970 the military has been generally subordinate to the president.
Yet it remains a very powerful actor within the Syrian state that can still shape outcomes, and is called upon repeatedly to ensure the regime’s stability – even existence.
The structure of the military is not monolithic, but can be divided into three groups.
Firstly there are the Alawi security ‘Barons’, who dominate in Asad’s inner circle.
Then there are the Ba’thist officers, who hold prominent positions in the Party.
Lastly there is the professional officer corps of the army.
The ‘Barons’ gave Asad a security base for his regime, and would assure him against any attempted coup.
This was Asad’s main instrument in his coup proofing of his regime
These security forces and the army in general can be seen as an Alawi institution, the Alawi control of the officer corps was always dominant under Asad.
Asad as a co-sectarian relied upon their support as the major power base of his rule.
Jaque Weulersse maintained, that a minority could dominate if it had political, military or economic superiority
The Ba’th Party military faction continued to send delegates to Congresses, the most senior went into the Regional Command council.
They all played politics and established client – patronage links into the Party and other government institutions as well as within their own personal fiefs.
If all else failed for the Asad regime it always had the security apparatus to fall back upon.
Their enormous repressive potential was seen especially in the multiple, pervasive and feared security and intelligence agencies.
They allowed little tolerance for dissent and were therefore effective in deadening any potential political plurality or life.
It was the Alawi ‘Barons’ who were seen as the Bulwark of the regime, most of whom were from Asad’s own Family or tribe.
A good analogy of their role is that of a “Godfather” and his associates.
These “Barons’ were viewed as above the law, they could ignore the regulations of the Ba’th Party and even held their own economic fiefs and patronage systems.
There was little opportunity for recompense against these groups, as for Asad to pursue them would mean undermining the main pillar his regime rested upon.
Conclusion:
The regime that came in, in 1970 could be seen as one of three things:
1. Ba’thists who happened to be Alawi officers.
2. or soldiers who happened to be Alawi Ba’thists
3. Or Alawis who happened to be Ba’thists and soldiers.
Of these the third is the most accurate, as both the military and the Ba’th party were critical, but in the end the transfer of power from the Sunnis to the Alawis is what counted the most.
It was this Alawi identity that ultimately defined and defended the rulers of this regime.
Above all this was Hafiz al-Asad. He had a Bonapartist autonomy, allowing him to stand above all the elite and play them off against each other. Leaving him room to maneuver within Syrian society.
Yet the foundation of his power rested not on the vote and will of the people, but was in the military, security services and formal institutions that he formed to rule the country!
Therefore going back to our parameter that we put down at the start, it has to be said, that although Asad tried to legitimize his rule via socio-political actions and pluralism, his state still can be seen as a military one.
Where the power held by the military and security services was disproportionate to that of civil politicians.
Yet at heart it was an Alawi regime.
Bibliography:
• Allan J.A.(ed.), Politics and the Economy in Syria: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London on 20 May 1987 / Conference Convened and the proceedings Edited by J.A. Allan; London; School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; 1987.
• Antoun & Quataert (eds.), Syria Society, Culture, and Polity; Albany NY; State University of New York Press; 1991.
• Batatu, Hanna, “Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria’s Ruling, military Group and the Causes for its Dominance”, in: Middle East Journal, Vol.35, No.3 Summer, 1981), 331-44.
• Ben-Tzur, Avraham, “The Neo-Ba’th Party of Syria”, in: Journal of contemporary History, Vol.3, No.3 The Middle East (Jul., 1968), 161-81.
• Bitar, Salah ed-Din; Marie-Christine Aulas; Eric Hooglund; Jim Paul, “The Major Deviation of the Ba’th Is having Renounced Democracy”, in: MERIP Reports, No.110, Syria’s Troubles (Nov. – Dec., 1982), 21-23.
• Bou-Nacklie, N.E., “Les Troupes Specials: Religious and Ethnic Recruitment, 1916-46”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.25, No.4 (Nov., 1993), 645-660.
• Bromley, Simon, Rethinking Middle East Politics: State Formation and development; Cambridge UK; Polity Press; 1994.
• Devlin, John, “The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis”, in: The American Historical Review, Vol.96, No.5 (Dec., 1991), 1396-1407.
• Drysdale, Alasdair, “The Asad Regime and its Troubles”, in: MERIP Reports, No.110, Syria’s Troubles (Nov. – Dec., 1982), 3-11 + 36.
• Dusen, Michael H., “Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria”, in: Middle East Journal, Vol.26, No.2, (Spring, 1972), 123-37.
• Faksk, M.A., “The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force”, in: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.20, No.2 (Apr., 1984).
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, Syria: Revolution from Above; London & New York; Routledge; 2001.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba’thist Syria: the Political Economy of Rural Development; Boulder, San Francisco & London; Westview Press; 1989.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, “Class and state in Ba’thist Syria”, in: Antoun & Quataert (eds.), Syria Society, Culture, and Polity; Albany NY; State University of New York Press; 1991, 38-46.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, “State and Civil Society in Syria”, in: Middle East Journal, Vol.47, No.2, (Spring, 1983), 243-58.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, “Political Recruitment and Socialization in Syria: The Case of the Revolutionary Youth Federation”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.11, No.2 (Apr., 1980), 143-174.
• Kaylani, Nabil, “The Rise of the Syrian Ba’th, 1940-1958: Political Success and Party Failure”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.3, No.1 (Jan., 1972), 3-23.
• Ma’oz, Moshe, “The Emergence of Modern Syria”, in: Ma’oz & Yaniv (ed.), Syria under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks; London & Sydney; Croom Helm; 1986.
• Ma’oz, Moshe & Yaniv (ed.), Syria under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks; London & Sydney; Croom Helm; 1986.
• Ma’oz, Zeev, “The Evolution of Syrian Power, 1948-1984”, in: Ma’oz, Moshe & Yaniv (ed.), Syria under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks; London & Sydney; Croom Helm; 1986.
• Perlmutter, Amos, “From Obscurity to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba’th Party”, in: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.22, No.4 (Dec., 1969), 827-45.
• Perthes, Volker, “A Look at Syria’s Upper Class: The Bourgeoisie and the Ba’th”, in: Middle East Report, No.170, Power, Poverty and Petrodollars (May. – Jun., 1991), 31-37.
• Pipes, Daniel, “Radical Politics and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.20, No.3 (Aug., 1988), 303-324.
• Pipes, Daniel, “The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria”, in: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.25, No.4 (Oct., 1989), 429-450.
• Quinlivan, James T., “Coup Proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East”, in: International Security, Vol.24, No.2 (autumn, 1999), 131-61.
• Roberts, D., “The Background and Role of the Baath Party”, in: Allan (ed.), Politics and the Economy in Syria: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London on 20 May 1987 / Conference Convened and the proceedings Edited by J.A. Allan; London; School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; 1987.
• Sadowski, Yahya, “Cadres, Guns and Money: The Eighth regional Congress of the Syrian Ba’th”, in: MERIP Reports, No.134, Asad’s Syria (Jul. – Aug., 1985), 3-8.
• Seale, Patrick, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; London; Tauris; 1988.
• Seale, Patrick, “Asad: Between Institutions and Autocracy”, in: Antoun & Quataert (eds.), Syria Society, Culture, and Polity; Albany NY; State University of New York Press; 1991.
• Van Dam, Nicolas, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba’th Party; London & New York; I.B. Tauris; 1996.
• Zisser, Eyal, Asad’s Legacy: Syria in Transition; London; Hurst & Company; 2001.
• Zisser, Eyal “The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and External Fronts”, in: Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol.5, No.1 (Mar., 2001), 1-12. http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/meria/journal/2001/issue1/zisser.pdf
• Zisser, Eyal, “Appearance and Reality: Syria’s Decision-making Structure”, in: Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol.2, No.2 (May, 1998), 29-42. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue2/zisser.pdf
Tables below:
Regional Command No.: » 1 - 4 5 - 8 9 - 13 1 -13
Period: » 3.63 2.66 3.66 11.70 11.70 1995 3.63 1995
District: Religion: % No. % No. % No. % No.
Damascus Sunni 2.0 1 - 21.4 21 10.4 22
(21)* Christian - - - -
Shi’i - - - -
Total 2.0 1 21.4 21 10.4 22
Aleppo Sunni 8.0 4 - 6.1 6 4.7 10
(20) Christian - - - -
Total 8.0 4 - 6.1 6 4.7 10
Idlib Sunni 4.0 2 - 5.1 5 3.3 7
(7) Total 4.0 2 - 5.1 5 3.3 7
Hama Sunni - - 4.1 4 1.9 4
(8) Isma’ili 10.0 5 9.4 6 - 5.2 11
Alawi - - 3.1 3 1.4 3
Christian - - 1.0 1 0.5 1
Total 10.0 5 9.4 6 8.2 8 9.0 19
Homs Sunni 10.0 5 9.4 6 6.1 6 8.0 17
(10) Alawi 2.0 1 - 1.0 1 1.0 1
Christian - - - -
Total 12.0 6 9.4 6 7.1 7 9.0 19
Latakia Sunni 10.0 5 6.3 4 5.1 5 6.6 14
(13) Alawi 12.0 6 23.4 15 16.3 16 17.4 37
Isma’ili - - - -
Christian - - 5.1 5 2.4 5
Total 22.0 11 29.7 19 26.5 16 26.4 56
Dayr al-Zur Sunni 12.0 6 15.6 10 7.1 7 10.8 23
(12) Total 12.0 6 15.6 10 7.1 7 10.8 23
Dar’a Sunni 6.0 3 14.0 9 9.2 9 9.9 21
(4) Christian 2.0 1 6.3 4 1.0 1 2.8 6
Total 8.0 4 20.3 13 10.2 10 12.7 27
Qunaytarah Sunni 2.0 1 6.3 4 1.0 1 2.8 6
(2) Druze - - - -
Total 2.0 1 6.3 4 1.0 1 2.8 6
Suwayda’ Sunni - - 2.0 2 1.02
(3) Druze 20.0 10 9.4 6 4.1 4 9.4 20
Christian - - - -
Total 20.0 10 9.4 6 6.1 6 10.4 22
Unknown Sunni - - 1.0 1 0.5 1
Total - - 1.0 1 0.5 1
TOTAL 100.0 50 100.0 64 100.0 98 100.0 212
Table 1: Regional and sectarian representation in Syrian regional Commands of the Ba’th Party (1963-95). * Represents the % of the total population.
Table:
Syrian Security Agencies:
Major Agencies: Branches: Character:
General intelligence Internal branch
External security
Counterespionage civilian
Political security Political Party
Students and Student activities
Surveillance and pursuit
City Civilian
Bureau of national security
Of the Ba’th Party Civilian
Military intelligence Palestine
Commando Police
Military interrogation
Military intelligence in Lebanon Military
Air force intelligence Military
Military police Military
Military security Military
Special forces Parallel Military
Presidential guard
Presidential Security Parallel Military
Source: Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights bu the Assad Regime (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), pp.48-53. as cited in: Quinlivan, James T., “Coup Proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East”, in: International Security, Vol.24, No.2 (autumn, 1999), p.152.
Religious Group: Estimated No.
of adherents: Percent of
group Percent of
total
Muslim: 4,631,000 100* 84.7
Sunnis 3,950,000 85.3 72.2
‘Alawis 600,000 13.0 11.0
Isma’ilis 56,000 1.2 1.0
Other Shi’ites 25,000 0.5 0.5
Christian: 654,000 100.0 12.0
Greek Orthodox 246,000 37.6 4.5
Armenian Orthodox 140,000 21.4 2.5
Greek Catholic† 80,000 12.2 1.5
Syrian Orthodox 72,000 11.0 1.3
Syrian Catholics† 30,000 4.6 0.6
Maronites† 25,000 3.8 0.5
Armenian Catholics† 24,000 3.7 0.4
Nestorians 15,000 2.3 0.3
Protestants 12,000 1.8 0.2
Roman Catholics 10,000 1.5 0.2
Others: 184,000 - 3.3
Druzes 170,000 - 3.0
Yazidis 10,000 - 0.2
Jews 4,000 - 0.1
Table Showing the religious Communities in Syria, 1964:
* Actual sum of percentages is 99.9 because of rounding
†Affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. Not included in this table are the Chaldeans, a small group historically derived from the Nestorians but affiliated with the Roman Catholics.
Source: U.S Army Area Handbook for Syria (Department of the Army Pamphlet, No.550-47, July 1965), p.124. cited in: Perlmutter, Amos, “From Obscurity to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba’th Party”, in: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.22, No.4 (Dec., 1969), p.829.
2. Syria before Asad:
Syria as a state lacked historical and real identity; it could be seen as a French invention in the 1920s.
The legacy of French mandatory rule was a handicap for the post independence regime.
Other problems included the countries demographic composition, and other social and political characteristics, such as:
• Its geographical location.
• Ethnic and sectarian divisions ( see table)
• The deep socio-political divisions of the Urban and rural populations.
• The challenge of the west. Its cultural and political influence and legacy.
• Lack of a tradition of sovereign independence.
• No accepted political center.
All these factors hindered the Damascus regimes from instituting a systematic and effective policy.
This led to radical and ill conceived policies. The need to give priority to pan-Arab interests hurt the ability to build a Syrian national identity.
Primary loyalties stayed on the regional level:
• Sectarian
• Tribal
• Or family.
This all led to instability and thus the intervention in the politics of the country by other actors, especially the military which was the only strong institution in the country, and external actors looking to influence the polity.
The big change in Syria came with the successful Ba’th coup in 1963.
This coup overturned the traditional Syrian pyramid of authority.
As the Ba’th Party garnered most of its strength from the lower disenfranchised classes.
The rulers here were divided between military and civilians, yet it was the military that held the upper hand, as the civilian Ba’th party gained only 15% of the vote in the 1963 election, and were handed the reigns of power by the Military junta that preformed the coup.
Yet it was the military under Salah Jadid that forced the next change in 1966, their more radical ideology forcing out the traditional ideologues of the Ba’th,
It was their radical policies and foreign policy adventurism that led to their downfall.
This was played out in the military sphere, as the radicals under Jadid and the moderates of Asad clashed.
There seemed little difference in the two groups as they were both;
• Petit bourgeoisie
• Cross-sectarian
• And civil-military coalitions led by Alawi generals.
Yet each were supported by distinct segments of society.
The Radicals by the Leftist intellectuals and trade unions.
The moderates by the military and bourgeoisie.
Thus Asad’s way to power can be seen as a victory of the military Ba’th party faction over the civil one.
Wednesday, 18 February 2009
The Case of Abu Qatada:
Abu Qatada can be deported from this country, so the Law Lords today have decided, and they are the British equivalent to the Supreme Court. And about time too. This case has exposed manifest absurdities in the way the British handle their affairs.
A Palestinian-Jordanian by birth, Abu Qatada came to Britain in 1993 on a forged United Arab Emirate passport. He wasn't thrown out. On the contrary, the following year he and his family of five children applied for asylum and were granted it. Pretty soon the lot of them were living on benefits paid by the British taxpayer. The man is wanted for murder and terrorism in Jordan and several other countries, and they have asked for his extradition. In vain, of course. Meanwhile he specialised in inflammatory sermons, tapes of which were found in a Hamburg apartment used by some of the 9/11 terrorists. Reputedly raising funds in Europe for Osama bin Laden, he had £170,000 in cash in his house when the police at last came for him. And still he wasn't thrown out.
An appalling game began as he played upon the weaknesses of the law. The British Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights protected him. He would be arrested, given bail, and either freed by the court or else went on the run. When the government tried to change the law to detain people like him without trial, the judges saved him. Lord Hoffman, a Law Lord, earned his place in British history alongside Ethelred the Unready by pronouncing that "the real threat to the life of the nation" does not come from terrorists but from the kind of law the government was seeking to introduce in this case. Today's ruling by his colleagues may well upset Lord Hoffman, but there's still a possible last chance for Abu Qatada. Three legal systems actually apply in Britain: its own code, sharia, and the European Court; and Abu Qatada may try to appeal to the latter. In which case, he may yet again avoid being flown home to stand trial in Jordan. This is not just a story about tying ourselves up in legal red tape on behalf of someone able to take advantage in order to abuse and injure us. Absurdities, did I say? Death wish is more like it.
A Palestinian-Jordanian by birth, Abu Qatada came to Britain in 1993 on a forged United Arab Emirate passport. He wasn't thrown out. On the contrary, the following year he and his family of five children applied for asylum and were granted it. Pretty soon the lot of them were living on benefits paid by the British taxpayer. The man is wanted for murder and terrorism in Jordan and several other countries, and they have asked for his extradition. In vain, of course. Meanwhile he specialised in inflammatory sermons, tapes of which were found in a Hamburg apartment used by some of the 9/11 terrorists. Reputedly raising funds in Europe for Osama bin Laden, he had £170,000 in cash in his house when the police at last came for him. And still he wasn't thrown out.
An appalling game began as he played upon the weaknesses of the law. The British Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights protected him. He would be arrested, given bail, and either freed by the court or else went on the run. When the government tried to change the law to detain people like him without trial, the judges saved him. Lord Hoffman, a Law Lord, earned his place in British history alongside Ethelred the Unready by pronouncing that "the real threat to the life of the nation" does not come from terrorists but from the kind of law the government was seeking to introduce in this case. Today's ruling by his colleagues may well upset Lord Hoffman, but there's still a possible last chance for Abu Qatada. Three legal systems actually apply in Britain: its own code, sharia, and the European Court; and Abu Qatada may try to appeal to the latter. In which case, he may yet again avoid being flown home to stand trial in Jordan. This is not just a story about tying ourselves up in legal red tape on behalf of someone able to take advantage in order to abuse and injure us. Absurdities, did I say? Death wish is more like it.
Tuesday, 17 February 2009
Wiki-bollocks!
"Wiki-enthusiasts cite the “wisdom of crowds” as a reason for the accuracy of the encyclopedia. They claim that, just as a market finds prices for goods based on our differing opinions of what they are worth, so a crowd can establish what truth is. But whereas prices are reliant on opinions and values, facts are either true or false.
"Any attempt to turn mob opinion into the test for truth is pernicious. That a thought might be popularly believed does not make it true. The earth did not stand still because Galileo fell out of favour, and evolution has not been disproved by the faith of believers. The wisdom of crowds can only be conventional."
"Any attempt to turn mob opinion into the test for truth is pernicious. That a thought might be popularly believed does not make it true. The earth did not stand still because Galileo fell out of favour, and evolution has not been disproved by the faith of believers. The wisdom of crowds can only be conventional."
Monday, 16 February 2009
Occam!
We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.
Sunday, 15 February 2009
Mill on the use of force.
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right...The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
Friday, 13 February 2009
Is this Britain?
I would be ashamed but that is not part of the British Psyche:
Things are happening on the political scene in Britain which even a few short years ago would have been unthinkable. Police have entered the House of Commons to arrest a Conservative Member of Parliament. The Home Secretary, one Jacqui Smith, is revealed to have claimed a six-figure sum for expenses in her home when she is living all the while in her sister's house, and this enormity is apparently within the rules parliamentarians have drafted for themselves. And now Geert Wilders, a member of the Dutch Parliament, and therefore an elected democratic politician, has been refused entry at London airport and deported back to the Netherlands. He is, Jacqui Smith's Home Office pretends, nothing less than a threat to "public security."
Free speech has been a particularly English glory since Milton first argued that it was a principle of freedom itself. Dissidents, rebels, and freedom fighters from Karl Marx and Mazzini to Stalin and Salman Rushdie have had the opportunity to say what they wanted, whether or not anyone disapproved. Now thanks to one Jacqui Smith, so comfortably padded by the taxpayer, this principle of freedom is suspended.
Things are happening on the political scene in Britain which even a few short years ago would have been unthinkable. Police have entered the House of Commons to arrest a Conservative Member of Parliament. The Home Secretary, one Jacqui Smith, is revealed to have claimed a six-figure sum for expenses in her home when she is living all the while in her sister's house, and this enormity is apparently within the rules parliamentarians have drafted for themselves. And now Geert Wilders, a member of the Dutch Parliament, and therefore an elected democratic politician, has been refused entry at London airport and deported back to the Netherlands. He is, Jacqui Smith's Home Office pretends, nothing less than a threat to "public security."
Free speech has been a particularly English glory since Milton first argued that it was a principle of freedom itself. Dissidents, rebels, and freedom fighters from Karl Marx and Mazzini to Stalin and Salman Rushdie have had the opportunity to say what they wanted, whether or not anyone disapproved. Now thanks to one Jacqui Smith, so comfortably padded by the taxpayer, this principle of freedom is suspended.
Thursday, 12 February 2009
A Phyrrhic Victory.
Geert Wilders has succeeded in his aim of putting his film Fitna onto the main steam map. the Muslim council of the UK and other extremist groups, as well as the government has done more for him than a visit to lords could have done. the Muslim brotherhood shooting themselves in the foot again and revealing their real colours.
Wonderful!! let the mainstream debate begin.
Wonderful!! let the mainstream debate begin.
Monday, 9 February 2009
Sunday, 8 February 2009
A jewish Democracy, the case of Israel.
There are people for whom the values of democracy and Judaism are compatible and others for whom they are not.
But in Israel it can be seen as a dichotomy where both sets of values need the other’s existence to survive. Thus the Jewish values in the state are its primary ,even only cohesive glue, and thus a necessity for the existence of the Israeli state. Therefore the existence of democracy in Israel is dependent on the existence of Jewish values in the state.
There are thus two groups that can be seen to endanger the Israeli democratic polity, these are the religious and secular extremists. This leads to the need for a synthesis of views to be represented – of liberal democracy and Jewish ethnocentrism. This is generally what is present in Israel today. As the mixture of tolerance and openness with hatred of others and a willingness to restrict their rights and freedoms is found in other western liberal democracies. The point is, if it reflected in the laws and is officially institutionalized.
Therefore the biggest threat to democracy is from the political composition evolving post 1967. here can be seen a great deal of religious ideological zeal, which is a mixture of religion, territorial increase and enmity of the Arab minority, this has led to the founding of anti-democratic religious groups auch as Gush Emunim, kach, the Jewish underground and to people like Yigal Amir who assassinated Rabin.
Though it must be stated that these are generally peripheral groups, and not all religious groups are anti-democratic. Thus groups such as Meimad allow a more pluralistic religious ethos to imbue the public realm of debate.
But in Israel it can be seen as a dichotomy where both sets of values need the other’s existence to survive. Thus the Jewish values in the state are its primary ,even only cohesive glue, and thus a necessity for the existence of the Israeli state. Therefore the existence of democracy in Israel is dependent on the existence of Jewish values in the state.
There are thus two groups that can be seen to endanger the Israeli democratic polity, these are the religious and secular extremists. This leads to the need for a synthesis of views to be represented – of liberal democracy and Jewish ethnocentrism. This is generally what is present in Israel today. As the mixture of tolerance and openness with hatred of others and a willingness to restrict their rights and freedoms is found in other western liberal democracies. The point is, if it reflected in the laws and is officially institutionalized.
Therefore the biggest threat to democracy is from the political composition evolving post 1967. here can be seen a great deal of religious ideological zeal, which is a mixture of religion, territorial increase and enmity of the Arab minority, this has led to the founding of anti-democratic religious groups auch as Gush Emunim, kach, the Jewish underground and to people like Yigal Amir who assassinated Rabin.
Though it must be stated that these are generally peripheral groups, and not all religious groups are anti-democratic. Thus groups such as Meimad allow a more pluralistic religious ethos to imbue the public realm of debate.
Saturday, 7 February 2009
Friday, 6 February 2009
Gurdjieff, Part 4:
Every branch of science endeavors to elaborate and to establish an exact language for itself. But there is no universal language. For exact understanding exact language is necessary.… This new language is based on the principle of relativity; that is to say, it introduces relativity into all concepts and thus makes possible an accurate determination of the angle of thought—making it possible to establish at once what is being said, from what point of view and in what connection. In this new language all ideas are concentrated round one idea. This central idea is the idea of evolution … and the evolution of man is the evolution of his consciousness.
G. I. Gurdjieff, paraphrased from page 70 of IN SEARCH OF THE MIRACULOUS
Thursday, 5 February 2009
Gurdjieff, Part 3:
THERE ARE TWO LINES ALONG WHICH MAN’S DEVELOPMENT PROCEEDS, the line of knowledge and the line of being. In right evolution the line of knowledge and the line of being develop simultaneously, parallel to, and helping one another. But if the line of knowledge gets too far ahead of the line of being, or if the line of being gets ahead of the line of knowledge, man’s development goes wrong, and sooner or later it must come to a standstill.
IN SEARCH OF THE MIRACULOUSWednesday, 4 February 2009
Norm on the Gaza conflict.
One-Eyed in Gaza
This is a post about war crimes in Gaza and the widespread public outrage over them directed at Israel. Since it is a long post, I begin by providing a brief map of what is to follow.
In Part 1 I present a sample of the angry public reaction to Israel's alleged war crimes in Gaza, as gathered mostly from the British liberal press. In Part 2 I consider the source of this anger, pointing to what may be thought to be the most likely one - the great and visible suffering caused by Israel's recent military action. I argue that the hypothesis that this was the cause of outrage against Israel is not decisively rebutted by a standard argumentative move made by Israel's defenders: namely, that if Israel was guilty of war crimes, then so too was Hamas, for sending rockets against Sderot and other civilian centres. In Part 3 I go on to show that the claim that anger at Israel was due, or mainly due, to the suffering caused by its military action is open to question nonetheless. If we are examining this issue under the rubric of responsibility for war crimes, then public outrage about them is skewed when directed, as it widely has been, exclusively at Israel. In Part 4 I draw three conclusions from what has gone before. The first of these concerns the implication of the attitudes explored here for the future progress of international law. The second bears on the present condition of the Western liberal-left. And the third is about the alarming worldwide growth of anti-Semitism.
Gurdjieff, Part 2:
YES, PROFESSOR, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING ARE QUITE DIFFERENT. Only understanding can lead to being, whereas knowledge is but a passing presence in it. New knowledge displaces the old and the result is, as it were, a pouring from the empty into the void.
One must strive to understand; this alone can lead to our Lord God.
And in order to be able to understand the phenomena of nature, according and not according to law, proceeding around us, one must first of all consciously perceive and assimilate a mass of information concerning objective truth and the real events which took place on earth in the past; and secondly, one must bear in oneself all the results of all kinds of voluntary and involuntary experiencings.
MEETINGS WITH REMARKABLE MEN
Tuesday, 3 February 2009
Gurdjieff part 1:
THERE DO EXIST ENQUIRING MINDS, which long for the truth of the heart, seek it, strive to solve the problems set by life, try to penetrate to the essence of things and phenomena and to penetrate into themselves. If a man reasons and thinks soundly, no matter which path he follows in solving these problems, he must inevitably arrive back at himself, and begin with the solution of the problem of what he is himself and what his place is in the world around him. For without this knowledge, he will have no focal point in his search. Socrates’ words, “Know thyself” remain for all those who seek true knowledge and being.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)