Hafiz's Syria:

A presentation of mine on Hafiz's Syria and its true being.


The definition being used to give parameters to the presentation is that of Charles Tilly. This would entail a regime being military if the army is preponderant in any one sector of political society.

Syria leading up to the rule of Asad.

This section focuses on the social and political divisions within society and politics and the subsequent rise of the military as one of the few actors in Syria with any strength.

The Asad regime: the three orbits.

Syria under Asad is split into three orbits that are used as bases of legitimating authority and power. These three are the Sub-National, National and supra-National spheres in society. Or:

1. Alawi.
2. Syrian.
3. Arab.

The system of government in Syria under Asad.

Syria is split into two parallel structures of governance. These are:

1. The Formal. (The Ba’th Party, Government Bureaucracy, etc….)
2. The Informal. (The Personal Rule of Asad, the Defense organizations, etc….)

This hopes to show that although executive and legislative authority is channeled through the Formal institutions of state, the real power in the Regime lies in the informal structures.

The Military and Defense Organizations of Syria.

This will show that the military is Alawi dominated, with real power within the military residing in the Alawi “Barons”. Asad is shown to be above these groups and uses them to his own ends, by playing them off against each other.

Conclusion.

That though under the Parameters set out at the start, the Regime does have a military base, yet actual power is seen to reside in Alawi sectarian politics.



Can the Regime of Hafez al-Asad be Characterized as a Military Regime?

1. What is a military regime?


According to Elizabeth Piccard, “military intervention in politics had become commonplace in many Arab states, actually with a much higher frequency than in most third world countries during the 1950s and 1960s.”

This could be easily seen in the 1970s and 1980s where the military expenditure in terms of GNP in the Middle East was nearly twice that of the next most militarized region, and over three times the world average.

Yet the proportion of states under military control was just below the world average!

So what can we take as being a military state?

Here I shall be taking as my base the military regime as that defined by Charles Tilly, which could be one or more of the following:

• “Key political leadership by military officers,
• existence of martial law,
• extrajudicial authority exercised by security forces,
• lack of political control over the armed forces,
• Or occupation by foreign military forces.”

Thus while we look at the rule of Hafiz al-Asad’s regime in Syria, lets keep these parameters in mind.



2. Syria leading up to the rule of Asad:


Syria as a state lacked historical and real identity; it could be seen as a French invention in the 1920s.

Other problems included Syria’s demographic composition, and other social and political characteristics, such as:

• Its geographical location.
• Ethnic and sectarian divisions ( see table)
• The deep socio-political divisions of the Urban and rural populations.
• The challenge of the west. Its cultural and political influence and legacy.
• Lack of a tradition of sovereign independence.
• No accepted political center.

All these factors hindered the Damascus regimes from instituting a systematic and effective policy.

This led to radical and ill conceived policies. The perceived need to give priority to pan-Arab interests hurt the ability to build a true Syrian national identity.

Primary loyalties stayed on the regional level:

• Sectarian
• Tribal
• Or family.

This all led to instability and thus the intervention in the politics of Syria by other actors, especially the military which was the only strong institution in the country.


The Asad regime: the three orbits:

4. Alawi.
5. Syrian.
6. Arab.

Hafiz al-Asad managed to turn Syria into a stable state and a regional power, but how?

A popular way to characterize the regime of Asad is that it evolved from two factors:

1. The sectarian nature of the regime. It being based on Alawi affiliation and control of the army and security services.
2. And secondly its strength from its dictatorial and repressive nature.

Another view is that this obscures the political, economic and social processes that have unfolded in Syria since Asad took power.

That by 1970, the issue of stability was a reality, as most issues – (ideological, political, socio-economic, sectarian etc….) were exhausted, liquidized or neutralized.

And thus the regime could be seen as a truer representation of Syrian society than any before it.

The regime acted in three orbits:

1. Alawi. The internal core.
2. Syrian. The outer shell.
3. And Arab. Legitimating its authority.



The system of government in Syria under Asad:

The regime in Syria has two aspects:

1. the formal:

This is a system of legislative and executive institutions, as seen in the Ba’th Party, the Peoples Assembly, the government and the Presidency, and various other legal institutions of rule.

2. the second is the informal:

This includes the heads of security and senior military commanders who ensure the stability and protection of the regime.

The difference here of these two systems is one of Quantity versus quality.

With The formal system representing and reflecting the weight of coalition members.

While the informal system shows a qualitative relationship, and thus a truer reflection of the balance of power in Syria.


The formal apparatus:

In practice this contains two parallel integrative subsystems:

1. The Ba’th Party.
2. And the civilian government.

According to the Syrian constitution, the Ba’th party has priority. clause eight stating:

“The Ba’th Party leads society and the state and stands at the head of the National Progressive front, which acts to unite the forces of the masses and to mobilize them in the service of the goals of the Arab nation.”

The Ba’th party is organized in such a way (in branches, departments and cells) that it can reach throughout the country.

Every four years the Ba’th party holds elections for their branch representatives to go to the Congress. These in turn elect the central institutions of the party which in turn elect the 90 member central committee, and the 21 member regional command.

The regional command is the highest political body in the Syrian Ba’th Party.

The executive and legislative systems work alongside the party system, and is controlled almost totally by the high officials of the party.

The system of legislative bodies includes, The Public Assembly.

This can ratify laws, approve budgets and development programs.

The executive includes the Presidency and the government. The presidency
Is seen as the highest executive authority in the constitution.

Both the Prime Minister and the ministers of state are appointed by the president and are answerable to him as are the military.

Asad makes sure that the different groups in the country are all represented to their correct balance in the government. Thus the Sunnis will hold about 60% of seats in the Party institutions and government. (Though generally not the strategically sensitive ones).
(Table 2)
Here there is also a strong representation by the military wing of the Ba’th Party, with important posts in the Bath Party being held by the top Alawi generals.

The Informal Ruling Apparatus:

The informal system co-exists with the formal one.

It centers on the chiefs of the security apparatus and the senior army officers, whose contribution are critical to the stability and continuance of the regime.

The Ba’th party is used to bridge the gap between the formal and informal.

It provides an ideological cloak for all to fit into and allows for a meeting place between the civil and military establishments.

The Ba’th party has both military and security branches, each of which elects their own members to the Bath Party’s top institutions.

But in the past this has failed to ensure the rule of the civil over the military, as can be seen in Asad’s corrective revolution in 1970.

As president Asad is also commander in chief of the military.

Yet his standing and power don’t just come from the constitution, but from his mastery of the informal system and the command of the security services and military.


The Military and Defense Organizations in Syria:
(table 3)
Since 1970 the military has been generally subordinate to the president.

Yet it remains a very powerful actor within the Syrian state that can still shape outcomes, and is called upon repeatedly to ensure the regime’s stability – even existence.

The structure of the military is not monolithic, but can be divided into three groups.

Firstly there are the Alawi security ‘Barons’, who dominate in Asad’s inner circle.

Then there are the Ba’thist officers, who hold prominent positions in the Party.

Lastly there is the professional officer corps of the army.

The ‘Barons’ gave Asad a security base for his regime, and would assure him against any attempted coup.

This was Asad’s main instrument in his coup proofing of his regime

These security forces and the army in general can be seen as an Alawi institution, the Alawi control of the officer corps was always dominant under Asad.

Asad as a co-sectarian relied upon their support as the major power base of his rule.

Jaque Weulersse maintained, that a minority could dominate if it had political, military or economic superiority

The Ba’th Party military faction continued to send delegates to Congresses, the most senior went into the Regional Command council.

They all played politics and established client – patronage links into the Party and other government institutions as well as within their own personal fiefs.

If all else failed for the Asad regime it always had the security apparatus to fall back upon.

Their enormous repressive potential was seen especially in the multiple, pervasive and feared security and intelligence agencies.

They allowed little tolerance for dissent and were therefore effective in deadening any potential political plurality or life.

It was the Alawi ‘Barons’ who were seen as the Bulwark of the regime, most of whom were from Asad’s own Family or tribe.

A good analogy of their role is that of a “Godfather” and his associates.

These “Barons’ were viewed as above the law, they could ignore the regulations of the Ba’th Party and even held their own economic fiefs and patronage systems.

There was little opportunity for recompense against these groups, as for Asad to pursue them would mean undermining the main pillar his regime rested upon.




Conclusion:

The regime that came in, in 1970 could be seen as one of three things:

1. Ba’thists who happened to be Alawi officers.
2. or soldiers who happened to be Alawi Ba’thists
3. Or Alawis who happened to be Ba’thists and soldiers.

Of these the third is the most accurate, as both the military and the Ba’th party were critical, but in the end the transfer of power from the Sunnis to the Alawis is what counted the most.

It was this Alawi identity that ultimately defined and defended the rulers of this regime.

Above all this was Hafiz al-Asad. He had a Bonapartist autonomy, allowing him to stand above all the elite and play them off against each other. Leaving him room to maneuver within Syrian society.

Yet the foundation of his power rested not on the vote and will of the people, but was in the military, security services and formal institutions that he formed to rule the country!

Therefore going back to our parameter that we put down at the start, it has to be said, that although Asad tried to legitimize his rule via socio-political actions and pluralism, his state still can be seen as a military one.

Where the power held by the military and security services was disproportionate to that of civil politicians.

Yet at heart it was an Alawi regime.


Bibliography:

• Allan J.A.(ed.), Politics and the Economy in Syria: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London on 20 May 1987 / Conference Convened and the proceedings Edited by J.A. Allan; London; School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; 1987.
• Antoun & Quataert (eds.), Syria Society, Culture, and Polity; Albany NY; State University of New York Press; 1991.
• Batatu, Hanna, “Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria’s Ruling, military Group and the Causes for its Dominance”, in: Middle East Journal, Vol.35, No.3 Summer, 1981), 331-44.
• Ben-Tzur, Avraham, “The Neo-Ba’th Party of Syria”, in: Journal of contemporary History, Vol.3, No.3 The Middle East (Jul., 1968), 161-81.
• Bitar, Salah ed-Din; Marie-Christine Aulas; Eric Hooglund; Jim Paul, “The Major Deviation of the Ba’th Is having Renounced Democracy”, in: MERIP Reports, No.110, Syria’s Troubles (Nov. – Dec., 1982), 21-23.
• Bou-Nacklie, N.E., “Les Troupes Specials: Religious and Ethnic Recruitment, 1916-46”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.25, No.4 (Nov., 1993), 645-660.
• Bromley, Simon, Rethinking Middle East Politics: State Formation and development; Cambridge UK; Polity Press; 1994.
• Devlin, John, “The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis”, in: The American Historical Review, Vol.96, No.5 (Dec., 1991), 1396-1407.
• Drysdale, Alasdair, “The Asad Regime and its Troubles”, in: MERIP Reports, No.110, Syria’s Troubles (Nov. – Dec., 1982), 3-11 + 36.
• Dusen, Michael H., “Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria”, in: Middle East Journal, Vol.26, No.2, (Spring, 1972), 123-37.
• Faksk, M.A., “The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force”, in: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.20, No.2 (Apr., 1984).
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, Syria: Revolution from Above; London & New York; Routledge; 2001.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba’thist Syria: the Political Economy of Rural Development; Boulder, San Francisco & London; Westview Press; 1989.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, “Class and state in Ba’thist Syria”, in: Antoun & Quataert (eds.), Syria Society, Culture, and Polity; Albany NY; State University of New York Press; 1991, 38-46.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, “State and Civil Society in Syria”, in: Middle East Journal, Vol.47, No.2, (Spring, 1983), 243-58.
• Hinnebusch, Raymond, “Political Recruitment and Socialization in Syria: The Case of the Revolutionary Youth Federation”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.11, No.2 (Apr., 1980), 143-174.
• Kaylani, Nabil, “The Rise of the Syrian Ba’th, 1940-1958: Political Success and Party Failure”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.3, No.1 (Jan., 1972), 3-23.
• Ma’oz, Moshe, “The Emergence of Modern Syria”, in: Ma’oz & Yaniv (ed.), Syria under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks; London & Sydney; Croom Helm; 1986.
• Ma’oz, Moshe & Yaniv (ed.), Syria under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks; London & Sydney; Croom Helm; 1986.
• Ma’oz, Zeev, “The Evolution of Syrian Power, 1948-1984”, in: Ma’oz, Moshe & Yaniv (ed.), Syria under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks; London & Sydney; Croom Helm; 1986.
• Perlmutter, Amos, “From Obscurity to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba’th Party”, in: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.22, No.4 (Dec., 1969), 827-45.
• Perthes, Volker, “A Look at Syria’s Upper Class: The Bourgeoisie and the Ba’th”, in: Middle East Report, No.170, Power, Poverty and Petrodollars (May. – Jun., 1991), 31-37.
• Pipes, Daniel, “Radical Politics and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party”, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.20, No.3 (Aug., 1988), 303-324.
• Pipes, Daniel, “The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria”, in: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.25, No.4 (Oct., 1989), 429-450.
• Quinlivan, James T., “Coup Proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East”, in: International Security, Vol.24, No.2 (autumn, 1999), 131-61.
• Roberts, D., “The Background and Role of the Baath Party”, in: Allan (ed.), Politics and the Economy in Syria: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London on 20 May 1987 / Conference Convened and the proceedings Edited by J.A. Allan; London; School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; 1987.
• Sadowski, Yahya, “Cadres, Guns and Money: The Eighth regional Congress of the Syrian Ba’th”, in: MERIP Reports, No.134, Asad’s Syria (Jul. – Aug., 1985), 3-8.
• Seale, Patrick, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; London; Tauris; 1988.
• Seale, Patrick, “Asad: Between Institutions and Autocracy”, in: Antoun & Quataert (eds.), Syria Society, Culture, and Polity; Albany NY; State University of New York Press; 1991.
• Van Dam, Nicolas, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba’th Party; London & New York; I.B. Tauris; 1996.
• Zisser, Eyal, Asad’s Legacy: Syria in Transition; London; Hurst & Company; 2001.
• Zisser, Eyal “The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and External Fronts”, in: Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol.5, No.1 (Mar., 2001), 1-12. http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/meria/journal/2001/issue1/zisser.pdf
• Zisser, Eyal, “Appearance and Reality: Syria’s Decision-making Structure”, in: Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol.2, No.2 (May, 1998), 29-42. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue2/zisser.pdf


Tables below:











Regional Command No.: » 1 - 4 5 - 8 9 - 13 1 -13
Period: » 3.63 2.66 3.66 11.70 11.70 1995 3.63 1995
District: Religion: % No. % No. % No. % No.
Damascus Sunni 2.0 1 - 21.4 21 10.4 22
(21)* Christian - - - -
Shi’i - - - -
Total 2.0 1 21.4 21 10.4 22
Aleppo Sunni 8.0 4 - 6.1 6 4.7 10
(20) Christian - - - -
Total 8.0 4 - 6.1 6 4.7 10
Idlib Sunni 4.0 2 - 5.1 5 3.3 7
(7) Total 4.0 2 - 5.1 5 3.3 7
Hama Sunni - - 4.1 4 1.9 4
(8) Isma’ili 10.0 5 9.4 6 - 5.2 11
Alawi - - 3.1 3 1.4 3
Christian - - 1.0 1 0.5 1
Total 10.0 5 9.4 6 8.2 8 9.0 19
Homs Sunni 10.0 5 9.4 6 6.1 6 8.0 17
(10) Alawi 2.0 1 - 1.0 1 1.0 1
Christian - - - -
Total 12.0 6 9.4 6 7.1 7 9.0 19
Latakia Sunni 10.0 5 6.3 4 5.1 5 6.6 14
(13) Alawi 12.0 6 23.4 15 16.3 16 17.4 37
Isma’ili - - - -
Christian - - 5.1 5 2.4 5
Total 22.0 11 29.7 19 26.5 16 26.4 56
Dayr al-Zur Sunni 12.0 6 15.6 10 7.1 7 10.8 23
(12) Total 12.0 6 15.6 10 7.1 7 10.8 23
Dar’a Sunni 6.0 3 14.0 9 9.2 9 9.9 21
(4) Christian 2.0 1 6.3 4 1.0 1 2.8 6
Total 8.0 4 20.3 13 10.2 10 12.7 27
Qunaytarah Sunni 2.0 1 6.3 4 1.0 1 2.8 6
(2) Druze - - - -
Total 2.0 1 6.3 4 1.0 1 2.8 6
Suwayda’ Sunni - - 2.0 2 1.02
(3) Druze 20.0 10 9.4 6 4.1 4 9.4 20
Christian - - - -
Total 20.0 10 9.4 6 6.1 6 10.4 22
Unknown Sunni - - 1.0 1 0.5 1
Total - - 1.0 1 0.5 1
TOTAL 100.0 50 100.0 64 100.0 98 100.0 212
Table 1: Regional and sectarian representation in Syrian regional Commands of the Ba’th Party (1963-95). * Represents the % of the total population.
Table:
Syrian Security Agencies:

Major Agencies: Branches: Character:
General intelligence Internal branch
External security
Counterespionage civilian
Political security Political Party
Students and Student activities
Surveillance and pursuit
City Civilian
Bureau of national security
Of the Ba’th Party Civilian
Military intelligence Palestine
Commando Police
Military interrogation
Military intelligence in Lebanon Military
Air force intelligence Military
Military police Military
Military security Military
Special forces Parallel Military
Presidential guard
Presidential Security Parallel Military


Source: Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights bu the Assad Regime (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), pp.48-53. as cited in: Quinlivan, James T., “Coup Proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East”, in: International Security, Vol.24, No.2 (autumn, 1999), p.152.

Religious Group: Estimated No.
of adherents: Percent of
group Percent of
total
Muslim: 4,631,000 100* 84.7
Sunnis 3,950,000 85.3 72.2
‘Alawis 600,000 13.0 11.0
Isma’ilis 56,000 1.2 1.0
Other Shi’ites 25,000 0.5 0.5

Christian: 654,000 100.0 12.0
Greek Orthodox 246,000 37.6 4.5
Armenian Orthodox 140,000 21.4 2.5
Greek Catholic† 80,000 12.2 1.5
Syrian Orthodox 72,000 11.0 1.3
Syrian Catholics† 30,000 4.6 0.6
Maronites† 25,000 3.8 0.5
Armenian Catholics† 24,000 3.7 0.4
Nestorians 15,000 2.3 0.3
Protestants 12,000 1.8 0.2
Roman Catholics 10,000 1.5 0.2

Others: 184,000 - 3.3
Druzes 170,000 - 3.0
Yazidis 10,000 - 0.2
Jews 4,000 - 0.1

Table Showing the religious Communities in Syria, 1964:
* Actual sum of percentages is 99.9 because of rounding
†Affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. Not included in this table are the Chaldeans, a small group historically derived from the Nestorians but affiliated with the Roman Catholics.
Source: U.S Army Area Handbook for Syria (Department of the Army Pamphlet, No.550-47, July 1965), p.124. cited in: Perlmutter, Amos, “From Obscurity to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba’th Party”, in: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.22, No.4 (Dec., 1969), p.829.


2. Syria before Asad:


Syria as a state lacked historical and real identity; it could be seen as a French invention in the 1920s.

The legacy of French mandatory rule was a handicap for the post independence regime.

Other problems included the countries demographic composition, and other social and political characteristics, such as:

• Its geographical location.
• Ethnic and sectarian divisions ( see table)
• The deep socio-political divisions of the Urban and rural populations.
• The challenge of the west. Its cultural and political influence and legacy.
• Lack of a tradition of sovereign independence.
• No accepted political center.

All these factors hindered the Damascus regimes from instituting a systematic and effective policy.

This led to radical and ill conceived policies. The need to give priority to pan-Arab interests hurt the ability to build a Syrian national identity.

Primary loyalties stayed on the regional level:

• Sectarian
• Tribal
• Or family.

This all led to instability and thus the intervention in the politics of the country by other actors, especially the military which was the only strong institution in the country, and external actors looking to influence the polity.

The big change in Syria came with the successful Ba’th coup in 1963.

This coup overturned the traditional Syrian pyramid of authority.

As the Ba’th Party garnered most of its strength from the lower disenfranchised classes.

The rulers here were divided between military and civilians, yet it was the military that held the upper hand, as the civilian Ba’th party gained only 15% of the vote in the 1963 election, and were handed the reigns of power by the Military junta that preformed the coup.

Yet it was the military under Salah Jadid that forced the next change in 1966, their more radical ideology forcing out the traditional ideologues of the Ba’th,

It was their radical policies and foreign policy adventurism that led to their downfall.

This was played out in the military sphere, as the radicals under Jadid and the moderates of Asad clashed.

There seemed little difference in the two groups as they were both;

• Petit bourgeoisie
• Cross-sectarian
• And civil-military coalitions led by Alawi generals.

Yet each were supported by distinct segments of society.

The Radicals by the Leftist intellectuals and trade unions.

The moderates by the military and bourgeoisie.

Thus Asad’s way to power can be seen as a victory of the military Ba’th party faction over the civil one.